

The Haiti Earthquake Operation

Real Time Evaluation for the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies

June 2010

Final Report

*“I see a cloud of dust over
Port-au-Prince,
and I hear a million voices
screaming.”*

IFRC officer in Port-au-Prince
on the phone with Regional
Representative, within minutes
of the earthquake

12 January 2010



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Acronyms

ERU	Emergency Response Unit
FACT	Field Assessment and Coordination Team
IFRC	International Federation of Red Cross & Red Crescent Societies
HNRCS	Haiti National Red Cross Society
ICRC	International Committee of Red Cross
MCF	Movement Coordination Framework
MINUSTAH	UN Stabilization Mission to Haiti
NGO	Non Governmental Organization
NS/s	National Society (or Societies)
PADRU	Pan-American Disaster Response Unit
PNS/s	Partner National Society/ies
RAT	Recovery Assessment Team
RC Movement	the International Committee of the Red Cross, the International Federation of Red Cross & Red Crescent Societies and National Societies
RDRT	Regional Disaster Response Team(s)
RIT	Regional Intervention Team(s)
RTE	Real Time Evaluation
IFRC Secretariat	the Geneva-based Secretariat of the International Federation of Red Cross & Red Crescent Societies and its regional Zones and Offices
UN (OCHA)	United Nations (Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs)

Map of the Affected Areas



Source: United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA)¹

Acknowledgements

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At the Base camp in Port-au-Prince in particular, with a high volume of people coming & going each day, this help and hospitality was greatly appreciated, as well as the willingness of all HNRCS staff and volunteers, delegates, ERU team members and other staff to assist and answer questions during our stay.

We wish you, and the people of Haiti, the best for the significant challenges ahead.

¹ Disclaimer: The designations employed and the presentation of material on this map do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the IFRC concerning the delimitation of frontiers or boundaries.

Map data source: United Nations Cartographic Section; United States Geological Survey.

Executive Summary

On 12 January 2010 an earthquake measuring 7.0 on the Richter scale struck the Caribbean nation of Haiti, with its epicentre south-west of the capital city, Port-au-Prince. Haiti was already the poorest country in the Western hemisphere and the earthquake killed somewhere around 230,000 people; it directly affected some three million others and displaced around two million into spontaneous camps or to host families; it devastated the government systems and destroyed or damaged much of the infrastructure.

All components of the Red Cross Red Crescent Movement – along with many hundreds of other agencies of all sizes – responded quickly and comprehensively to get relief materials, food, water and personnel to Haiti. This was the largest response operation for a single country ever mounted by the Movement. An experienced FACT team was on the ground within 48 hours; 21 Emergency Response Units (ERUs) were mobilised along with over 700 staff; another 700+ delegates and staff have been through the Haiti operation since January. The Emergency Appeal for Haiti launched by the IFRC on 09 February for CHF 218.4 million is currently 93% covered². Up to CHF 1 billion may have been raised by the Movement in total.

The IFRC commissioned this Real Time Evaluation (RTE) because of its commitment to carry out a high quality operation in terms of speed, efficiency and effectiveness, and a commitment of accountability to beneficiaries' needs as well as to the donors to this operation. Due to the scale of the disaster, the number of external actors both within and outside the RC, and the significant levels of funding, there will be a need for high levels of accountability and scrutiny and there will also continue to be international attention on the response and recovery operation in Haiti.

The RTE was undertaken in May 2010, slightly later than originally planned, and at the stage when many ERU teams were withdrawing and handing over their activities and responsibilities to the IFRC. Relief activities were still underway in some sectors and because of the scale of damage and other complexities, many hundreds of thousands of people are still displaced. The Evaluation looked at the efficiency and effectiveness of the management and coordination systems used by the IFRC to deliver the services it provides, and to identify possible opportunities, challenges and risks, but it did not look specifically at the programme deliveries themselves. It is anticipated that a follow-up Evaluation will be done towards the end of 2010 to look at how any follow-up on the findings, recommendations and lessons of this first review were implemented.

This report explores what has worked well during the operation so far, and identifies a number of areas where work still has to be done. Many issues are interlinked in this situation, and some are more institutional rather than specific to Haiti. During this Evaluation, feedback presentations have been given in all places visited and already a number of highlighted issues are moving forward. [Chapter Six](#) of the report presents a summary of findings and list of recommendations as presented throughout the text.

Key Findings and Recommendations

a) Early Response

Overall, the first couple of months of the operation were seen by all interviewees as positive in a very difficult and complex operating environment. The RC Movement has been seen to have and to use its global tools quickly and effectively, which have profiled the universality and strength of the Movement admirably. The FACT team was very competent and subsequent work has built on what they put in place; the deployment of all the ERUs in the system was efficient and effective. In this operation a number of National Societies from the region have been actively engaged in the field for several months, and they have gradually been brought 'into the fold'. The scale and complexity of this operation presents a unique opportunity for the IFRC to review its global tools for deployment in large operations, particularly the deployment-readiness and Standard Operating Procedures for all ERUs.

b) Understanding the Context

There is no question that the situation in which this work is taking place is both challenging and rapidly changing – there is no strong government leadership, the population is moving regularly, the national economy is too weak to rebuild from within – but this is the first time where the aid agencies have been faced with a massive disaster in an urban setting where population numbers and density are so high. The urgent need for shelter, and the agencies' capacity to deliver it, is counteracted by the serious problems being faced over land ownership. The Evaluation team finds that the context in which the Movement is now operating in Haiti is not fully understood and external 'intelligence gathering' mechanisms and interaction with non-RC partners need to be improved.

² <http://www.ifrc.org/docs/appeals/Active/MDRHT008.pdf> as at 01 July 2010

c) Management Culture

There continues to be a lack of clarity on roles and responsibilities, and therefore on levels of decision making authority, at all IFRC levels. The Zone Office in Panama, which as a result of the IFRC's recent restructuring has taken the lead on responding to and overseeing this operation in Haiti, has done a positive job to date but still needs to increase its number of dedicated support staff for the Haiti operation. This capacity could be in the form of a 'Task Force' or 'Support Cell', to provide adequate support to this major operation. There needs to be more and closer engagement between people and less resort to email and indirect communications to develop a true problem-solving culture. It should be noted here that following several feedback sessions to the management teams in Haiti and Panama, a number of identified issues – including the question of programme support - are already being addressed.

Learning from the tsunami response, the IFRC's coordination mechanisms in large disasters have become clearer, as was evidenced in Haiti by the involvement a large number of PNSs. There is need for greater emphasis on "big picture" analysis and planning, joint problem solving, as well as identifying opportunities to address the capacities and interests of the RC partners.

d) The Haitian Red Cross, the host National Society

The Haitian Red Cross has been actively involved from the very onset of this disaster situation, despite having been directly affected in so many ways. The HNRCS has very much taken the lead in activities, via its network and its volunteers, and has gained a lot of public respect for the work they have done. At a local level there has been limited developmental engagement between the IFRC and the HNRCS on a permanent basis, and the Haiti delegation is not resourced at this time to make any significant OD inputs. The HNRCS is not adequately structured to lead and support the large scale of the current and future operation, and as such is perceived as being a bottleneck in certain areas. The IFRC needs to develop its delegation capacity and working arrangements to provide appropriate OD and management support to HNRCS, as this will be a critical factor on how the Movement responds to seasonal disasters in Haiti while the post-earthquake operation is ongoing. At the same time, the HNRCS needs to view this operation as a true opportunity to capitalise on the resources available to it, and to transform itself accordingly.

e) Issues regarding Human Resources

A very large number of delegates has been through this operation and the HR systems of the Movement have worked hard to find and recruit well over 1,000 delegates to date³. The effective use of RDRT and RIT members (from Africa and the Americas respectively) is notable. The Evaluation team finds the current IFRC recruitment processes and procedures too bureaucratic, slow and inflexible, directly impacting on programme implementation, and this operation could be used to identify where further harmonization and streamlining of the HR procedures could take place. The HR planning also seems to have been done ahead of a detailed strategic plan on programming delivery for the period ahead, rather than being designed to respond to identified programme needs.

f) Programming, and the Way Forward

There were several issues identified here, not least being that there appears to be no clear strategy for delivery of the various programme sector inputs in a holistic manner, and in particular no systematic consideration and effective inclusion of livelihoods programming. Activities at the present time are still very relief focussed – which is undoubtedly necessary – but there needs to be some clarity developed on the way forward in recovery areas. The risks are significant – a commitment for shelter provision which is proving hard to get moving; large amounts of money in the RC system which need to be spent appropriately and, so far, no clear strategy for how this will all work.

i) Health:

The RCRC has been a key provider of high-quality medical assistance to the population following the earthquake which decimated the available health sector capacity, and as the operation moves into a reconstruction and recovery phase, there is the need to have a clear exit strategy of the health services being provided through the ERU teams. The IFRC needs to urgently agree a clear policy vis-a-vis continuation of its hospital-based healthcare work in Port-au-Prince, particularly with regard to the government's policy of reverting to a paying system.

ii) Shelter

The IFRC has more than met its target for providing emergency shelter kits. The post-emergency shelter commitments made in Montreal may be undeliverable given the current operating context and there needs to be more work done on understanding the range of other options and possibilities for delivery of housing solutions. In terms of IFRC's role as cluster lead on shelter, it has led the Emergency Shelter Cluster well and its role is acknowledged by all external interlocutors. A Movement-wide shelter strategy, incorporating a multi-pronged approach appropriate for the mainly urban context of the Haiti earthquake, needs to be developed to determine the right approach for the RC Movement.

³ Approximately 700 delegates via the ERU inputs, and several hundred more in other positions

iii) Livelihoods

There has been an insufficient focus on livelihoods interventions by the RC to date, and as the Movement moves towards transitional shelter implementation, the approach needs to integrate livelihoods with shelter, watsan and other programme areas. This will require significant bolstering of the IFRC's capacity to undertake complex community-based programming in these fields, and should include cash grants and a variety of other livelihoods interventions. The IFRC therefore needs to develop a strategy to integrate its shelter work with the provision of livelihoods which is seen as critical to long term sustainability of any shelter programme.

iv) Water and Sanitation

The RC Movement has made – and continues to deliver - a significant and valuable contribution towards the overall needs of the affected population in water and sanitation, through the inputs of the various ERU teams and the IFRC programme teams. However, there is a danger that the withdrawal of the ERUs is leaving gaps which the IFRC may not yet have the capacity to fill. In consultation with local water and sanitation authorities and other watsan providers, the IFRC needs to develop a clear exit strategy for the longer term, while at the same time continuing to provide the required services in the temporary camps.

v) Protection

The IFRC has been slow to take this commitment forward and needs to have an improved accountability mechanism in place, which includes consistent reinforcement of the Staff Code of Conduct. The IFRC needs to be more proactive in the field of protection and gender-related issues, both in programme planning and in delegate awareness.

vi) Contingency Planning

The bulk of the earthquake-affected population now living in temporary camps is likely to remain in similar situations for at the very least the next six to twelve months. Contingency plans need to be developed and operational capacity put in place to deal with coming hurricane and rainy seasons as well as potential political instability which may lead to more displacements. The IFRC should implement the recommendations regarding contingency planning made in the report produced by the Recovery Assessment Team in March, in collaboration with the HNRCS.

Chapter 1: Introduction, Framework and Methodology

1a: Introduction

This Real Time Evaluation was commissioned by the Secretariat of the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) in Geneva, Switzerland. Its purpose is to assess the effectiveness and efficiency of the systems of the Haiti earthquake response operation during the period 12 January and mid-May 2010 and to provide 'live' feedback to delegates and management on the operation. It covers both the relief and early recovery phases, and concentrates on the coordination and management aspects of the operation and on the IFRC's systems and structures in place to provide an overall look at the operation's ability to deliver the identified results, but it did not evaluate the work of any specific sector of the operation nor on their actual deliveries or outputs.

The report which follows explores the current situation surrounding the operation in Haiti and offers a series of conclusions and recommendations to the IFRC Team in Haiti, the Americas Zone in Panama, the IFRC Secretariat in Geneva and to the members of the Partner National Societies (PNSs) in the operation, on ways to improve these systems to help the overall Red Cross Red Crescent (RCRC) interventions move forward. Most are recommendations the Team believes are achievable in the short term which should make a significant difference in addressing the current challenges in the operation.

The Evaluation Team was composed of four independent consultants – biographies are given in [Annex Five](#). The Evaluation fieldwork was carried out during May 2010: a full itinerary is given in [Annex Four](#).

This Evaluation had the following objectives, as detailed in the Inception Report:

- to examine the efficiency and effectiveness of the systems currently in use by the IFRC at all levels in this operation and highlight any gaps or bottlenecks;
- to feed back real time information to managers at field and headquarters levels during the ongoing relief operation to help them improve management and coordination functions;
- to make recommendations based on evidence gathered to assist the decision-making processes on the ground, in the Americas Zone and in Geneva;
- to analyse the current operation and situation in Haiti in order to identify possible opportunities, challenges and risks and to assist the IFRC Secretariat's management at Geneva, Zone and country levels to plan for future programming, especially the early and longer-term recovery and rehabilitation of the affected population and the involvement and capacity building of the Haiti National Red Cross Society;
- to support the delegates on the ground as well as the IFRC Secretariat's management at each level through the identification of areas to be improved or streamlined for more efficiency;
- to identify lessons to be learned for use in future operations, and/or consider where past lessons learned have – or have not – been replicated in the Haiti operation.

The period under review was from 12 January (date of earthquake) to mid-May 2010 (arrival of RTE team to Haiti). Geographically, the RTE focused on the operation in Port-au-Prince, but also covered the other operational centres such as Jacmel, Léogane and Carrefour in Haiti, and Santo Domingo in the Dominican Republic.

1b: The Evaluation Framework

Before commencing the fieldwork for the RTE, the Evaluation Team produced an inception report outlining the broad questions and methodology to be followed during the evaluation. The IFRC's preliminary appeal which was launched on 13 January 2010, and was the basis for the early response, was used as one of the reference points for the evaluation. Additionally, the "[Montreal Declaration](#)⁴", which the IFRC membership agreed subsequently to be the broad guiding framework for the RCRC response, was also used as a key reference point for this RTE. The commitments from this forum were later translated into a plan of action for twelve months. Together they form the reference points against which the specific questions outlined in the [ToRs for the RTE](#) were analysed and conclusions drawn on.

The Montreal Commitments were as follows:

- **Capacity Building:** *The Movement committed to assist in executing a Plan of Action to be developed by the Haitian Red Cross. Capacity building efforts will have the short-term objective of increasing the National Society's ability to respond to the impending hurricane season, as well as the long-term objective of rebuilding and expanding its capacity.*
- **Health:** *The Movement will continue to provide curative health services for a catchment area of at least 500,000 residents of Port-au-Prince and the surrounding area for at least six months. This complements*

⁴ The Red Cross Red Crescent commitment for Haiti – Montreal, Canada – 9 & 10 February 2010 (see Annex Seven)

ongoing community-based health programmes, such as first aid, psychosocial assistance and disease prevention, and may later include blood collection.

- **Shelter:** The Movement will seek to provide, as quickly as possible, approximately 30,000 families with appropriate transitional shelters.
- **Water and Sanitation:** Integrated with community shelter, health and other facilities, the Movement will continue to provide water to over 30,000 families each day during the relief phase.
- **Protection:** The Movement will closely work with Haitian governmental authorities and the Protection Cluster members to actively assist unaccompanied children to restore links with their families while assuring the appropriate use of technology, in the prevention of violence against children and women, and in the identification and orderly disposal of mortal remains.

1c: Methodology

- A comprehensive document review using both internal and external documents, appeals, correspondence, reports and data. Much of the documentary references used throughout this evaluation are publicly issued documents or reports, or internal IFRC documents or emails, or those accessible on the internet. These sources have been referenced in footnotes;
- Semi-structured and structured interviews, both face-to-face and by telephone with a range of stakeholders including IFRC delegates and staff, PNS staff, beneficiaries, UN agencies, NGOs and other partners. A full list of people interviewed appears as [Annex Three](#). Over 120 individuals were formally interviewed, and many more were talked to informally (individually or in groups) during the stay at the base camp in Port-au-Prince;
- In Haiti, formal interviews were scheduled with the programme managers and coordinators of all programme sectors in the IFRC team, plus the leaders of the ERU teams on the ground;
- In addition, involved staff members in the IFRC Secretariat in Geneva, in Santo Domingo and in the Americas Zone office in Panama were interviewed, as well as host National Society representatives in Haiti and the Dominican Republic;
- In Haiti several PNS country representatives, including several regional NSs, were interviewed as well as other NS HQ staff who were visiting. Several additional telephone interviews were also conducted to NS HQs;
- A short questionnaire was emailed to 32 NS HQs requesting contributions and comments from that level; of these, nine NSs have replied;
- Over 100 feedback replies to an online delegate exit survey⁵ were reviewed;
- Direct feedback was given throughout the fieldwork and at four formal sessions (Haiti x 1, Panama x 2 and Geneva x 1) and a number of the identified issues has already been worked on by those responsible. Where these are known they are annotated in the text.

Limitations:

- With the exceptions of the visits to Panama and the Dominican Republic, no meeting schedules had been prepared for the Evaluation Team, so interviews had to be arranged on arrival in Haiti by the Team itself. While this meant a delayed start it also enabled some flexibility in approach and allowed attendance at coordination meetings and similar fora at short notice, but inevitably meant that certain key people were not available due to pre-existing commitments;
- The lack of set up interviews and lack of administrative assistance decreased the total number of people it was possible to interview because much time was spent trying to track people down and explain our work. The lack of administrative assistance was also noted as a limitation in the earlier RAT mission, although it is acknowledged by the RTE Team that the delegation was already extremely overstretched with numerous other pressures and tasks;
- Staff turnover in this operation has been extremely high and many key people from the earlier months had already moved on by the time the RTE Team was on the ground;
- The IFRC's Country Representative in Haiti was only available for about three hours before he left on well-deserved R&R; in addition only one hour was scheduled for meetings with the Director of Zone during the initial visit to Panama, and during the second visit he was only available via a video link as he was overseas;
- During the Team's visit the President of the HNRCS was unfortunately away from the country so a direct interview was not possible, but she has since been contacted and interviewed by telephone. Visits to Government officials were not undertaken without this facilitation. During the visit to the Dominican Republic, the Team met with the Vice-president, the Head of Relief and the Head of the Disaster Risk Reduction programme of the National Society but the NS's leadership was overseas and unavailable.

⁵ Feedback via an online anonymous exit survey completed by over 170 delegates leaving the Haiti Earthquake Operation

1d: Format of the Report

This Report is intended to be a useful working document. The following findings, with associated conclusions and recommendations, cover a number of key issues which have become evident during the Evaluation process.

The following chapters 3 – 5 are based around the three main objective areas as set out in the [Terms of Reference](#). In Chapter 5 the risks and challenges identified around the programming areas use the framework of the "[Montreal Declaration](#)" and the agreed 'priority areas' for the recovery work in Haiti.

It should be noted, however, that many of these issues are not stand-alone but are inter-related.

Chapter 2: The Context

There is broad agreement that the context in which this operation is having to develop is extremely challenging in many ways. The earthquake of 12 January 2010 devastated the capital city and surrounding areas of the poorest country in the Western hemisphere; it killed somewhere around 230,000 people; it directly affected some three million others and displaced around two million; it devastated the government systems and destroyed or damaged public and private infrastructure. The urban nature of the disaster, combined with the fact that it affected such a large and poor population and took place in a densely populated city like Port-au-Prince, has made this operation a highly complex one in terms of options for relief and recovery. The tasks of rebuilding and reorganising will take many years.

The UNDP's Human Development Report (HDR) for 2009 indicated that Haiti had a Human Development Index (HDI) of 0.532 which placed the country 154th out of 182 countries globally, with 72 percent of the population living on the equivalent of less than US\$ 2 per person per day. About 62 percent of the country's population lives in the rural areas and 80 percent relies on agriculture for its livelihood, including small-scale production in the form of backyard gardening and small animal rearing in urban areas.

For the Red Cross Red Crescent Movement this is the largest single-country operation in its history, with around one billion Swiss Francs available via donations. The Haiti response is also the largest relief operation to be undertaken since the recent restructuring of the IFRC Secretariat which led to creation of decentralised structures known as the 'Zones'. As in the Indian Ocean tsunami, much of the income received in response to this Appeal came from private individuals around the world, often via their national RC Societies which has resulted in many NSs becoming 'donors', and the obligations on the IFRC to account and deliver accordingly are critically important. An important aspect of the operation in Haiti has been the significant role played by some of the neighbouring National Societies (namely the Dominican RC, Mexican RC and Colombian RC) which were involved right from the early hours after the earthquake and made significant contributions to the relief operations in the first four months.

By the end of April⁶, the RC operation in Haiti had provided:

- Health care: >95,000 people treated at facilities including two field hospitals, four basic health care units, four fixed and 41 mobile sites; >152,000 vaccinations carried out; >16 million SMS messages distributed with key community health messages;
- Relief distributions: hygiene kits, kitchen sets, buckets, food items, mosquito nets, jerry cans and blankets distributed;
- Water and sanitation: over 90,000 m³ of clean water distributed to over 300,000 beneficiaries, and sanitation services;
- Shelter: over 6,000 tents and over 156,000 tarpaulins + ropes and tool kits distributed;
- Logistics: 104 relief flights received and 244 shipments by sea.

Usually the situation after an emergency begins to stabilise within three or four months, but in Haiti this is not the case. The relief operations will need to continue – probably for several more months – because the affected people are still forced to live in temporary sites, and the rainy season (traditionally torrential) has now begun creating additional problems, especially regarding flooding and sanitation, and health issues.

⁶ For full details see the three month progress report: <http://www.ifrc.org/docs/appeals/10/MDRHT00814.pdf>

Chapter 3: The Efficiency and Effectiveness of Processes and Systems

3a: Deployment of the Global Tools – FACT and ERUs

The IFRC, as a global international network, demonstrated a well-coordinated and speedy initial response to the Haiti earthquake. Within two hours a Field Assessment and Coordination Team (FACT) and Emergency Response Unit (ERU) information and alert messages had gone out to the National Societies from Geneva, and within five hours a FACT team leader had been identified⁷. The IFRC's Regional Representative for the Latin Caribbean travelled by helicopter to Haiti with the Director of the Dominican RC, the Regional ECHO representative and the Spanish RC representative, and conducted an initial aerial and land assessment less than 18 hours after the earthquake struck. Their assessment report remained in DMIS⁸ for the next four days as the reference point for many operational decisions.

The Preliminary Appeal was launched within 24 hours, based on initial information reports emerging from Haiti and Panama, and this, and combined with the Operations Updates which followed regularly, served as the basis for the PNSs' appeals. The information flow in the early weeks was found to be good by the PNSs interviewed during this RTE, although one stated that information sometimes varied between what FACT was reporting and other output from the Zone. The IFRC's pledge management system was, with a couple of notable exceptions, highly praised by most donor NSs interviewed as a key Movement coordination tool, and the logistics mobilisation table was live and updated from the outset. An initial plan of action (PoA) for the immediate operation was included in the Emergency Appeal, although a more detailed PoA for the longer term was not available to the PNSs until several weeks into the operation; while this is not unusual, particularly in this context, a number of partners felt that even a working draft plan in advance of this would have been helpful in coordinating the collective response by the Movement partners.

The ERU and FACT alerts were promptly confirmed into employment orders by the IFRC Secretariat in Geneva, and a FACT team leader was on the ground less than 48 hours after the earthquake. During this initial period a total of 11 ERUs and an eight person FACT team were sent to Haiti; in the next four days a total another five ERUs would be deployed and by the end of the first three weeks a total of 21 ERUs were on the ground with over 300 international staff operating. By mid-June 2010, over 700 ERU team members had been deployed to Haiti as part of the ERU system, and another 700 international staff and visitors had been through the base camp.

During the RTE this Team was presented over and over again with a consistent message from ERU team members, PNS HQ staff, IFRC delegates on the ground, Zone Office interviewees that the overall initial response of the global tools was extremely impressive; this was also confirmed by all the interviews conducted with external stakeholders. The IFRC's Secretariat (Zone and Geneva) was prompt in releasing the ERU alert and deployment messages and the FACT team leader, working closely together with those responsible in the IFRC structure, did not hesitate to trigger additional response tools as needed. There was a genuine willingness from the ERU teams and other PNS teams to be coordinated, even though they felt this was not always happening adequately. On the ground there was a general feeling of working together amongst ERUs and FACT members, certainly during the first three or four weeks of the operation.

A series of structured follow-up debriefing meetings have been held with the original FACT members to identify specific points for reflection, and to produce recommendations for future operations to learn from. Additionally, a new approach (initiated by the PMER Department in Geneva) was to launch an anonymous online exit survey for departing delegates (FACT members, ERU staff and others) and this has provided a range of useful insight and information of the early days of the operation.

Some of the conditions that contributed to the successful initial response were the following:

- The severity of material destruction and the human suffering triggered by the earthquake became immediately apparent to the global humanitarian community, so there was little likelihood of deployed resources remaining unused;
- The knowledge of the Haitian National Society's (HNRCS) capacities and the country's vulnerabilities facilitated the fast decision-making regarding activation of the response systems;
- The HNRCS soon realized it would be overwhelmed and did not hesitate to accept international assistance and work hand in hand with the IFRC's Regional Representative, who had previous first-hand experience in FACT and ERU deployments both from Geneva and as team member;
- The immediate deployment of the Regional Representative from Santo Domingo to Haiti to accompany the leadership of the HNRCS and support them in their overall strategic challenges in the operation;
- The majority of the staff and delegates in the initial months were very experienced from previous emergency operations, with only around 10% on their first mission (unlike in the Indian Ocean tsunami);

⁷ Annex Two gives a detailed timeline for the first few days of the operation

⁸ Disaster Management Information System

- The Zone Office coordinated and managed the communication and information flow (eg: sitreps, updates) between Haiti, Panama and Geneva well which enabled prompt appeals and real-time information updates that were necessary for the PNSs to launch their own appeals;
- A base camp was deployed and established for staff working under the IFRC's umbrella. People interviewed refer to a sense of "shared hardship" that served as a catalyst between the various ERU and FACT members on the ground;
- The ICRC, which had an existing delegation in Port-au-Prince, immediately offered support to the HNRCS and the IFRC, both in terms of material assistance and coordination capacities.

Challenges in the deployment of the Tools:

- Some of the ERUs who responded to the first alert were not operation-ready for immediate launch. It took several days before they found delegates and/or received their full set of equipment to go live, and this delayed the start up operation on the ground;
- While the RTE was in the field, the ERU teams were in the process of handing over and withdrawing. In a few cases, there was some weak handover planning and phasing out protocols, for example situations where the handover guidelines in the Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) were ignored and/or manipulated (regarding retention of essential equipment) in a way that compromised some ongoing activities (specifically in the case of watsan);
- Language skills were an important factor but not critical - as the FACT team leader stated in his EOM report: *"A good delegate is more important than a poor one who speaks French"*. One medical ERU team was 'not allowed' into a camp (because of "language limitations") by two other ERU teams who felt this could compromise their security – the first team did not have a translator either (and felt the IFRC should have provided one);
- The RTE Team heard directly from one PNS team (and other National Societies) which felt they had not been 'treated equally' when it came to decisions on which ERU teams to alert and deploy in the early days.

Conclusions

- Overall, the first couple of months of the operation were seen by all interviewees as positive in a very difficult and complex operating environment;
- The RC Movement has been seen to have and to use its global tools quickly and effectively, which have profiled the universality and strength of the Movement admirably;
- Comprehensive debrief and feedback processes have been initiated which have provided professional and considered information and recommendations about the strengths and weaknesses faced during this operation;
- Some of the NSs with ERU capacity may have been under-prepared for immediate deployment despite information given to Geneva to the contrary, and this inevitably impacted on the early operations on the ground.

Recommendations

- R1: Geneva ERU team to follow up with all ERU NSs to ensure compliance with procedures regarding updated information about readiness to deploy;
- R2: Undertake a detailed analysis on the ERU deployments in order to ensure that the valuable lessons from this massive deployment are crystalized;
- R3: Review existing global tools, systems and SOPs (especially the ERU handover protocols) in order to draw lessons from the Haiti Operation so as to fully utilize the wide range of human and material resources available to the Movement.

3b: Regional NS interventions and roles

During the first weeks a number of NSs from the Americas region deployed their staff and volunteers with limited coordination from the IFRC Secretariat, neither from Panama nor Geneva, very often in support of, or as part of, their own government's response. The RTE Team heard of a real feeling of alienation and exclusion early on experienced by various National Societies in the region (Mexico, Colombia, Dominican Republic) which felt they had not been fully integrated into the IFRC's operation during the initial response. The Mexican RC (MRCS), for example, had offered its support via the Pan-American Disaster Response Unit (PADRU) on the first day but had been told to send relief items only, and not search and rescue or relief teams. In the end they offered the same to their own government, who supported the MRCS deployment into Haiti⁹. The MRCS and Colombian RC teams both remained in Haiti for four months overall, using a series of rotations of volunteers from their regional branch networks, and were later effectively integrated into the IFRC operations and were resident on the base camp.

Other NSs from beyond the region also supported the relief effort with the placement of medical teams and/or delegates into the wider operation, often as part of a shared deployment of ERUs or as emergency response, search and rescue or medical teams. These included the Iranian RC, Qatar RC, the South Korean RC and the MDA from Israel. Two other NSs (from outside the region) deployed without reference to the IFRC or the HNRCS. It is also relevant to note the extensive

⁹ A separate meeting was held in Montreal between the IFRC, the regional NSs and the HNRCS to determine how these external Societies would engage in the overall operation.

multilateral inputs by many other NSs around the world, and the role the IFRC played in channelling and coordinating these inputs and conveying the required information.

Regional Disaster Response Team (RDRT) members from Africa and Regional Intervention Team (RIT) members from the Americas also made a critical and effective contribution to the overall operation, and indeed this continues. Not only did these team members bring considerable relevant experience and NS-centred knowledge to the operation (and will return with enhanced experience to their own NSs), their inclusion demonstrates the flexibility and potential global reach of the regional disaster response tools of the IFRC. The inclusion of up to 20 RDRT members from Africa at any given moment across all IFRC departments - including within the ERUs - in Haiti also included an essential francophone component which has proved to be so valuable.

The Dominican Red Cross responded immediately by crossing the border with volunteers¹⁰ and relief items. The Colombian RC made contact with the HNRCS directly, and came to a bilateral agreement regarding deployment. These NSs initially set up their own base camps and operated independently, although as mentioned above, the Colombian RC later became integrated and co-located. In other cases, like the Ecuadorian RC, the NS provided search and rescue, first aid and psychosocial support during the initial three weeks, and worked and lived closely with a team of military and fire service personnel from their country. The Nicaraguan RC, Costa Rican RC and the El Salvador RC were all engaged in the early days.

The Mexican and Colombian RCs received donated goods – including large quantities of foodstuffs - from their home countries during the operation, and shipped them to Haiti. This was despite written advice¹¹ against such methods from the Director of Americas Zone. Although the IFRC discouraged the practice, a meeting was organized in Montreal with the Mexican, Colombian, Dominican RCs and the HNRCS to discuss the question of unsolicited goods, and the HNRCS president accepted that these NSs could continue to send the food, which ultimately was distributed to over 150,000 people. While the spirit of the individual donors and the NSs to provide assistance in times like these needs to be actively encouraged, much work still needs to be done in many home countries to educate individuals about not donating unsolicited goods, and food in particular, and also with the various NSs about the complexity and potential consequences of failing to establish a robust and well coordinated logistics and supply chain management system for transporting and distributing these items.

The 'non-ERU' NSs also felt their relief efforts were not fully reflected in the IFRC's early reporting (although this was partly due to a number of them not actually providing information on their activities). This situation was corrected once several NSs logged formal complaints and the reporting systems were harmonized. However to an extent this situation still remains, as the IFRC reporting does not always accurately reflect the important role some of these NSs have played and will continue to play in the operation, though it does require the commitment from both sides.

The Dominican RC, with the support of the IFRC team deployed into Santo Domingo, played a vital role in facilitating the overall response in the early days. During the first three weeks a total of 40 aircraft with RC material assistance landed in the Dominican Republic and many hundreds of humanitarian workers used the "humanitarian corridor" established by the Dominican RC, thanks to their high level connections with their government. The DRC was faced with a triple role to play: a) a direct provision of humanitarian support from the DRC to Haiti; b) as logistics hub for the Movement; and c) as auxiliary to their government, which meant that they became responsible for facilitating the logistics on behalf of the government of all the international assistance channelled through Dominican Republic, and not just that of the RC Movement which was largely handled by a Logistics ERU and additional Regional Logistics Unit (RLU) staff. The Zone and the RLU in Panama supported this operation from the early days but additional support and engagement by the Zone into Santo Domingo, to help facilitate the 'political' aspects of the humanitarian corridor there in the early days, would also have been a positive move.

The IFRC may have underestimated the significant role the Dominican RC was playing beyond the logistics process. The Dominican RC provided significant (mostly ad hoc) support to the operation in Haiti out of Santo Domingo - they provided office facilities, volunteers and transportation (trucks) for goods in transit and personnel at entry points, mainly the airport, for facilitation of customs clearance, and later made limited warehousing space available. This support proved invaluable in the initial stages of the operation but was insufficient to maintain the level of operations at later stages. The Dominican RC felt they were able to manage the logistics hub alone and considerable work had to be done to find ways of working together (the DRC, Logs ERU and the IFRC) to avoid bottlenecks and acknowledge the actual capacity levels.

Although the logistics hub in Santo Domingo was supported, there was limited overall 'political' coordination support which also created unrealistic expectations and missed opportunities. The senior management of the DRC was quickly preoccupied with humanitarian operations inside Haiti and the IFRC Regional Representative deployed to Port-au-Prince the morning

¹⁰ This volunteer team was made up of about half Dominicans and the rest who were Haitians studying or resident in the DRC. This is part of an initiative that was developed in 2006 as a contingency for a disaster on the island of Hispaniola

¹¹ Letter from Head of Americas Zone to Presidents and Directors General Of National Societies of [the] America[s]; Panama, 27 January 2010

after the earthquake. The Federation Status Agreement granting it certain rights in the country was ignored, for example, and the DRC did not allow the IFRC to contract logistics support directly. The Director of the Americas Zone travelled to Santo Domingo on day three, but there was no permanent senior level management support for the DRC at HQ until the tenth day in this complex logistical and coordination operation which was, by now, supporting the wider humanitarian community. A PADRU officer was sent to the Dominican Republic to facilitate the coordination with the DRC, releasing some of the pressure but not able to resolve all issues. The IFRC Secretary-General and President also visited the Dominican Republic and travelled to Haiti during these first days, accompanied by the DRC's Director-General and the Director of Zone.

Conclusions

- The regional NSs and emerging PNSs played a vital and appreciated role in the relief operation, with them increasingly being brought into the operation as time progressed. This should be seen as critical from the outset in a future operation;
- The Zone office could have deployed a senior-level coordinator to Dominican Republic from the outset when it was clear that this country would become a main corridor for access into Haiti. This important aspect (of managing a humanitarian corridor in a third country beyond the pure logistics) did not receive adequate attention in the initial planning process¹².

Recommendation

R4: As more and more regional NSs have begun to play vital roles in almost all large disasters in their regions, the IFRC Zone Offices, using their local knowledge of the NSs, need to orient the FACT teams as they are deployed about the importance of proactive engagement with and support to regional and other PNSs already on the ground.

3c: Scoping Mission and RAT Deployment

The IFRC in Geneva decided to deploy a brief "Scoping Mission" to make a pre-assessment of recovery issues, and this team was in Haiti during the first week of February. It was followed by a full Recovery Assessment Team (RAT) in March. The Scoping Mission was a good initiative and their report¹³ identified key issues and challenges for the recovery planning process. However, the RTE team noted that the findings of the Scoping Mission inform neither the ToRs nor the actual work of the later RAT team, which was another missed opportunity. One RAT team member indicated that the Scoping Mission's report had not even been made available to them.

Further, as will be discussed in the section on [Recovery](#) later in this report, the Haiti experience also points to the need to re-examine the RAT process. While the process facilitates a collective understanding of the recovery and transition issues by enabling a substantial number of PNSs to be involved in the assessment, the extent to which the findings of the RAT team are used in the planning process for recovery needs some reflection. Indeed, in the Haiti case very little real recovery planning has yet (mid-June) taken place by any agency, and it will be important for the RC Movement to use its RAT team's findings as these processes develop.

3d: Human Resources and Staff Security

With a major operation like this requiring the recruitment of many hundreds of staff over a short period, human resources (HR) capacity of any organisation is likely to be overstretched and would need significant scaling up. During the New York summit meeting in April 2010, HR was identified as an area of real concern. An ad hoc Haiti HR Working Group was created to discuss the Movement's identification, recruitment, training, deployment and retention of staff and delegates for the operation. The findings of the Working Group¹⁴ are closely aligned with the findings of this Evaluation but the summary is most pertinent:

"The HR capacity within the IFRC Secretariat and all of our National Societies is believed to be very limited and there is no dedicated HR team for Haiti. The ability to recruit and train large numbers of delegates quickly is in question".

¹² This does raise questions about how the IFRC, as a global organisation, assimilates and disseminates lessons from its operations in various countries. The IFRC did a very thorough job of facilitating and managing such a humanitarian corridor in Syria during the Lebanon crisis response in mid-2006, but experiences and lessons from that did not appear to have been brought to bear on this response.

¹³ Haiti Recovery Scoping Mission, Preliminary Analysis and Recommendations, 08 February 2010

¹⁴ RC/RC New York City Summit for Haiti – Haiti HR Working Group, 15 May 2010

HR DEPARTMENTAL STRUCTURE

The Haiti HR working group further stated:

"IFRC Americas Zone HR management to put in place sufficient dedicated capacity to deal with the full scope of IFRC-wide HR management matter¹⁵.

When the FACT team was being put together, HR was requested to find someone who could join the team from the outset, but could find no-one suitable, and this is considered another missed opportunity as experience elsewhere has shown that having HR competences on the ground from the first days significantly helps in the longer term. It is considered that this role should have been taken by the Zone HR manager¹⁶.

From the outset the HR team in Panama and the HR team in Haiti have both been under-resourced and with a slow commitment by the Zone to actively strengthen these teams sufficiently. It has also been extremely difficult to find candidates interested in taking the posts. Nevertheless, the individuals who have been in the positions have done a remarkable job in filling the advertised operations posts given the workload and the organisational constraints they have been working with. The Geneva HR team strongly supported the field teams (Panama and Haiti) through the placement of a number of staff-on-loan and through finding experienced HR delegates for temporary assignments, and it was only later that Panama recruited additional support staff. The Evaluation Team feels that the Zone's HR capacity remains overstretched and needs to be strengthened. For example the current Haiti HR officer¹⁷, just one highly experienced delegate recruited for three months, is being expected to handle all the recruitment and other HR processes that accompany the current 51 delegates and 46 future delegates for Haiti. She currently sits as part of the Zone HR team rather than as part of a Haiti Support Cell (see '[Management Issues](#)' below).

The IFRC HR staff in Port-au-Prince are providing HR services for local hires to the IFRC teams and not to PNSs at this time because the team is also under-staffed (and because there are no service agreements). More details follow under 'Local Staff Recruitment' below.

Conclusions

- The HR team, especially at the Zone level, was well supported by the Geneva HR Team in the initial months;
- In more recent months, the Zone has not sufficiently scaled up its own capacities in this area and is currently relying on one delegate (+ administrative support staff) to undertake all the Haiti delegate recruitment internationally;
- The capacity to support HR matters in Haiti itself is also too limited at the present time, although plans are underway to recruit additional people onto this team.

Recommendation

R5: The HR capacity within a Haiti Support Team in Panama, and the team in Haiti, needs to be scaled up as a matter of urgency.

HR – PLANNING AND RECRUITMENT

The operation so far has been successful because of the high number and high calibre of the delegates who have been through the system, and for the large amounts of work done to find them and get them there. Around 1,400 RC delegates and staff have been in Haiti in the various rotations of the 21 deployed ERU teams, other relief teams and other IFRC delegate positions. Departments such as IT and Logistics are now almost fully staffed - currently many delegate positions are being filled within six weeks and most local hire positions are being filled within a few weeks. However, several key delegate positions in health (eg: it took over three months to identify a new health coordinator), watsan, livelihoods/recovery and shelter (see below) remained unfilled at the time of the Evaluation. All four of these programme departments have been negatively impacted by the lack of critical staff.

Approximately 300 delegates and 1,500 national staff are said to be needed in order to ensure the RC Movement can meet its recovery commitments¹⁸. However, there is still no strategic programme planning for the months ahead so it is hard to verify (or even determine) this number. Nevertheless, hiring, training and retaining this many – or the eventual number of - competent and qualified staff will be an ongoing challenge throughout the recovery period. The intense competition for skilled staff by other aid organizations¹⁹ responding to the earthquake make Haiti an especially challenging HR environment, not least as the living and working conditions do not encourage people to consider staying for very long – though this is similar for many agencies.

¹⁵ Haiti HR Working Group Document

¹⁶ This person did not travel to Haiti at all until early May

¹⁷ Panama-based, dealing with international recruitment, with administrative support. Another HR delegate in Haiti is currently dealing with around 150 national staff on IFRC short-term contracts, and all new local staff recruitment; this team is currently being strengthened.

¹⁸ HR mapping May

¹⁹ At least five senior UN managers were former IFRC/PNS personnel

The problem of finding the right delegates is not going to go away – with most delegates only signing three or six month contracts (some are as short as six weeks), and a multi-year commitment from the IFRC, the ongoing supply of professional staff will be a major challenge for years to come. Although many positions are currently filled or will soon be filled, the short length of the contracts (see “Delegate Retention” section on page 17) puts staff continuity, and thus any sense of institutional knowledge, at risk. The Zone Office initially aimed to hire staff on one year contracts but the lack of applicants linked with living conditions, salaries and allowances and external competition for the individuals forced the reduction in contract lengths.

Considerable use has been made in this operation of delegates from the regional disaster response teams (RDRT) and the regional intervention teams (RIT). They brought a clear ‘NS perspective’ to their work and engagement with the HNRCS, which was not always evident in their delegate colleagues. Overall this has been seen as an excellent intervention with a good number of motivated and experienced individuals involved. While it is vital to access the staff resources where they can be found and using these staff can be seen as a capacity building input, there are inherent risks in their deployment to international operations potentially weakening their own NSs²⁰ and programmes during their absence; though at the same time such exposure, as mentioned above, enhances their own skills and strengthens the understanding and effectiveness of the global tools.

Several managers and PNSs have expressed their frustration with the IFRC’s official recruitment processes which they feel are too inflexible and too slow to meet the current needs of the operation. This frustration is reflected in the exit survey feedback²¹, and the Haiti HR working group also made certain recommendations regarding reviewing the recruitment processes. Currently, the formal process of recruitment is as follows: a job is identified, a job description is written by the manager, submitted to HR Panama, and ultimately posted on JobNet²², applications may (or may not) be received, short-listing is done, interviews (if necessary) are carried out, a decision is made, and eventually the job may be offered. This process takes time – at best two to three weeks, and at worst, much longer. With luck these delegates may arrive in Haiti five to six weeks after the job is identified, and many now come on only three or six month contracts.

There does not appear to be the latitude to think or to operate beyond or outside these strict process parameters, even when it became clear the results were not consistently meeting the needs. There could, for example, be more creative thinking on who/what/where advertisements can be placed, using selected trade magazines and websites, Reuters AlertNet, ALNAP, personnel agencies and a range of other international recruitment options. There could be a much broader and more engaged search process, exploring whether some of the 186 member NSs can find and recruit locally-available professionals from their local markets²³ rather than just delegates already on their registers. A number of PNSs report that they have not been proactively asked to be engaged in this process of searching their own home markets. Although this may have happened in a few cases, managers should have more latitude to identify and recruit the best people via all possible routes rather than only selecting from those who apply through the heavily-bureaucratic JobNet system.

The positions advertised are graded for salary levels which are pre-defined and not open to negotiation. It is acknowledged that to change such a system, which includes many PNSs’ working together, is far from a straightforward exercise, but there needs to be considerably more flexibility in pay scales and benefits on offer to be able to recruit the best people around – Red Cross salaries, particularly at the starting levels and in conditions such as Haiti at the moment, are simply not competitive enough. As an example, one of the most experienced programme managers currently in the field for the IFRC was unable to negotiate any latitude on a basic starting salary because it was his first IFRC contract²⁴ – and he was informed he could not go onto a consultancy contract either. This is despite the fact that he has many years of professional field experience elsewhere, is responsible for a major component of the IFRC’s programming, and was being actively head-hunted by other agencies in Haiti. In another case, in mid-June four separate potential candidates for technical positions turned down offers directly because of the low salaries on offer. Others, though, have been given consultancy contracts (by Geneva, in one specific case), and this is also common with delegates working in the Shelter Cluster team. Without such flexibility, the already difficult job of delegate recruitment will not get any easier.

There is also the need for some lateral thinking and more of a problem-solving approach to recruitment in general. Currently some HR issues are bounced around between two or three locations delaying decision making and it is often unclear who has final responsibility and authority for HR-related decisions. One much-debated example is the recruitment of a new shelter coordinator, who initially agreed to a 12 month contract if he could get a family posting and his wife could live ‘somewhere in the region’. It took five weeks of back-and-forth emails between Haiti / Panama / Geneva for a decision to be made on this question, before an offer was made to him. The explanation given was that it had been necessary: “to seek

²⁰ Although not all RDRT members are full-time staff of their home NSs

²¹ Feedback via the exit survey completed by delegates leaving the Haiti Earthquake Operation

²² JobNet is the IFRC’s public job advertisement page: <https://jobnet.ifrc.org/public/index-ifrc.asp>

²³ One major PNS, in early June, was still reporting that they had not been contacted by HR to actively search for delegates

²⁴ During the time of the RTE this person was currently on a PNS contract and trying to find options to remain in his post, either by extending his current arrangement or taking an IFRC contract (this situation was resolved after the RTE left Haiti).

advice from the security department; to seek advice from the legal department; to seek advice from the HR department; to analyze the impact of how this kind of decision may affect other offices regarding an administrative impact [regarding setting policy precedents]; and to make sure that decisions like this are properly discussed with the host NS". In this case the candidate then came back with additional requests, which the IFRC felt unable to meet, and he ultimately turned down the offer, but it is hard to see why it took so long to finalise an initial decision one way or another, for a critical member of the senior management team. The situation now is that this crucial position has been reopened and recruitment has to start once again, in a priority programme area which really needs some strong momentum.

The Evaluation Team identified a lack of clarity on future programming, and this inevitably impacts on human resources. If coherent and well-developed programmes are not in place and being delivered, then delegates will quickly become frustrated. Clearly in the early days of such a major and complex operation there is bound to be uncertainty, but this should be becoming clearer by this stage.

It is relevant in this section to highlight the success of the Shelter Department in the way they have been able to maintain full staffing levels for the numerous positions required to fulfil the IFRC's Shelter Cluster commitment since they took over the responsibility in early February (see [Shelter section](#) below for further details). All positions have been filled and handovers have been assured via a combination of maintaining a centralised 'live' database of names, by using the resources of other agencies involved in shelter, by being able to contract and deploy people on consultancy contracts with more flexible salary deals, all handled separately from the normal recruitment system. Conversely, however, the shelter operations team has suffered from open positions and poor continuity in a critical programming area for the IFRC. Although the Shelter Department has also deployed its own staff for periods of time, filling the shelter operations positions, including the crucial shelter coordinator post mentioned above, has not been as successful as filling the cluster roles and it is suggested that the Shelter Department should also be more positively engaged in working with HR to recruit for these operational positions.

The positive impression given by the FACT team and the Shelter Cluster Team was because these teams have been staffed by delegates who are known to 'the system' centrally, have experience working together on a range of previous operations, whose data is centrally managed, and – in many cases – whose NSs have engaged in and committed to the agreements for emergency deployments. Much of this information is not directly available at the Zone levels. This offers a strong case for recentralising all emergency staff recruitment back to Geneva for the first months of a major operation, while allowing the Zone to gear itself up to manage the ongoing delegate recruitment process for the longer term.

Conclusions

- HR at the field level has done a good job to find the numbers of delegates they have found, but was (and remains) under-resourced for the amount of work required;
- The most effective recruitment procedures in this operation remained those which were handled centrally in Geneva (the FACT members and the Shelter Cluster team) where the centralized databases are maintained, where there is still some 'institutional knowledge' of people and past operations; and when contractual conditions and remunerations are more flexible;
- The current IFRC recruitment processes and procedures are too bureaucratic, too slow and too inflexible, directly impacting on programme implementation;
- In the competitive HR environment there is a need to ensure that RC Movement pay scales and incentives are competitive with other organizations, particularly where the IFRC and PNSs see fit and have the funds to pursue programming in sophisticated and highly complex interventions such as watsan, shelter and health in Haiti;
- HR planning seems to have been done separately from a detailed plan for strategic programming for the period ahead, rather than being designed to respond to the identified programme needs;
- Recruiting and retaining skilled staff will remain a challenge throughout the life of this operation. The short contract lengths and low number of anticipated contract extensions puts programme continuity at risk and decreases coordination within and outside the Movement.

Recommendations

- R6: The strategic programme planning needs to precede the delegate planning and subsequent sourcing and recruitment to ensure the right delegates and staff are recruited for the identified jobs, rather than the other way around, so once the programme planning is finalised, the HR mapping will need to be redone accordingly;
- R7: If delegate salaries cannot be readily increased then 'hardship packages', terminal bonuses²⁵, 'education grants' and other similar incentives need to be quickly developed, approved and made available to encourage more appropriately-qualified people to apply for the open positions;

²⁵ The HR working group addressed the issue of remuneration as well - "We should - under clearly defined criteria - consider "lump sum" enhancements to our current pay levels for these difficult assignments. It's common practice in the commercial world and the military but the Red Cross seems to be resisting it". In Haiti at present MSA is paid to delegates but food costs etc are not charged to them, effectively increasing their 'in-pocket' money considerably; although some PNSs do not agree with this approach.

- R8: Consultancy contracts could be more widely used which would allow more salary flexibility and a quicker result – managers/budget holders need to be able to make that call, within certain limits and oversight and for certain key levels of job, but without having to ‘fight the system’ each and every time;
- R9: HR in general needs to become considerably more creative and wide-ranging in where it advertises and posts open positions, and should consider making better use of more NS inputs and resources, tapping into wider markets and global expertise, sourcing people who would not know about or use the limited JobNet option;
- R10: Roles and responsibilities need to be defined for the relevant levels (eg: in Haiti and/or the Zone) to enable a much shorter decision-making process, giving the authority to decide faster on more flexible contracting options, more creative remuneration packages etc.
- R11: Consider recentralising (to Geneva) all emergency recruitment procedures for the initial weeks of a major emergency, to take advantage of institutional knowledge of delegate and to allow the Zone to gear up its HR capacities.

DELEGATE RETENTION

During the interviews with numerous current staff members, only a few people stated they would be willing to extend their contract beyond its original end date. In interviews with programme managers, several of them stated that they did not know of any staff members planning on extending their contracts. The short length of contracts (generally) means that staff turnover will remain high and filling these positions on a regular basis will remain a challenge. High turnover rates have already impacted programme continuity and coordination with other actors.

The primary reason given for not extending contracts by staff and managers was the ‘harsh’ living conditions in the base camp (see ‘Living Conditions’ on next page). Other reasons included the desire for a family posting (now possible for certain positions) and the sense of isolation caused by the curfew.

LOCAL STAFF RECRUITMENT

The FACT team experienced problems in the early days around recruiting national staff, and they often had to rely on ERU teams to hire drivers, loaders etc, as the ERUs seemed to have greater flexibility and autonomy to do this. It is not quite clear why this is the case.

There are currently over 1,000 national staff²⁶ on contract or under recruitment including those working with the IFRC and the PNSs, all of whom have to be on HNRCS contracts principally because of the lack of a Status Agreement. The HNRCS had already agreed that the IFRC could recruit managerial support for national staff recruitment, and this process is being developed with one delegate responsible for the local staff recruitment in place and additional national staff under recruitment for the team. Currently each of the 17 PNSs still present in Haiti is working individually with the HNRCS, and this issue was also addressed by the HR working group, which recommended:

“a centralized HR function in Haiti to support the recruitment of national staff and to support the Haitian Red Cross with volunteer development”²⁷.

A revised pay scale for local staff was finalized in May, four months after the relief operations began. It was developed by the IFRC at the request of the HNRCS, based on a survey of the rates in use by the UN, other NGOs and international agencies. This scale is considerably above national (eg: government and HNRCS) pay levels, and although approved by the HNRCS, it has obvious implications on sustainability by the NS in the longer (post-operation) term. Some PNSs, particularly those like the hospital ERUs which employ considerable numbers of local staff on HNRCS contracts, complained that they have seen their salary costs double and are frustrated they were not involved in these discussions, but are being obliged to follow the new scale.

While there is now an ‘official’ pay scale, revised HR policies and procedures have yet to be developed for the operation and the pre-existing ones are in use. Nevertheless, several PNSs have now begun to create their own revisions and there is some concern that the differences in HR policies between the PNSs could lead to problems in the future, especially staff recruited for programmes which may be handed over to the HNRCS.

Conclusions

- The IFRC is currently providing no centralized HR services to Movement partners, who are having to work directly with the HNRCS for local staff contracts and other administrative matters;
- There are no common HR Policies and Procedures.

Recommendations

- R12: The creation of unified HR Policies and Procedures for local recruitment should be made a priority and done in conjunction with those PNSs which have already created their own policies and procedures;

²⁶ HR mapping, May 2010

²⁷ Haiti HR Working Group Document

R13: A working agreement should be developed with each PNS for IFRC HR services, even if a Status Agreement is not yet signed;

R14: The Haiti delegation HR team needs to increase its staff complement to be able to provide those services adequately.

DELEGATE ORIENTATION

There is an extremely high turnover of delegates arriving and leaving the base camp, and while those arriving all receive a brief 'welcome chat' and a health and security briefing, there is little further orientation given to new IFRC delegates or to PNS staff. IFRC delegates do not pass through Panama before arriving in Haiti and the briefings in Port-au-Prince are standardised, regardless of position or responsibilities. These newcomers therefore miss any formal introduction to key staff, presentation of procedural issues or the organizational chart, or new staff handbook. The limited briefings given, coupled with the other issues mentioned here, make it challenging for new staff members to get up to speed or have their questions answered. As one delegate reported: *"It takes three months just to work out how to order stationery"*. Although it is not realistic or possible for every staff member to be briefed on every procedure or system, clear identification of focal points for support within the country team would help everyone.

It is also encouraging that plans are being drawn up to start a range of Movement training sessions (including IMPACT courses, induction courses and so on) for new delegates and local staff, to be held in Haiti, and these will hopefully be open to key staff and delegates from all the NSs in the operation.

Conclusion

- The current orientation given to new delegates is insufficient to prepare them for their work.

Recommendations

R15: Key senior IFRC delegates should be routed through Panama before traveling to Haiti in order to meet Zone management staff and receive an initial orientation;

R16: A staff handbook or briefing file with information on policies, procedures, organizational structure and other necessary information should be available to all staff in Haiti; and a focal person should be assigned in Port-au-Prince to orient all new staff and be generally available to assist with questions and needs of new staff.

LIVING CONDITIONS and STAFF WELFARE

To be able to meet the needs of an operation of this magnitude two base camp ERUs were deployed. The Danish camp is considered to be of higher quality, and has a limited number (80) of beds in tents of six persons, each with their own inner tent. In contrast the Italian camp focuses more on quantity, handling a larger and forever changing number of people both in the large communal tents and in the free camping area. Each camp has its own kitchen (even though they are adjacent), catering for the residents in the respective camp sites. The Italian side is seen as more flexible (more food, access to tea and coffee outside 'mealtime hours'; but with less variety in the food served). This difference in focus (and in their SOPs) created a feeling that the two camps catered for "two different classes of citizens". The Welcome Centre assigns people to their camps, with long term delegates and VIPs generally housed in the Danish camp, and the others on the Italian side. These ERU camps will be handed over to the IFRC in July²⁸.

As the operation transitions from short term stays to missions lasting three, six or even 12 months (in rare cases), living conditions are becoming an issue in staff recruitment and retention. Heat is one of the biggest complaints. Tents have little air circulation and can reach 32°C as early as 07:00h in the morning, into the mid-40s later in the day, and not cooling down significantly at night. Fans had been ordered from Panama (but had not been delivered by the time the RTE Team left). There are few air conditioned offices and many staff and volunteers spend the day in the heat out in the field. While some offices have refrigerators, there is no common access to cold water or other cooled drinks. Many staff only have access to warm water for drinking from the taps around the camp²⁹. The staff health records indicate that 25 percent of the cases treated are either heat or dehydration related (40% local staff / 60% delegates)³⁰.

There are very limited recreation or diversionary leisure or sports activities available, and those that there are (eg: the three nights a week bar and the movie screenings) do not appeal to everyone. There is one relaxation area with hammocks but no 'cool area' and almost no privacy – these may be acceptable in emergency postings but are harder to accept in longer mission postings. However, there is a willingness to make things better and small improvements are regularly being made.

The base camp kitchens serve three meals a day in the respective canteen areas (on Sundays only brunch and dinner). Outside these fixed mealtimes delegates and staff are unable to access any food or drink other than water, and foodstuffs are not permitted in the tents (to deter rats). The RTE Team witnessed staff members who were unable to eat in the Danish

²⁸ At the time of the RTE visit this handover was scheduled for July. However it was later put back to September and now is planned for November 2010.

²⁹ Feedback from the Haiti delegation since the first draft of this report indicates that these issues have been addressed.

³⁰ Based on records kept by the Staff Health Delegate

canteen because work obligations conflicted with canteen hours, and there is no alternative option on the base camp for the people who eat there; but there is more flexibility on the Italian side. One suggestion has been to establish a small commercially-run 'kiosk' on site, where drinks, snacks and other consumables could be stocked and sold³¹. This enterprise could be sub-contracted to a local person(s) who could be given a small amount of seed money to start the business.

In general the base camp was considered to be well run and adequate for the emergency period. Although there were initial problems with toilet and shower facilities on the original site ("*two showers and three latrines shared between 200 delegates*"³²), at the time of the RTE on the new site there were two communal showers (one male, one female), four individual showers outside and two showers (one male, one female) inside a portable building, all in one area, and around 20 chemical toilets around the camp site, designated by gender.

In interviews with female delegates, some unease about living in mixed gender tents was brought up and a few interviewees stated that they would prefer single gender tents. There is no privacy in the communal tents; and there are no changing facilities in the private showers³³. Two 'incidents' have occurred around the male and female group showers which about each other, although these were dealt with when reported to the management.

It was often stated that these conditions were a deciding factor in whether the individuals accepted a three or a six month contract initially or when delegates were requested to extend their current contracts. This is a similar case with the other agencies now in Haiti where staff are camp-based. However, several agencies and several bilateral PNS teams have secured accommodation in the city in houses or apartments, and it is suggested that this could be looked into as an option for some IFRC personnel – eg: those on longer contracts. While many people interviewed feel that the proposed containerized units would make life in the camp more acceptable, there is no indication of when these will be delivered. It is also to be noted that the less experienced delegates are the ones more likely to complain – the 'old timers' find the conditions easier to accept but this is perhaps indicative that missions these days are so often capital city-based and 'hardship' missions are less normal than hotel or apartment-based accommodation.

The delegation has put in place a system whereby delegates can get offsite at weekends and take a trip to one of a number of approved beach hotels, for 24 or 48 hours, for a break from the camp, and this is appreciated and used. Transport is provided on a schedule. Also, R&R is provided (now five days + two days travel time) every six weeks. These benefits, and the fact that meals and refreshments are provided free on the base camp, have gone some way to offset some of the other conditions.

Conclusions

- The base camp was generally considered to be comfortable, adequate and well-run during the emergency period, although the two separate base camps have different SOPs and operating conditions which could potentially cause problems in a different situation;
- The separate units of the camp have created a degree of alienation between the residents, and it makes mixing of everyone more difficult. This may be resolved when the IFRC takes over the two camps and they are run as a single camp from November (see footnote 28);
- Shower and toilet facilities have improved over time although some staff still have issues about them; in some contexts gender-separated accommodation tents and other facilities could be considered;
- The base camp offers practically no chance of leisure activities or privacy which is already having a negative impact on some of the longer-term delegates;
- The current arrangements do not cater for delegates to be able to access food or drinks (other than water) between fixed mealtimes (see footnote 29);
- The desire for shorter contracts and lack of contract extensions is closely related to the current living conditions (eg: heat, privacy, curfew) at the base camp, and to encourage longer term contracts there could be other possible accommodation options in the city which need to be explored further.

Recommendations

R17: The base camp ERUs need to have harmonized SOPs working to a single standard agreed for future deployments;

R18: Management should encourage the installation of a small commercial kiosk on-site, to be run by local people, to sell food and drinks to delegates and staff; several water coolers should be purchased and positioned (and maintained) around the site (see footnote 29);

R19: The Haiti management needs to explore and consider what other accommodation options may be available to help encourage key delegates into long-term positions;

³¹ Feedback from the Haiti delegation since the first draft of this report indicates that this has now been done.

³² From a delegate's End of Mission Report

³³ Feedback from the Haiti delegation since the first draft of this report indicates that both these issues have been addressed.

R20: Consideration needs to be given to providing a range of leisure or sports activities, and maybe a 'cool area' within the camp.

SECURITY

The security situation in Port-au-Prince is volatile and uncertain, and clearly managing a large field team in such a context is a challenge. It can be noted here that despite a generally deteriorating security situation around the city, no incidents have been reported by the IFRC/PNS teams. Strict security rules are in place for staff moving about inside Port-au-Prince, and radio contact is maintained by drivers ahead of road journeys during which they are advised on an updated basis of areas of the city to avoid. The RTE Team did not undertake any separate security assessment but suggests some consideration could be given to the current regulations. Paramount, however, is the need to regularly communicate the reasons for the rules to the delegates affected.

Security at the base camp site is generally well managed, but the current timing of the curfew is causing major resentments amongst the IFRC staff (and other base camp residents) who have to be on the base camp between the hours of 18:00h and 06:00h. All other organisations that the Evaluation Team came across have curfew hours starting between 22:00h and 24:00h; the ICRC's curfew is 23:00h (as at 20 May 2010). Many delegates living on the base camp indicated they did not understand the reasons for the IFRC's curfew timings, and feel they are 'locked up' without knowing the justification for these hours. The fact that the IFRC curfew timings are so off the norm (when compared to every other agency in the city) makes it appear arbitrary and not based on any substantive evidence-based data. Much of this frustration can be attributed to insufficient regular explanation to the delegates – especially those who do not attend the management meetings - of the regular security assessments being done, and therefore the justifications for the curfew hours.

Some staff working offsite (the shelter cluster team, for example, which works at the adjacent UN base) have special dispensations to this rule, but other cases were quoted of relief teams undertaking afternoon distributions who had to be back before 18:00h which had caused afternoon distributions to be cut short, or other work-related programmes to be curtailed.

Conclusions

- Management clearly takes the issue of security seriously and this is appreciated by most of the delegates;
- The current curfew hours are perceived as too restrictive and are having a negative psychological effect on delegates, already living in difficult conditions, who feel they "are being locked up".

Recommendations

R21: Management should define and agree a range of possible options for delegates to be able to get offsite during the evenings for social evenings with other agency staff, meals in restaurants etc, from time to time;

R22: Ensure options are in place, and known about, to enable necessary operational commitments to be met regarding evening meetings, etc;

R23: The hours of the curfew should be subject to regular review to take account of the prevailing situation around the city. Whether the hours are changed or not, delegates should be given clear reasons for why these decisions are being taken and the basis for taking such decisions (whether they are relaxed or tightened).

STAFF HEALTH

The IFRC has a staff health delegate³⁴ on the field team and permission was recently granted to hire three additional staff (national doctor, psychologist and nurse) in accordance with the staff health plan³⁵. A second expatriate was requested – but refused by the management – so the current delegate is on duty 24h per day seven days a week, is completely overloaded, and there is no expatriate cover during her R&R periods. During the time of the RTE visit, the health unit was relocated into a tent with air conditioning allowing proper facilities for treatment and recuperation. There are medical referral possibilities in town if necessary. So far, the nurse has been unable to provide health services to RC staff living outside the Port-au-Prince area but the increased staffing should allow for regular visits by health staff to outlying towns. The continuing lack of service agreements means that it is currently unclear whether PNS staff will be able to access staff health services.

It was suggested by many interviewees that the absence of a staff psychosocial delegate from the outset was an omission considering the scale and consequences of the emergency being addressed, the large size of the delegation and the stressful living and working conditions. Senior IFRC staff (and the RTE team) often found themselves debriefing/listening to delegates' personal concerns as there was no-one else. The Mexican RC team routinely deploys a psychosocial volunteer with its relief teams, and were very surprised the IFRC did not.

³⁴ This delegate resigned at the end of June

³⁵ The Staff Health Programme in Haiti 2010

Several delegates have arrived in Haiti without their necessary personal medications and up to date vaccinations, or in some cases with only the first of several vaccination shots. With no access to a functioning cold chain and difficulties ordering medication (as discussed in the health section), these delegates put themselves at severe risk.

Conclusions

- Staff health services are improving with the new health tent and increased staffing, but the current single staff health delegate is completely overloaded;
- Proper psychosocial support is not available for delegates;
- Some deployed delegates are putting themselves at risk by arriving without personal medications and/or appropriate vaccinations.

Recommendation

R24: The Haiti management team and HR Geneva need to agree an appropriate level of health cover for the staff and delegates, and to revise the staff health complement in Haiti accordingly;

R25: National Societies and the IFRC need to ensure that all delegates arrive in Haiti with sufficient medication and vaccinations, as they may not be available in country. Deploying NSs need to ensure this information is provided and verified in advance of travel.

Chapter 4: Management and Coordination

4a: Management Issues

The Haiti emergency response is the first major relief operation to be carried out under the new decentralised structure, and in this case it thrust the Americas Zone in Panama into the 'driving seat' to deliver the support required. Various departments of the IFRC Secretariat in Geneva actively supported the Zone in Panama with staff secondments and technical advice from the outset, and staff interviewed in Geneva indicated they thought Panama was in charge.

Overall, the Zone played its role effectively during the response in the early weeks and they called in external support, principally from Geneva, as required. The Zone deployed a number of its existing staff complement to Haiti and other locations in the aftermath of the earthquake, often for periods of up to a month. However, as the operation is now moving to a more complex transitional stage, the Zone needs to better understand the complexity and scale of the operation, and therefore to define the level of additional support it needs to make available in the period ahead. This direct support appears to have been declining over the past weeks as many of the Zone staff get back to their 'regular' functions, which is understandable as the Zone is by and large focused on ongoing 'development' programmes in the Americas. Emergency operations in this Zone in recent years have been in the nature of DREF operations for small and medium sized disasters, and the Zone needs to realise the significant difference in support required between a DREF operation and the current scale of the task in Haiti³⁶. It is also acknowledged that subsequent disasters (eg: the February earthquake in Chile, and floods in Mexico & Brazil in March) had to be responded to by the same Zone team.

There is a culture of pushing decision-making up to the next line at all levels. During this Evaluation numerous people at different levels in all locations have talked of a prevailing "culture of fear" in the IFRC Secretariat structure: fear of making decisions, fear of sanctions, fear of stepping out of line, fear of engaging in debate with anyone perceived as authority. Risks, some of which may pay off and some which may not, are no longer an accepted part of the operating culture. FACT works because it has the mandate and freedom to make decisions based on needs as they determine them on the ground, without having to be second-guessed at every step. It deals admirably with this risk factor – indeed it is appreciated from the FACT teams – but this does not work elsewhere in the structure.

Much of this is down to the lack of clarity on roles and responsibilities, and this has been a major theme running through this operation. Geneva has decentralised and theoretically empowered the Zones, but in general does not necessarily have all the expertise and capacity in the various Zones to take this considerable added responsibility on board, such as in this case - despite Panama's best efforts. There seems to have been little constructive hands-on support and oversight to the Zone by Geneva (or indeed by the other Zones) – everyone assumed everything was going just fine in Panama. These lessons need to be captured by the IFRC Secretariat.

There have been numerous cases of decisions being taken in Geneva in this operation with little or no reference to the management teams in Haiti or Panama. Several examples would be: a) the unilateral decision to employ and field a GBV

³⁶ For example, the Great Lakes operation in Africa had a dedicated Task Force in Geneva of several people; the tsunami operation for Asia had a team of six or seven.

delegate³⁷ (also see [‘Protection’](#) section below); b) a decision to design a ‘business plan’ ; c) to deploy Geneva departmental staff to Haiti for ‘information visits’ with no oversight or advance discussion with Haiti; d) to run the communications strategy directly from Geneva, including Geneva recruited staff and with very limited engagement with the Zone team.

In addition to the confusion regarding roles there is also ambiguity over authority levels. Examples of this are to be found in the protracted process leading to failure to recruit the shelter coordinator mentioned earlier, or to be able to give clear answers to the watsan coordinator regarding his contract continuation until the very last minute; or this input from a PNS which reads:

“As an example of the combination of micro-management and reluctance to take decisions, it should be noted that for two NSs to bring in their joint cash team, we had to speak to nine different levels of IFRC management in Haiti, Panama and Geneva (this doesn’t even include the Haiti RC) – each person approved of the suggestion and wanted the team to come to Haiti but each level thought others (non-specified) needed to give actual approval! This reflects a lack of clarity in the leadership structure during the first month, and too many levels”.

The clear turning point in this operation was from the time FACT left and was replaced by the IFRC Secretariat team (the first week of February), with the interim head of operations being a staff member from the Panama Zone office. From this time the operation became more process driven. Panama staff indicated Haiti had the authority to make decisions and Haiti staff agreed they could take some of the day-to-day decisions; but there were others, notably on policy issues, when Panama had to refer decisions to Geneva for approval (for example, the shelter coordinator question as described previously). Senior staff in Geneva referred frequently – including to the RTE Team directly - to what the senior management wanted. This has created frustrations at all levels and major delays in making some crucial decisions. The overall culture is heavy on processes - a problem-solving orientation is often lacking.

The Haiti Country Team appears (to the RTE team) to be seriously under-supported in all areas from strategic guidance to sufficient administrative support. The Haiti senior management team seems overstretched considering the size of this operation, both with operational activities and with other ‘priorities’. The management team spends much of its time dealing with emerging issues (visits by PNSs and/or visits from IFRC Geneva, often unannounced in advance, occupy many hours) and it would seem appropriate to have a better resourced team at this level to take on some of these extra-curricular activities. It was also reported that Haiti regularly referred technical questions to Geneva directly as there was insufficient technical capacity at Zone level.

As mentioned previously, there has been some reluctance from the outset for Panama to increase its overall staff complement or to set up any form of direct support mechanism for Haiti – effectively to create the role of the former desk officers in Geneva – which was obvious to many as being required. The Zone office certainly allocated existing staff to a number of support and operational roles (eg: OD coordinator as a member of the RAT team, the DRM coordinator acting as head of operations; support from HR; extensive support from the reporting unit and the PMER delegate; dedicated finance support, logistics support etc), and other Zone staff have filled in temporary positions in Haiti and in Santo Domingo. This input was necessary – and indeed part of the Zone office’s mandate - but the necessity to form a dedicated support unit or team to undertake the ‘desk officer functions’ was not adequately taken forward. In February a ‘support team coordinator’ role was created and filled in Panama, as yet has no team to coordinate³⁸ and has been unable to really engage with and spend sufficient time in Haiti due to conflicting pressures on him from the Zone.

There are numerous ongoing support functions which need to be done for the Haiti operation, though not necessarily in Haiti itself, which would give justification for the establishment of a Haiti Support Unit in Panama to draw together these functions and to deliver the necessary support which the RTE Team believes the Haiti management team needs. Exactly what the complement of this Unit will be for the current Zone management and the Haiti Country Representative to determine together, but it should remain part of the Zone structure with full authority at the level of the team’s coordinator. In addition to the coordinator (the desk officer role), it would have a small core team of qualified and experienced support staff³⁹, perhaps ‘resident’ in the various different departments of the Zone premises but reporting to and being managed by the support team coordinator, without other Zone support functions. The aim should be to reduce the layers and increase the support to Haiti; not to provide a direct counterpart for every senior field manager, but certain roles which can add real value to the operation at a regional level.

Development of the longer-term Plan of Action was done by Panama staff after meetings and coordination with the technical teams in Haiti, and the draft was approved by the Haiti team. The budgets were completed a month later based on the plan. The production of several documents or plans appears to have been more driven by the needs of the IFRC Secretariat to

³⁷ Delegate funded by a PNS. Although Haiti had no issue with the initiative in principle, no formal process of discussion with the field managers or of ‘due diligence’ was followed (email stream of 04 May refers)

³⁸ The two other staff dedicated for the Haiti operation currently sit separately and do not report to the Haiti support team coordinator

³⁹ By the time of the RTE visit there were dedicated staff covering the human resources and finance functions but these people were not reporting to the support team coordinator.

have something available for the Montreal meeting or the New York meeting, or documents such as the more recent 'Haiti Business Plan', rather than based directly on field necessities. The commitments made in Montreal by the wider Movement are considered somewhat premature in terms of a real understanding of the possibilities on the ground, and they were readjusted in April on the basis of the delegation's capacity to deliver. The Plan of Action gave limited openings for the donors to work with and as the situation on the ground is changing all the time, the PoA needs to be regularly updated.

Conclusions

- There continues to be a lack of clarity on roles and responsibilities, and therefore on levels of decision making authority at all levels; and this leads to weak accountability for results;
- The current Zone set-up in Panama is offering inadequate dedicated support to the Haiti operation and there needs to be scaled up support functions, developed in agreement with the Haiti team, regarding what is required. There needs to be operational autonomy of this team vis-a-vis the current Zone structure.

Recommendations

- R26: Develop a Haiti Support Cell at Zone level, with an adequate staff complement which should be empowered to make decisions and to find answers efficiently; and should work closely with and directly for the Haiti operation. Reporting to the Zone Director and the Secretary General in a matrix relationship, the Head of the Support Cell will have full authority and control over all aspects of the Zone's support functions for the Haiti operation. It should be time-limited and funded from the Haiti budgets. There should be regular and close interaction between the post-holders and the Haiti team, including regular field visits;
- R27: The Haiti Country Representative should be empowered to run the country operation and should be able to resource his/her support needs accordingly. S/he should be held accountable to deliver on the agreed plans and given the latitude and authority to make the decisions necessary;
- R28: Senior management in Geneva needs to agree the strategic directions with the Zone and Haiti teams, and then stand back and allow Panama and Haiti to deliver and be held accountable for that delivery, and support them as necessary.

POLICIES & PROCEDURES

Rest & Relaxation (see also [R&R section](#) above)

The general lack of access to policies and procedures was noted in delegates' exit survey responses and problems have arisen when the policies followed in the field are not in line with the written policies predating the disaster. Staff are often not aware of the numerous rules, especially when they are first time delegates, and it would be useful to have a current set of policies for reference. Although all policies and procedures are available⁴⁰ online, any variations/amendments to the standard IFRC policies and procedures are not disseminated to staff.

An example of this is the confusion around the R&R policy. The written R&R policy⁴¹ as published on the IFRC's website (as at 02 June 2010) predates the earthquake and states: *"for Haiti Port-au-Prince: "Accompanied Status (spouse only), no R&R"*. In reality, it is now a non-accompanied posting and R&R does apply. The current practice in Haiti (at the time of the RTE visit) allowed for R&R (two travel days and three days off) every six weeks from the date of the last R&R, and required that it should be taken less than four weeks before the end of assignment. Additional confusion was added during the visit of the Head of HR Geneva in April when she acknowledged that it "could possibly" move to two travel days and five days off, though this was not a definitive commitment⁴².

Principles and Rules in Disaster Relief

The RTE Team found examples where the 'Principles & Rules of Disaster Relief' had been used proactively, which was when they were quoted in circular letters from the Director of the Americas Zone to the regional NSs regarding the dispatch of non-solicited relief items⁴³, or regarding NSs' engagement with the military.

Conclusions

- The lack of clear and updated policies and procedures, particularly those to do with HR, is creating confusion and uncertainty amongst delegates and staff;
- Although the 'Principles and Rules in Disaster Relief' policy document is readily available (on FedNet) and its content was directly relevant to all members of the RC Movement operating in this context, it was not adequately referred to or followed by many of the partners.

⁴⁰ Although available via FedNet, many delegates would not know this.

⁴¹ IFRC R&R Policy: available at https://fednet.ifrc.org/graphics/Fednet_files/Human_Resources_06/HR%20Guidelines%20%20Tools/Rest%20and%20Relaxation%20Dec%202009.pdf

⁴² Postscript (02 June): on 31 May the following email was sent to delegates in Haiti: *"It has now been approved that each R&R will consist of five actual days of R&R and one day of travel time either end of the five day period. So, in total, absence from the base camp will be a total of seven days. For the second R&R the option to add up to five days [of annual leave] still applies"*. The R&R Policy document on FedNet still remains unchanged, however (as at 02 June).

⁴³ Letter from Head of Americas Zone to Presidents and Directors General Of National Societies of [the] America[s]; Panama, 27 January 2010

Recommendations

- R29: Ensure staff policies and procedures are known to the staff and printed copies are available in the camp for reference purposes;
- R30: HR Geneva to ensure the HR policies and procedures published on the website are updated when they are amended;
- R31: The 'Principles and Rules in Disaster Relief' policy document needs to be better profiled by the IFRC and NSs during regular DP work, and it needs to become better understood and adhered to by the NSs themselves.

4b: Coordination

"This will be one team and one operation";

Mme Gedeon, president of the HNRCS to the IFRC's senior staff at the onset of the operation

When evaluating the effectiveness and efficiency of coordination mechanisms, the RTE Team complemented the findings from interviews with attendance at various coordination meetings⁴⁴ and a review of the following documents in order to analyze how the Movement's Components were working together in the operation: the Movement Coordination Framework presented in Montreal; the Draft Memorandum of Understanding between HNRCS, IFRC and ICRC; the Seville Agreement; the Montreal Declaration and Minutes of the New York Meeting; and descriptions of the IFRC's disaster response system. Where possible the Team verified interview claims with email communications.

Coordination during the Early Response

As described in the [Early Response](#) section, the initial global coordination within the Movement overall was effective and efficient. Considering the unprecedented number of Movement actors involved, the complexities of the environment and the humanitarian challenges at hand, the RTE Team noted that for the first three weeks Movement Coordination worked very well.

The HNRCS was prompt in recognizing the magnitude of the humanitarian needs and requested international assistance almost immediately. The IFRC's Secretariat identified (within five hours of the disaster) an experienced disaster manager who met the language skills, global disaster response tools experience and with previous experience in the region, to serve as FACT team leader. The team leader was deployed promptly and started operating almost immediately (see 'Early Response' section). The IFRC deployed to Port-au-Prince its Regional Representative for the Latin Caribbean less than 24 hours after the earthquake, as an advisor to the HNRCS President. This not only served as a successful strategy to reinforce the capacity of the Haitian RC but also as an important complement to the FACT team's coordination tasks.

Almost immediately after the earthquake the ICRC, the IFRC and the HNRCS sat down to agree on roles and responsibilities and agreed working methods based on the Seville Agreement. Within a week of the earthquake, they had developed a Movement Coordination Framework (MCF) which (although not signed until three months later) served as the guiding document for Movement cooperation issues. This document was drawn up using coordination experiences from the tsunami operation, and provides three mechanisms being used on a daily basis: the Technical Committee (30 meetings held), the Movement Operational Committee (eight meetings held) and the Movement Platform (MP). The first two were operational already from late January and have continued since, and the MP did not continue after nine meetings held up to the middle of February. Furthermore the MCF established three additional leadership and coordination mechanisms for: a) performance and accountability; b) virtual communications; and c) high level board focus groups. The RTE team did not find enough evidence to determine, one way or another, the effective implementation of all these mechanisms.

Areas for improvement and lessons learned for early response

Due to the pressing humanitarian needs the FACT team decided to focus on operational demands and meeting the immediate relief needs of the operation. It is widely acknowledged, including by FACT themselves, that the assessment element of their work was not prioritized sufficiently and coordination beyond ERUs was not in the forefront of their day-to-day activities. The RTE Team found, through exit surveys, face to face interviews, PNS surveys and end of mission reports, that the FACT was perceived as a relief ERU focusing too much on operational matters. As an example, even four months later the IFRC's country delegation had neither established a base in Léogane nor a mechanism to engage in a permanent coordination function in that highly operational area with five active PNS teams.

During the RTE, Team members were able to verify how certain NSs had been - and still were, to a certain extent - operating in parallel but isolated from the global response tools and without any operating procedures agreed with the IFRC's country delegation. This is an important area that requires serious analysis and demands a rethink of how global tools can best

⁴⁴ The RTE Team attended two ERU team leaders' meetings; one health coordination meeting; one PNS ERU coordination meeting in Léogane; and two Programme Coordinators meetings at the Base camp.

integrate all assets of the RC Movement. In the FACT debrief document, it was pointed out: “[these] PNSs were doing their own assessments and relief delivery. When things went wrong, FACT and ERU were obliged to intervene”.

In Santo Domingo, the RTE Team learned that the early response coordination mechanisms set in place for the Dominican Republic were late in arriving and could have been stronger (see [Early Response](#) section) to cater for the coordination and support expected from international RC partners. This specific element has provided many opportunities to learn lessons for the future.

Findings on the current state of Coordination and the way forward

The IFRC’s principal role in a situation like Haiti is to be the coordinating entity, but the understanding of what this coordination role is varies widely, and expectations are similarly wide-ranging. Amongst IFRC staff the RTE Team found interpretations ranging from “soft coordination” through convening meetings and sharing of information, to “hard coordination” which implies a definition of operational priorities, assigning geographical areas, and auditing the technical quality of services offered and control over type and quality of goods delivered.

It remains unclear to many delegates and teams engaged in Haiti what support and supplementary services the IFRC Secretariat is obliged and/or expected to make available to its members on the ground, and therefore frustration develops when expected services are not available. Two examples of the unrealistic expectations which the RTE Team came across in Haiti are: a) two different health ERUs thought that the IFRC should provide, as part of their support services, a cold chain for their medicines. The IFRC does not agree. This has resulted in medicines being stored, at least at these two sites, in temperatures above the recommended norms; b) another health ERU had the expectation that the IFRC would provide incinerators for medical waste disposal [during the Evaluation the ERU concerned was still awaiting a solution to this problem]. Further details are provided in the [‘Health’](#) section.

The various coordination meetings that the RTE Team members attended were mostly information sharing and security briefings. The RTE Team heard from several PNSs that they felt that little ‘real coordination’ beyond information sharing is effectively being conducted. There appears to be no systematic joint contextual analysis, no collaborative decision making, not enough joint priority definition and insufficient technical debate and discussion happening, even at the Port-au-Prince level. One PNS suggested communications flow was vertical and “*despite the critical high level coordination meetings that have taken place, there is no clear coordination mechanism at the field level in Haiti. There is a system for information exchange between sectors inside the operation and PNSs in the field (open meetings); however, information sharing is not one and the same as field coordination (i.e. joint design and planning of activities)*”. In other words: effective coordination that aims towards “Working as a Movement” is currently lacking and would be welcomed by most of those involved.

The outgoing Movement Coordinator has clearly moved the general understanding forward amongst the partners, and this momentum needs to be maintained by his successor. The RTE team suggests, however, that while there is a position in the structure tasked to lead on Movement Coordination, it is the duty of all delegates and teams to proactively work as coordinators, both within the operational sphere and between the Movement partners, and this needs to be highlighted better in the various job descriptions, briefings and appraisals for all delegates.

Away from Port-au-Prince, and despite the presence of five operational PNS teams in Léogane (and no HNRCS Branch), the first coordination session was held there only in mid-April. It was reported by the PNSs to have been very useful and it was again recommended to have an IFRC presence in the town to ensure an improved and permanent coordination mechanism between the partners and to ensure real engagement. A delegate post is currently being advertised. For operational coordination by the NSs in Léogane it was expected that they would attend the Port-au-Prince sessions, although the Haiti management team now accepts it would have been better to have had a Léogane presence in this area from early on also.

In Jacmel, with two PNSs and a strong local Branch of the HNRCS, coordination has worked well enough between them without a permanent IFRC presence – an IFRC-led coordination meeting was first held at the end of April. One of these NS representatives indicated⁴⁵ to the RTE Team that they did not see the need for a full-time IFRC coordinator in Jacmel, feeling they could undertake this role between themselves and be supported with occasional visits from Port-au-Prince. A delegate post is, however, currently being advertised. Again, regular inputs from the IFRC’s programme coordinators were also encouraged.

During the RTE a draft of the “Recovery Strategy” was delivered. However, the process that led to the creation of the document did not include an “ownership building” mechanism within the IFRC delegation and Movement partners. Such an important document could serve as a foundation to promote further coordination, but there is now a risk that Movement components perceive this document as having been developed with insufficient formal consultation with them, or even as

⁴⁵ There remains confusion over this question. While this was the information given directly to the Evaluation Team by one PNS delegate, subsequent feedback has been contradictory and a misunderstanding during the visit seems to have arisen.

competition and interference with nationally defined priorities and ways of working. What appears to be needed now is the mechanism to agree a coordinated approach and then divide up the agreed tasks between the partners who would like to work multi-laterally. At least one PNS, who would have preferred to have a multilateral engagement, has decided to go bilateral directly because of this lack of direction; and at least three others have deployed unilateral teams to assess early recovery options for themselves.

During the RTE a number of partner NSs were experiencing significant pressure from their headquarters who seemed to be questioning their operational financial resource absorption capacity, overall strategy and speed of delivery. Many of these pressures came from countries with a well-developed civil society that will demand accountability and transparency. From a coordination perspective, and as stated in the MCF, the above becomes a Movement concern, not a problem to be confined to a small group of NSs: "*... the collective accountability of the Movement*"⁴⁶.

Conclusions

- The IFRC's decision to post a representative to the HNRCS was fundamental to the engagement in the early days and should be adopted as common practice for large scale international disaster responses;
- The assertiveness of the HNRCS in acknowledging when it needed support was instrumental in allowing the international response system to engage promptly and appropriately;
- Although the early response has been widely acknowledged as a Movement success there is much room for improvement on matters related to operational coordination of global response tools;
- There is little evidence that coordination, as exercised today within the Movement in Haiti, systematically includes the fundamental elements of "big picture" analysis and planning, joint problem solving, as well as identifying opportunities to address the capacities and interests of the RC partners;
- The IFRC Secretariat's coordination and implementation roles generated an understandable tension from the onset, and continue to be a challenge that finds IFRC delegates and staff having to undergo a complex balancing act between focusing on being a facilitator of membership and being a service and goods delivery entity.

Recommendations

- R32: Ensure that expectations regarding the IFRC's coordinating role are clearly understood, and better reflected in job descriptions, action plans, and the work of all delegates;
- R33: Further clarify what support services and supplementary services the IFRC Secretariat is obliged to provide to its membership, and sign the required agreements with the partners;
- R34: Ensure full implementation of the various coordination mechanisms included in the signed Movement Coordination Framework (SCC, MP, OCC, TC) plus the three additional leadership and coordination mechanisms, as necessary;
- R35: While an IFRC coordination delegate for Léogane is being identified, place an acting delegate and/or establish a coordination mechanism that can be closely monitored from Port-au-Prince; and re-evaluate whether a delegate is needed in this position in Jacmel.

4c: External Relations

Traditionally, the IFRC is seen as fairly weak in its interactions with organisations outside the Movement, especially at the operational level in the field. The Haiti response appears to have been somewhat different in this regard in the early period when there was close interaction with the ICRC and the PNSs already present in Haiti in the days after the emergency, as well as with external agencies, but this has not continued at the same level since, although the IFRC management still has regular meetings with the ICRC delegation. Other external interactions with the UN humanitarian sector, UN OCHA and the various sectoral cluster teams also take place on a regular basis but the management team has been forced to balance its involvement here with the other requirements of the operation. For example, numerous high-level PNS visits, very often announced at short notice but demanding of people's time, have occurred regularly over recent weeks and months. A slightly larger senior management team (eg: assistant country representative(s) positions) could share some of these responsibilities and ensure better participation with the external partners.

Discussions about signing a Status Agreement with the Government of Haiti happened at the highest levels within days of the earthquake, but to date only limited progress has been made on this issue. Admittedly at that time the government was still in disarray, and it has been mentioned on several subsequent occasions to the authorities, but it has not materialised. The lack of this agreement means all leases, contracts and importations have to be in the name of the HNRCS and not the IFRC, adding to the workload and inevitably slowing down the results. It also means that the IFRC country team does not feel able to provide the required services to the partner NSs in Haiti directly, such as local staff contracts and vehicle registrations. Despite legal advice from Geneva that service agreements with PNSs in Haiti could be entered into without having a Status

⁴⁶ The MCF calls for the establishment of a High Level Board Focus Group chaired by the IFRC Vice-President of the Americas to assist the Governing Board to overview the collective accountability of the International IFRC.

Agreement, the Haiti management team has refused to proceed with formal service agreements, much to the frustration of a number of the PNSs, although certain services have been provided subject to capacity.

There was improved interaction at the various programme levels, and most notably through the IFRC's role leading the Emergency Shelter Cluster. Through this mechanism, the IFRC is seen to be interacting well with other agencies, particularly the NGOs engaged in shelter work. In some cases (eg: Concern Worldwide), the IFRC is helping with logistics/procurement support, and CARE is also keen to enter into a similar arrangement.

Attendance at the various sectoral cluster meetings – beyond emergency shelter – has been regular by the programme coordinators though there seems to have been some issues with inadequate information flow back to the ERU and PNS teams in some cases. Some PNSs were reported⁴⁷ to have been attending UN “... *cluster meetings alone, making statements and agreeing to commitments which were perceived by the meeting and external partners as the formal IFRC presence when in fact this was not the case*”. Similarly, reporting to the clusters has generally been good although some individual PNSs have not always provided information. What seems not to be fully clear within the country team is the relationship between the IFRC operation and its Emergency Shelter Cluster Lead responsibilities, and the need to keep the cluster role totally independent of the operations.

The RTE Team is of the opinion that since the IFRC's expertise in the area of livelihoods is limited, and the recovery response needs to be built on a holistic approach to shelter, livelihoods and basic needs (particularly water and sanitation), that the IFRC should consider leveraging its resources and logistics capacity to enter into partnerships with experienced NGOs who may have greater competencies in other programming areas, and in livelihoods interventions in particular. Currently, however, the HNRCS is not in agreement with such an approach and the delegation will need to continue discussions with the Society to try and resolve this *impasse*.

Conclusions

- There is insufficient engagement at the highest inter-agency or government levels and additional momentum could possibly be achieved on a range of current issues if this was strengthened;
- A positive outcome of the Status Agreement discussions with the government should help the Movement operations in a number of areas, as well as relieving some of the pressure on the HNRCS;
- The IFRC needs to be more proactive in regard to forging agreements beyond the Movement where the relevant resources are not available within. One likely area is around livelihoods, which needs to become a major factor in IFRC programming but internal capacities appear to be weak (as highlighted in the RAT report; which also provided some suggestions on ways forward).

Recommendations

- R36: The Country Representative needs to concentrate on increased interaction beyond the RC Movement – closer and more regular links need to be established and maintained with external agencies, the UN and the Government of Haiti;
- R37: The Country Representative also needs to further explore possible link-ups with other partners on areas such as livelihoods interventions, where the RC Movement is traditionally weak, and ensure that the HNRCS is in agreement with this approach;
- R38: Obtaining the Status Agreement should be considered a priority for the country delegation.

4d: Advocacy

More recent moves to engage with and be formally represented on an inter-governmental Interim Commission for Haiti at the highest levels are being encouraged by Geneva but left to middle management level staff to negotiate and commit to, without any significant input, guidance or engagement from Geneva's or the Zone's senior management team. The RTE Team has to question whether it is fully appropriate for the IFRC, with an eye on its principles of independence and neutrality, to be more than an observer at such a forum.

Conclusion

- Direct participation in this Interim Commission would directly challenge several of the RC Principles. The Red Cross would perhaps benefit from being an observer at the Commission, and for advocating through and with it, but could be compromised by becoming a full member.

4e: Accountability to the Affected Population

In the early days of the relief operation, it would appear (from numerous comments made in the delegates' exit survey) that beneficiaries were not systematically involved in the planning of needs or distributions, although their involvement certainly

⁴⁷ FACT debrief report

did happen in many situations. To a limited extent this was acceptable in the first weeks as the needs were overwhelming and widespread, many other actors were on the ground, and the pipeline was still being put together, but it should have improved after a few weeks. This was also more recently acknowledged in the minutes of a management meeting in Haiti⁴⁸ - one comment drawn from this document: *"improve communications with beneficiaries, asking them ... now is one-sided communication"*; and one discussion point during the meeting: *"accountability to donors & impact; beneficiary treatment/listening; beneficiary communications"*.

A number of examples were mentioned where ERU teams did not adequately engage with the communities: one case, actually witnessed by one RTE Team member during a field trip, was when a water bladder had been installed by a watsan ERU team without appropriate consultation, and just a few houses further down the road there was a cement cistern owned by the community leader of the area. When asked if her cistern could be used she agreed, and confirmed that she had never been consulted about this before. It was then witnessed how the IFRC's watsan delegate made a deal to provide materials to make some minor repairs, with the owner providing and paying for the labour.

It would certainly appear that a full participatory needs assessment was not done in all cases and should have got better as time passed, and this is a missed opportunity which is not helping with ongoing contacts with the communities concerned. This phenomena was not fully analyzed by the RTE team, although it appeared that despite the existence of many tools and materials (VCA, BPI, etc), as well as stated commitments to participatory processes, they seem to a degree to have been left aside during this operation.

A novel approach to beneficiary involvement in this operation was the SMS messaging service which was used heavily. It has been used to transmit community health messages, to advising beneficiaries of distribution details, and more recently to be the conduit for cash transfer programming. Several developing strategies have been implemented in the current situation including the:

- SMS Blast (Short Message Service): The SMS Blast allows the user to send out small amounts of information to a large number of recipients on general health and sanitation issues. By mid-April some 16 million messages had been sent out.
- Red Cross Information Line *733: The information line allows the user a one-stop voice recorded service giving relevant information relating to the Red Cross relief cycle. The service was advertised to Haitians using a BLAST SMS. The service also allows information on health and sanitation issues.

The basis of the project is to allow beneficiaries the opportunity to participate in the processes of emergency response and development. Access to national radio and TV networks, local and national publications and distribution networks as well as access to a population where a large percentage of people have mobile phones, allows interaction with the majority of Haitians. Access to these services does not incur a cost to the user. Future initiatives will cover a range of beneficiary accountability activities passing messages, information and updates to beneficiaries via SMS, radio, television and print

4f: Civil/Military Relationships

A particularly controversial issue in the Haiti response was the heavy use of external military forces. Representatives of these contingents were part of the clusters, and military air assets were used heavily for airdropping of supplies. The presence of the US armed forces in particular was massive in terms of deployment (with nearly 20,000 marines in Haiti at one time) and their wide-scale involvement in direct relief distribution created a certain amount of unease amongst NGOs.

This was exacerbated by the fact that the resident UN contingent, MINUSTAH, struggled to get its act together after the loss in the earthquake of several key officials. MINUSTAH did not make its logistics resources available to the humanitarian community for several days as it did not want to take on responsibility for humanitarian response (which was outside its peacekeeping mandate). It took about a week from the disaster for the Security Council to agree to a specific humanitarian mandate for MINUSTAH. It was only from that point that MINUSTAH helicopters could be used to carry out reconnaissance outside Port-au-Prince⁴⁹.

Due to logistical bottlenecks, as relief deliveries were still slow, there were frustrations and public anger spilling out onto the streets, and this made some of the NGOs rely on security provided by armed military from MINUSTAH and the US Army to guard distribution sites. The World Food Programme and USAID tried to make their implementing partners carry out their distributions from these sites. Some accepted, but others did not, such as large American NGOs like ADRA, World Vision, CARE and CRS (Grunewald, 2010). The Red Cross, however, stayed away from any of these sites and ensured that they had mobilised community volunteers and leaders for distribution support.

⁴⁸ IFRC, Minutes of Haiti Delegation and Zone Office joint meeting, 4-5 June 2010

⁴⁹ François Grunewald, Blanche Renaudin. *Real Time Evaluation of the response to the Haiti earthquake of 12 January 2010. Mission: 9-23 February 2010*, Mission Report. French Ministry of Defence's Strategic Affairs Directorate

Several of the regional RCs made use of their countries' military logistics capacity (eg: Mexico and Ecuador) to get to Haiti but had no further engagement with them thereafter.

Conclusion

- Although the role of the military in responding in the aftermath of large scale disasters is generally accepted these days and there exist guidelines⁵⁰ for organisations to leverage military assets for humanitarian operations as a last resort, in the Haiti response the use of the military for providing security during relief distributions became an easy option for many NGOs;
- Despite the heavy military presence in the early days, and unlike numerous other NGOs and Agencies, the Red Cross was able to avoid direct interaction with the military contingents and succeeded in not using military assets at any stage of the operation, relying instead on the traditional use of community volunteers for assistance and security during relief distributions.

4g: Reporting and Communications

Issuing the Preliminary Appeal was very fast (within 24 hours of the event), and the revised Appeal (15.01.2010) and subsequent Operations Updates have been both timely and comprehensive. One important aspect of this operation was the deployment of at least five very experienced reporting/information delegates to complement a capable and committed (but understaffed) PMER team in the Panama Zone office. PNSs have commented that all necessary information and detail was included in the documentation which enabled them to quickly approach their governments for additional support. Similarly, the organised telephone conferences were timely and provided good quality feedback.

The Federation-Wide Reporting System, used in this emergency response for the first time, was also seen by the PNSs as a positive step forward and was appreciated. It has to be seen whether the link-up between narrative (to mid-April) and financial (figures only till end of February) could be improved, but certainly this is a good beginning.

The reporting delegate included in the FACT team was overwhelmed by the number of media interviews she had to do (*"15 interviews before 11:00h"⁵¹*), so her ability to actually produce written reports for FACT in addition was stretched. It would seem sensible to clearly separate the roles of media/communications and reporting in these early stages of response, to allow the primary reporting role to concentrate on this output. Nevertheless, FACT reporting was said to have been sufficient for NSs' needs although a range of better maps and other visual tools would have been appreciated. One PNS suggested some inconsistencies between FACT reports and those coming from the Zone, as well as conflicting information from different IFRC contacts regarding ongoing operations. It is important to deliver the same message.

From the outset the Communications Department in Geneva actively supported the Zone principally via the secondment of staff and the formulation of an overall communications plan, due to a lack of resources in Panama from the time of the earthquake. The Geneva department still appears to be taking the lead on many issues regarding communications, including for example the decisions on which communications delegates to place in Haiti, and although the department has regularly recommended that the Zone team needs to be strengthened to take over the responsibilities, to date this has not happened adequately. Media enquiries, by this stage, should be routinely directed to Haiti and Panama.

Communications working group sessions were held with the PNSs at both the Montreal and New York meetings to plan the approach for Haiti, and these were jointly led by staff from Geneva and Panama. There certainly needs to be a standardised and consistent approach to external and internal communications after such a major disaster, especially because of the pressure and expectations from NSs as well as the external media, but it does appear to the Evaluation Team that there has been limited involvement by the Zone in the overall communications output for Haiti. There are – inevitably – different perceptions expressed by Geneva and Panama about this matter.

If the Zone is already under-resourced and cannot handle the additional workload a large emergency generates, Geneva could consider setting up a 'communications cell' at Zone level, staffed if necessary by Geneva staff and working collaboratively with the relevant Zone delegates and support staff. This cell would handle all communications and media enquiries at the Zone level and implement the communications plan agreed between country/Zone/Geneva, and all requests should be channelled here. Certainly by month four Haiti and the Americas Zone should be more engaged (and better resourced to do so) and Geneva less so, which does not appear to be the case, even though the Geneva department would like this to be possible.

⁵⁰ OCHA 2003, Guidelines on the Use Of Military and Civil Defence Assets to Support United Nations Humanitarian Activities in Complex Emergencies" ("MCDA Guidelines")

⁵¹ FACT TEAM debrief report

Conclusions

- Reporting in general, in terms of content, frequency and timing, is seen as being very good;
- The reporting role within the FACT team became swamped with other duties, and was unable to concentrate on the team reporting sufficiently;
- The external communications role has been handled principally by Geneva rather than by the Zone. While acknowledging there needs to be a standardized output, this could have been handled differently and by now the Zone should be leading the process, but still needs to be strengthened accordingly.

Recommendations

- R39: The FACT reporting delegate should be able to concentrate on reporting for the Team, and be supported by a dedicated communications cell at Zone level (see Recommendation #40) and/or a communications delegate within the FACT;
- R40: In future large-scale emergencies, and if necessary (in terms of Zone capacity), consider placing a Communications Cell at the relevant Zone level to centrally handle all communications enquiries ... bring 'Geneva to the field' from the outset and run the communications from the Zone, thereby supporting and empowering the Zone in the longer term;
- R41: In this operation, responsibility should be transferred to the Americas Zone under the guidance and support, but not the direct management or direction, of the Geneva Communications Department. The Panama Communications Team should be strengthened to enable this to happen.

4h: Support Systems

Pledge Management

Overall, given the very large number of pledges coming in, this system has worked reasonably well but a major issue, once again, was the lack of clarity on roles and responsibilities in the process. At least one pledge was signed off by senior management in the Zone and Geneva (with no reference to the Haiti team or the Panama-based PMER officer) for something which had already been funded. All pledges, no matter how small, were expected to go via the Country Representative for approval, but this was unnecessary when many of them were unearmarked and he was so busy.

It was very hard in the early days to accept specifically earmarked pledges as there was no Plan of Action ready and then no budgets, and at least one partner was frustrated by this.

Finance

Basically this worked (and continues to work) reasonably well, using the strong base of the RFUs and the developed finance systems. Budgets were only developed in the later months due to the strong input from a Geneva finance officer, and nominated budget holders mostly at field level are now identified. It remains unclear to the RTE Team who has the overall responsibility for the total budget oversight, and some budget holders did not actually know details of their budgets. Lessons learned from the tsunami experience have established procedures where commitments for programme activities can only be agreed once corresponding hard pledges are confirmed and included in the finance system.

Logistics

The Haiti operation was, of course, a massive logistical exercise in so many ways – by mid-April 104 flights and 244 sea shipments had been received and cleared (around 7,500 mt of materials)⁵², and over 100 logisticians have been involved to date. Logistics ERU teams were deployed to both Port-au-Prince and Santo Domingo in the first days, although the first team deployed into Haiti was not ready to get operational immediately and then their equipment was delayed in Europe by several days. Other support was made available by the regional logistics unit (RLU) in Panama supported by Geneva.

Although a few relief flights landed in Port-au-Prince in the first days, the airport was later taken over by the US military and access by relief planes became difficult. At this point the logistics base established in Santo Domingo came into its own, and the cargo from 40 relief flights and hundreds of personnel – both RC delegates and other agencies' staff – passed into Haiti through there. Two key staff of the RLU were deployed into Santo Domingo also (one on 15 January and the second on 17 January) and they played a key role in establishing and maintaining this humanitarian corridor.

There was good cooperation between the relief teams and the logistics team on the ground. In the early stages the supply of mobilised relief goods arrived somewhat sporadically and relief distributions were based more on what had arrived and was available that day than on actual assessed needs. The Zone already had some pre-positioned relief goods in Port-au-Prince so these were immediately mobilised for distribution. As relief supplies were mobilised from outside, food and health consignments were given priority by the Haitian authorities rather than other goods. Relief and logistics were able to coordinate the needs versus the availabilities and were able to deliver and distribute these supplies to the beneficiaries on a daily basis. Non-food items, such as components of family packages, often arrived as individual consignments and had to be

⁵² IFRC; Three Month Progress Report, IFRC; <http://www.ifrc.org/docs/appeals/10/MDRHT00814.pdf>

consolidated to make up complete family packs. The relief teams were able to distribute a full NFI package within two weeks of the earthquake.

Inevitably there has been a number of frustrations expressed regarding logistics – although very often the reasons are not fully appreciated. The logistics teams were doing their best to work with forever changing information: numbers of beneficiaries changed all the time, the priority items changed frequently, planned distributions were subsequently found to have been done by other agencies to the same communities, etc. Extremely large quantities of goods in kind were mobilised early on and shipped shortly afterwards, and had to be received, transported, stored and distributed. Some mobilization decisions made by the first relief programme coordinator were not well respected by his successors - for example a large quantity of hygiene and baby parcels were mobilized in a single “urgent” consignment, with associated airfreight and handling costs, and then the distribution plans were not implemented, so the goods had to be stored for future distribution.

Currently all procurement done by the Logistics team in Haiti is for locally available goods, and the international tendering and ordering is still done through the RLU in Panama, supported by Geneva. Frustrations were reported to the RTE team regarding delayed or unfilled orders, but it is acknowledged that many of these issues come about because the requesting delegate has only provided partial specifications, or has changed the specifications or quantities after requisitioning. Some of the examples looked into were the following: a) a major order for shelter materials was seen as being greatly delayed, but in fact the specifications were amended regularly until the order was actually placed; b) the delivery of three GPS units to Haiti which had been purchased but were retained in Panama for three months “because of customs delays” [when the RTE Team raised this issue with the Zone office the units were hand-carried the next day]; c) the purchase in Panama and delivery to Haiti of electric fans for the tents, which has taken several months⁵³. One ERU team reported the refusal to purchase a suitable medical incinerator, available on the Haitian market, because it did not meet IFRC specifications ... so the ERU in question has been forced to store all medical waste until an approved incinerator arrives from overseas.

Importation of goods is seen as another blockage as all imports have to be consigned to the HNRCS and they have insufficient staff⁵⁴ to process the paperwork efficiently⁵⁵. Customs clearance is a well-known bottleneck in Haiti. When normal import procedures were reinstated by the government at the beginning of March 2010, the IFRC hired two qualified customs agents to assist the HNRCS for the clearance of general cargo and one IFRC staff working full time on vehicle clearance and registration.

There have been considerable delays in finalising the registration of imported vehicles, especially those of the PNSs, which has meant transport shortages as well as additional costs as other cars have had to be rented. Unfortunately one PNS was holding up the whole dossier which had to be presented all together to the HNRCS and then the government. This was finally completed (coincidentally) during the stay of the RTE mission, but it will still take up to two months to receive the plates. Currently all vehicles imported into Haiti in the last few months will become the property of the HNRCS, with possibly major cost implications for the IFRC’s leasing programme. Many of these delays and uncertainties could also have been avoided had there been a Status Agreement.

4i: Audit and Risk Management

A staff member from the Geneva Audit Team has been posted to the Haiti Delegation for six months with the intention of both supporting the ongoing operations team in its risk management work as well as to provide an ongoing audit function. The Evaluation Team considers this to be a relevant and appropriate intervention in an operation of this size. The primary role should be considered as one of support rather than oversight, and as such the rest of the delegation needs to make more use of the function in a collaborative manner, which is not happening sufficiently at the moment.

4j: The Continuing Role of PADRU

There is a consensus that the early stages of the response operation were very good, and the PADRU team clearly worked long hours to support the operation, both in Panama and on deployment elsewhere. However, the RTE Team gathered, from many discussions with people involved, that PADRU seems to have lost its focus and is struggling with its redefined ‘Zonal Unit’ role. In this operation PADRU was engaged in the early days in the discussions and decisions regarding the deployment of the ERUs, and deployment decisions were made jointly with the input of the acting Head of PADRU, but subsequently it seems that decisions were being made at the Zone management level. The most experienced disaster management delegate currently in the Americas Zone office, who was also a former head of PADRU, was explicitly excluded from involvement in the Haiti operation from the early days by the Zone management, although he was involved in the subsequent months on a range of programming areas with Haiti. Soon after the Haiti response, PADRU was again involved in responses to the Chile

⁵³ Electric fans are available in the Port-au-Prince markets, although they are said to be of poor quality.

⁵⁴ There has been an opening for a local customs clerk, but it has not yet been possible to fill it.

⁵⁵ The first step in customs clearing is to obtain a franchise letter that entitles the HNRCS to import duty free. The burden is on the HNRCS to prepare this letter, signed off by the President, and finally approved by the Ministries of Health and Finance. This first crucial step can take several days to accomplish.

earthquake and the flooding in Mexico and Brazil. The composition of the initial Haiti FACT team⁵⁶ included nine members who have occupied key positions in PADRU in the past few years, including the FACT team leader, the IFRC Regional Representative for the Latin Caribbean and the three heads of operations that the operation has seen to date. This can lead to various conclusions, including that PADRU served as a school for disaster managers, and it appears that there was more experience (and authority) in the field in the early days than in the Unit in Panama.

The ongoing restructuring of the Zone Office seems to have contributed to uncertainties over the future of PADRU. The move from an operational Unit to one that serves as a hub for a more “systemic” approach to disaster response (ie: where NSs in the region support each other and welcome global solidarity) is commendable in theory, but the way it is being implemented limits the operational response capacity which should be paramount in the IFRC’s thinking. During the RTE a review of PADRU was being conducted by the IFRC Secretariat in Geneva and alternatives for the future of the Unit were being analyzed. Numerous PADRU staff indicated in discussions with the RTE Team that they remained unclear on the future structure of the Unit - and several senior PADRU staff have resigned in recent months.

Conclusion

- PADRU responded to the initial emergency in Haiti effectively, and to the initial needs in several other countries soon afterwards. However, the ongoing status of PADRU as an independent response Unit seems to be unclear to many, including internal staff, and indicates an insufficiently planned decentralization process.

Recommendations

R42: The review of PADRU currently underway needs to analyse in detail the role the Unit has had in the Haiti response, and whether this is considered appropriate and acceptable to the IFRC Secretariat, to help produce informed decisions about PADRU’s future.

Chapter 5: Opportunities, Challenges and Risks in Programming for Early and Longer Term Recovery

5(i): Recovery Transition

The decision to deploy the ‘Scoping Mission’ early in February is seen as positive and a very focused input from which to plan the recovery options. Although the follow-up RAT process is a new tool which the IFRC has now deployed twice, there appears to have been insufficient link-ups between the Scoping Report and the later RAT Report – many of the Scoping Mission’s recommendations have not been further developed, particularly regarding the livelihoods/economic security field⁵⁷. The RAT Report – which took a large effort by a large team up to six weeks to complete – made a number of relevant recommendations, but many of these do not appear to have been taken up subsequently in the IFRC’s Plan of Action.

With major relief operations now gradually phasing out (although relief will be ongoing for many more months in some sectors), emphasis is being laid on moving towards recovery and reconstruction by the humanitarian community. In the case of Haiti it is recognised now that relief, transition and recovery will all continue at the same time, with no clear delineation of the different activities. Within the IFRC, there is the need to develop and agree a clear framework for managing the overall operation involving the various elements of the overlapping areas of activity. Currently, the thinking is scattered, and there is no formally agreed framework or plan which has been discussed or agreed by Movement partners. This is causing a sense of uncertainty as different individuals have different perspectives of what the operation should be in future.

The RTE tried to grasp some of the key issues that will need to be taken on board in developing the IFRC’s recovery strategy and action plans, and these are covered in the following sub-sections on OD and Capacity Building, Shelter, Health, Livelihoods, Water & Sanitation, and DP/DRR. While examining these issues, the RTE has taken the Montreal commitments as a reference point as these constitute an agreed results framework for the entire operation.

However, one area which was neither mentioned nor enquired about during the RTE mission was non-housing construction projects. Past large-scale emergency responses (in Bam and Sri Lanka for example) have opened up opportunities of institutional construction also, notably schools and medical facilities, professionally built to earthquake resistant standards. Such buildings are vital to maintain community cohesion and re-development, are focal points within communities for many reasons, land tenure should not be an issue, and larger building projects could offer opportunities for employment. It is

⁵⁶ PADRU staff were integrated into the follow-up FACT mission also.

⁵⁷ One member of the RAT team reported that the Scoping Mission’s full report had not been made available to that Team.

unknown if such projects have been considered for Haiti, and what decisions may have been taken around this area of intervention⁵⁸.

5(i)a: OD & Capacity Building (Item 1 of the Montreal Declaration)

The third pillar outlined in the Plan of Action for Haiti was designed to address the growth and development of the HNRCS across Haiti, which is also the first enabling action in Strategy 2020⁵⁹: *"Build strong National Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies"*.

The HNRCS was significantly impacted by the earthquake and many of its staff and volunteers lost family members and relatives, homes and other assets, as well as being affected in numerous other ways. The HQ building and other infrastructure in Port-au-Prince and other towns was badly damaged, and the NS is now operating out of the base camp offices in Port-au-Prince.

There is a good cadre of branch level staff and volunteers across the country, and a limited number of middle management staff. The President is very much 'hands-on' and takes all key decisions, and has played a very active role in the operations since January. The HNRCS has been heavily involved in the relief period, in providing volunteers and finding local staff, and in facilitating – wherever possible – the work of the Movement partners. The Haitian public recognises what the National Society does to support the population and the NS's profile has grown considerably since the widespread involvement in relief activities.

With the scale of the activities facing the RC Movement in Haiti, it is recognised by most RC partners that there needs to be a concerted effort to assist the HNRCS to develop its capacities to assist the operation more effectively, but also to strengthen the structures and sustainability of the Society itself.

IFRC support in recent months

There has been no in-country IFRC presence, except for a finance delegate, for several years, and interaction between HNRCS prior to 12 January was handled by the Regional Representative in Santo Domingo. He was also the first IFRC official to be in contact with the HNRCS after the earthquake, and arrived in Port-au-Prince in the morning of 13 January. His role as the primary OD contact has continued since then.

Although it was proposed to include an OD delegate on the FACT team this was not considered a priority and did not happen. Subsequent attempts to recruit a dedicated OD delegate for the Haiti delegation have so far come to nothing, principally because the profiles of those applying and/or their language skills were considered weak. The ongoing organizational support has therefore remained with the Regional Representative, with back-up from the Zone OD delegate (based in Lima) and the Haiti Country Representative. A full-time OD delegate is still not employed within the delegation.

In Montreal it was agreed that a special advisor, with knowledge of the NS and able to form strong working relations with the leadership, should be hired to map out a comprehensive plan⁶⁰. One PNS supplied a delegate for two weeks to assist with this, with the support of the Regional Representative.

Capacity Building areas

In the short to medium term there remains the need to build the delivery capacity of the HNRCS for the period of the earthquake operation, by working closely with the Society to determine what structural requirements are needed and how decision-making authority can be spread out to reduce bottlenecks. The President has confirmed she is open to change but this needs to be taken forward via the identification of positions required in a new structure, identifying and employing the right persons for the positions, and agreeing devolution of authority. This needs to be actively led by the HNRCS supported by the IFRC. It is important to avoid the PNSs and other partners developing their own strategies of support for the HNRCS, and the National Society thus finding itself pulled in too many directions. The Montreal Declaration stated: *"A concerted approach in supporting the HNRCS to build its capacity and their role in civil society in light of the context is needed"*.

The RAT Report quoted the President as saying she foresaw the need for capacity building in the HNRCS's core areas of health, logistics and disaster preparedness. The HNRCS needs to work out where it was before the disaster and where it wants to be in maybe three or four years. The IFRC's "Strategic OD Guidance"⁶¹ document outlines the areas which a National Society could develop internally during the extended response period, areas which the NS needs to work on during the same

⁵⁸ Some information on this subject has been received subsequently: most schools and medical facilities in Haiti pre-earthquake were privately owned, and thus their replacement raises ethical questions about rebuilding private business infrastructure. However, the RTE team would suggest this is an area to explore if there are government facilities in need of rebuilding.

⁵⁹ IFRC, Strategy 2020: Saving Lives, Changing Minds

⁶⁰ This document has not been seen by the RTE Team

⁶¹ IFRC Geneva OD Department: Strategic OD Guidance, Emergency Response and Recovery Planning for the Haiti Earthquake Response, , January 2010

period but making use of the additional but temporary RC support available to it, and a third area where the NS accepts it cannot become engaged and which can be contracted out. Finding agreement between the HNRCS and the IFRC on this last part is important. Determining these areas at this point would help the HNRCS identify the areas where increased capacity for the operational implementation of the earthquake response is required, and plan for its strengthening in the longer term.

The RTE Team also discussed possible peer support, or peer learning groups at senior NS levels, to try to develop a two-way institutional exchange of experiences regarding large-scale emergencies, their impact and the opportunities which have developed through them. This would be a counterbalance to the strong views and pressures expressed by the larger donors in this operation, and allow the HNRCS to learn from other host NSs' experiences. There could be value in enabling such sessions between NSs directly involved in recent large disasters – eg: Iran, China, Indonesia, India, Kenya, Philippines, and so on.

Conclusions

- At a local level there had previously been only limited engagement between the IFRC and the HNRCS on a regular basis, and the delegation is still not resourced at this time to make any significant OD inputs;
- Without any consistent input, the NS risks being pulled or pushed in different directions by its various partners rather than via a unified approach. Some PNSs are already beginning to do deals directly with the HNRCS for their own needs rather than look at the collective needs of HNRCS and the wider Movement partners;
- The HNRCS is not adequately structured to lead and support the large scale of the current and future operation, and as such is perceived as being a bottleneck in certain areas. Working through a strategic planning exercise should identify these areas and problems and allow the HNRCS to increase its capacity accordingly.

Recommendations

- R43: Determine and clarify the OD roles and responsibilities within the IFRC's country and regional team;
- R44: Urgently find and place a suitable OD delegate(s) within the IFRC country team with clear milestones set on moving forward with the OD process;
- R45: PNSs should be brought back to their commitment of working in "a concerted approach" rather than along individual lines of engagement;
- R46: The HNRCS should accept that it has to actively address the needs to scale up in a number of key areas of management and support functions, and to move ahead to ensure they remain 'in the driving seat' as anticipated;
- R47: Consider the establishment of a Peer Learning Network of senior management of affected NSs who have the past and current experience of having to scale up and restructure following a major natural disaster.

5(i)b: Health (Item 2 of the Montreal Declaration)

Until April, the RC hospitals and clinics operated on five fixed and 41 mobile clinic sites. Most of the 95,000 patients treated to date have been for non-communicable diseases and everyday emergencies. Over 390 deliveries and 1,339 surgeries have been performed and 150,000 people have been vaccinated. Over 9,000 people have been reached through community-based health activities, and 4,000 people have been directly reached through health promotion⁶². In addition millions of health messages have been disseminated via the SMS communications system described earlier.

Currently those NSs operating health facilities suggest that they are working largely without any effective coordination mechanism. There have been problems with information sharing and coordination since the early days, mainly due to the serious understaffing of the IFRC's health department in Port-au-Prince. Few official coordination meetings were held in the early months and no meeting minutes were circulated for those not in attendance. Many of the PNSs, especially those based outside the capital, felt they required more engagement from the IFRC, and through them, to the Health Cluster.

Previously there has been only one delegate and no local staff in the IFRC's health department. The absence of notes from external or internal meetings⁶³ along with the turnover of the health coordinator with no face-to-face handover has resulted in almost no institutional memory. The new health coordinator had not yet attended a health cluster meeting (he had been in country for three weeks at the time of the RTE visit) and no effective coordination activities with the RC health sector partners was taking place.

Medical supplies have been problematic but requisition processing has been streamlined and all health ERUs now comply with the procedures. There is only one approved local supplier⁶⁴ and past deliveries have been incomplete for a number of reasons orders, although this is improving now. Orders via IFRC Geneva take up to five weeks to arrive. On arrival, the supplies, including drugs, are often inappropriately stored in tents where the daytime temperatures regularly exceed 40

⁶² According to the IFRC-wide Reporting for Haiti

⁶³ A recent search one PNS engaged as a medical ERU was unable to find any meeting notes and only one memo sent to their team email address.

⁶⁴ The IFRC has only validated one local supplier who offers a strict quality control on its supply, monitored by the PAHO/WHO quality assurance team

degrees (this was seen both at the base camp and at the ERU Field Hospital). It is unclear at this time whether the drugs are rendered dangerous or useless by such exposure to heat over extended periods of time. However, it is also unclear whose responsibility it should be to ensure a proper storage system in place – several PNSs assumed it should have been the IFRC to establish one, but this view is not shared by the IFRC and is perhaps unrealistic. Both these issues, however, are currently being addressed by the medical logistics delegate.

Medical services in Haiti have traditionally been provided to a large extent via the private sector, for which fees have been charged. After the earthquake the medical agencies offered their medical care for free, which meant that the private sector lost its income. The balance between providing free health care and not undermining the local health system was highlighted in another RTE⁶⁵ conducted in February 2010:

“Generally, in Haiti, you have to pay to gain access to healthcare and it is too expensive for many Haitians. Nevertheless, this sector is a large source of jobs. The instigation of free medical aid is crucial, due to the level of extreme poverty, but would threaten the viability of numerous medical centres. How to deal with these two issues is extremely delicate”.

The Government of Haiti has now announced that all facilities should begin charging fees for services from mid-July. Several medical NGOs have already indicated that they will not charge for their services, while others have already begun charging⁶⁶. The ‘delicate’ position identified above now requires a decision by the IFRC, as several of the RC medical units will continue to operate beyond the government’s deadline. The government has been asked to clarify the timing and expectations so that the humanitarian agencies can plan accordingly and once they provide further information, decisions will need to be made quickly as to how to deal with this issue. The IFRC Secretariat’s Health Department in Geneva will need to take the lead on this.

Conclusions:

- Information sharing and coordination mechanisms need to be re-established and prioritized by the IFRC health coordinator to the health ERU teams in particular, but also to the other PNSs as they work to develop longer term health projects;
- Involvement by the IFRC at the Health Cluster meetings has been inadequate, and the resultant lack of sufficient information flow has impacted negatively on the RC partners working in the health sector;
- Ordering⁶⁷ and inappropriate storing of medication has been a challenge, with some unrealistic expectations of the IFRC set by several PNSs;
- The government’s decision to ask NGOs and other international agencies to stop providing free medical care, and the implications this may have on the RC partners’ work, will need to be quickly addressed once certain clarification is received from the authorities.

Recommendations:

- R48: Attendance at the Health cluster meetings and better dissemination of the information gained there needs to begin as soon as possible;
- R49: Suitable storage facilities for medical supplies need to be found as a matter of urgency;
- R50: The Health Department in Geneva, in conjunction with the delegation management, health staff and PNSs in the field, will need to decide a policy to address the issue of charging for medical services and ensure this is disseminated to all partners.

5(i)c: Shelter (Item 3 of the Montreal Declaration)

The earthquake affected over three million people, of whom an estimated 1.3 million were displaced. There are currently 150 registered sites and almost 1,200 highly congested, spontaneous camps containing around 1.5 million people in Port-au-Prince and other affected areas⁶⁸, many of which are located in high-risk areas prone to landslides and flooding, on steep slopes or in low-lying areas. Some 101,000 individuals are currently living in high-risk sites. More than half a million people had moved to outlying *départements*⁶⁹ to live largely with host families, but also in camps⁷⁰. These numbers continue to change as a proportion of the population moves to, from and between urban camps and outlying *départements* on a regular basis.

⁶⁵ François Grünwald & Blanche Renaudin: *Real-time Evaluation of the Response to the Haiti Earthquake of 12 January 2010*; Mission Report, 04 April 2010 (Evaluation funded by the French Ministry of Defence’s Strategic Affairs Directorate)

⁶⁶ Operations Update, 21 May 2010

⁶⁷ More recent information indicates that the issue of delivery delays has largely been resolved by the local drugs supplier; and the majority of drugs orders from Geneva are delivered within a couple of weeks.

⁶⁸ Numbers from UN OCHA’s Humanitarian Bulletin, 19 June 2010: [http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/RWFFiles2010.nsf/FilesByRWDocUnidFilename/MINE-86KR32-full_report.pdf/\\$File/full_report.pdf](http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/RWFFiles2010.nsf/FilesByRWDocUnidFilename/MINE-86KR32-full_report.pdf/$File/full_report.pdf)

⁶⁹ Haiti is divided into 10 *départements*, administrative jurisdictions similar to states or provinces. Four of these *départements* have received almost 400,000 of the over 500,000 displaced people: Artibonite (capital: Gonaïves), Centre (capital: Hinche), Grande Anse (capital: Jérémie) and Nippes (capital: Miragoâne).

⁷⁰ Action Plan for Recovery and Development of Haiti, Government of Haiti – Immediate Key Initiatives for the Future, March 2010

The continuous movements of people from one camp or neighbourhood to another, including the movement to and from outlying rural areas, have made any proper planning of interventions difficult. More than a month after the earthquake, more than 60 percent of the displaced people in and around Port-au-Prince had still received no plastic sheeting or tents and were under the sun, in makeshift shelters without any adequate protection from the elements⁷¹. Occupants were living in densely packed, inadequately constructed shelters of salvaged materials (such as corrugated iron sheets), or with tarpaulins, blankets and bed sheets.

The IFRC's Response in the Early Phase:

Collectively, the RC had provided emergency shelter materials in the form of tarpaulins, tents and shelter kits to 98,900 households⁷² by the middle of April, ie: within 90 days of the disaster. In the first few weeks, there was slow progress towards the provision of emergency shelters by the entire humanitarian community, and distribution of items only picked up at the end of February. This delay was partly due to the continuous movement of the population; however, a major factor which also contributed was the endless debates within the humanitarian community over whether to provide plastic sheets or tents, or to start building houses immediately, and if so where would the land be available, etc. According to several interlocutors, these debates wasted a lot of time as by now it should have been clear from all previous similar disasters that regardless of what long term strategy is decided upon, people certainly need emergency shelter for the initial months at a minimum.

Within the RC Movement, the IFRC mobilised one relief ERU to concentrate on the distribution of emergency shelter materials. It was the first time that a focused relief ERU was deployed, with a specific focus on emergency shelter distribution. This team arrived on 26 January and was the last of the four relief ERUs to get to Haiti. This ERU then found they were being managed by the shelter delegate within FACT which was problematic; these issues were resolved when line management reverted to the relief delegate in FACT. The deploying NS argued that the shelter technical team (STT) was relevant only for transitional shelter (TS) and/or house construction later on, as part of recovery and reconstruction work, but not during the initial weeks when the focus was on distribution of emergency shelter materials. In fact the ToRs for the STT indicate that it is the tool to provide the technical capacity at field level to undertake detailed assessments, engage with the Cluster, and to support the programme teams in operationalising shelter activities.

With the exception of the Relief ERUs there was no other operational shelter capacity deployed by the Zone or otherwise mobilised through rapid recruitment. This is perhaps the most significant issue in the shelter response in Haiti. The STT (deployed from Geneva, comprising members of the Geneva technical department and others recruited by the Geneva department due to the lack of availability of any PNS technical roster personnel) was deployed to provide the technical support (the "thinking") to aid the operational personnel, who never materialised. This led to the oft-repeated criticism that the STT spent all their time "thinking" and not "doing". By default, due to the lack of any other operational capacity, the STT ended up "doing" the shelter plan of action activities – but as the STT personnel were the short term deployments as explained above, their timeframes were always going to be limited.

The Haiti country representative requested the respective STT leaders to extend a total of five times – due to the continuing lack of mobilisation or recruitment of shelter programme personnel. The Zone HR team has so far mobilised only one shelter delegate (the Zone shelter technical delegate who was then redeployed to Chile). However, as stated elsewhere, other interviewees suggest the recruitment support provided by the Geneva shelter department could be enhanced and should extend beyond the STT and cluster responsibilities.

Many RTE interviewees felt there were *"very many shelter people who all did separate things"*: the STT, the FACT/Shelter, the Shelter ERU, and the shelter operations team: the "thinking" and the "doing" as above. But once again, as seen in numerous other situations, the shelter cluster coordination function was unclear to many in the delegation even during the time of the RTE visit, and work still needs to be done, internally in the IFRC, to get this message across.

The Emergency Shelter Cluster and the IFRC's Role of Cluster Convenor

The International Organisation for Migration (IOM) was initially given the task of coordinating shelter activities but was replaced as Emergency Shelter Cluster Lead by the IFRC on 10 February, which allowed IOM to focus on other cluster obligations. Since that date the IFRC has deployed a substantial team of delegates on rotation to facilitate the cluster coordination and provide the information management, and all of the external agencies interviewed during this RTE viewed the IFRC's leadership of the cluster as very positive. The IFRC is seen as proactive in bringing issues to the table for discussion among the cluster membership and the fact that the coordination is happening not just in Port-au-Prince, but also in outlying *départements*, is particularly appreciated.

⁷¹ François Grünwald, Blanche Renaudin. Real-time evaluation of the response to the Haiti earthquake of 12 January 2010 Mission: 9-23 February 2010, Mission Report - French Ministry of Defence's Strategic Affairs Directorate

⁷² IFRC-wide Reporting for Haiti – Internal Results Report, April 2010

While this is appreciated and acknowledged, it needs to be set against the problems mentioned elsewhere regarding recruiting and retaining suitable delegates for critical positions. It is perhaps relevant to point out that the shelter cluster coordination roster is directly managed, based on the obligation to the IASC, by the Geneva Shelter Department who actively recruit and train appropriate staff and maintain the roster to ensure it can fulfil its commitment. It is to be noted that, even with this high number of delegates required, the commitment has been fully met, although the same cannot be said for the recruitment of shelter delegates into direct operational positions which the technical department does not directly assist with.

Although the cluster has not yet been able to articulate a clear strategy for the post-emergency phase (neither transitional shelter nor permanent housing) due to the complexities of the situation in relation to land titles, lack of land availability, the government's policy of decongestion (moving people from Port-au-Prince to rural and peri-urban areas), the coordination mechanism through the cluster is helping members to coordinate their response and plans on an ongoing basis. Several cluster members are already moving toward building TSs on land where title deeds are clear, or are undertaking repairs to houses in rural areas.

In Haiti, donor agencies are playing an active role in the cluster. It is reported that some donors - namely ECHO and OFDA - are pushing through their own designs and cost parameters on the NGOs they fund, in the absence of clear recommendations on designs and cost parameters from the cluster.

The IFRC's shelter work in the months ahead

Although the RTE was tasked to look at the operation until the time of arrival in Haiti, the following paragraphs are included to try and capture some of the underlying debate present in the delegation and elsewhere. The challenges in moving forward with these issues, and ensuring a 'holistic' approach with the livelihoods and watsan programmes, are clear to many and need to be addressed - and the absence of a shelter programme coordinator in Haiti, until now, has resulted in very limited progress in strategic programme thinking.

The IFRC's Montreal Declaration and the subsequent Plan of Action set a target of 30,000 "appropriate transitional shelters as soon as possible". However, except for a few pilot shelters for demonstration, work is yet to commence⁷³ on construction of any TSs. Increasingly, within the Movement, there is a greater understanding of the fact that given the complexities of the situation in Haiti - namely, non-availability of useable land, the urban nature of the disaster, problems over land tenure, lack of the government's capacity to put in place a coherent policy on land issues, etc. - no single strategy or approach will work, and hence a variety of solutions will need to be found to address the shelter/housing issues in the medium to long term.

The Government of Haiti, which had earlier indicated that it would relocate a large number of households from Port-au-Prince as a strategy for decongesting the city, has recently come up with a revised strategy⁷⁴ which gives emphasis to a range of options. These include:

- Returning to a home assessed as structurally sound: "green house" (safe, no repair needed) or "yellow house" (repairs needed)⁷⁵;
- Relocating to live with a host family who would welcome them in safe plots or safe homes, anywhere in the country;
- Moving or remaining in 'adequate' proximity sites⁷⁶ within original neighbourhoods;
- In very specific instances where there is no other option, relocation to a planned temporary relocation site (eg: Corail-Cesselesse in the peri-urban area north of Port-au-Prince).

Within the IFRC's shelter operations team and the Movement shelter coordination team, there is now an increasing understanding of the need to move forward on shelter using multiple approaches, rather than being fixed on the single-track idea of building TSs. Land availability is still a major constraint, but it should not stall the response to shelter needs of the affected communities.

Debris removal from individual plots (estimated at 40 million cubic metres⁷⁷) to carrying out repairs to houses which are assessed as structurally sound⁷⁸, and providing material and cash assistance to families to rebuild their own shelters/houses on cleared land, are part of a wider range of interventions that could contribute towards the overall shelter needs. In some cases, providing survivors with employment and cash transfers through clearing of rubble early on can lead to families

⁷³ As at the time of the visit of the RTE Team, in late May 2010

⁷⁴ Government of Haiti Settlement Strategy Outline, May 2010

⁷⁵ Currently the Ministry of Public Works is undertaking a house to house assessment of structural damages and classifying the surveyed houses on the basis of earthquake damages into three categories: (a) green - no damage; (b) yellow - some damage needing repairs; and (c) red - totally damaged or needs demolishing as the structure is unsafe; these indications are sprayed in coloured paint at the entrance

⁷⁶ Existing small sites in proximity to point of origin (spontaneous sites) may be considered proximity sites

⁷⁷ HEC, Haiti Earthquake Reconstruction Taskforce.

⁷⁸ Engineering inspections being conducted by U.S. military engineers estimate that up to 40% of homes in Port-au-Prince are structurally sound and safe for people to move back into, even when some parts of the building may still require light repairs.

rebuilding their own houses. Taking the time to ensure that all usable building materials are recovered and recycled is a way to ensure that the poor will be able to afford to rebuild.

As several previous earthquake responses (eg: Maharashtra, Gujarat, Bam) have shown, in-situ reconstruction can take advantage of existing infrastructure and community facilities, while minimising resettlement and social dislocation. It is generally observed that following major natural disasters, victims tend to clamour for relocation during the early days following the disaster, but with time the importance of preserving community relationships and social cohesion overrides the urge to relocate⁷⁹.

The IFRC shelter team, in collaboration with the Movement Shelter Coordinator in Haiti, needs to explore and articulate a holistic strategy on shelter outlining these various options. It needs to be noted that technical issues on design of TS over which protracted discussions within the Movement appear to have currently stalled are of much less importance than the need to get going on a multi-pronged approach, based on community needs. Shelter, for the affected victims, is not a design issue. For the communities who need it, shelter is intimately linked to, and determined by, their access to livelihoods and other community needs. The IFRC will need to therefore take into account the livelihoods and other needs of the affected communities in developing a shelter strategy. The IFRC may need to 'remarket' or 'rebrand' the commitments for "30,000 ... appropriate transitional shelters" made in Montreal into something like "appropriate housing solutions" because of the operating context in Haiti at present, but maybe better now to accept that than to have to defend the situation in six or 12 more months.

In the last few weeks, the IFRC has developed a few design options for TSs⁸⁰ based on the concept of core shelters and transitional shelters as follows:

- (a) Core Shelter: Provision of a standard package of construction materials – timber sections, CGI/metal roof sheeting, additional plastic sheeting for walling or floor coverings, fixings, etc. – to enable households to construct a safe, robust core shelter of 12m² which can be moved and extended where space and resources allow.
- (b) Transitional Shelter – Timber/steel Frame: Provision of a standard package of construction materials – timber/steel sections, CGI/metal roof sheeting, additional plastic sheeting for walling or floor coverings, fixings, etc. – to enable households to construct a safe and robust transitional shelter of 18-24m² which can be moved and extended where and when space and resources allow. When using steel frames, shelter can be made on two floors, each with a floor area of 12m² to make a total floor area of 24m². The steel frame provides an earthquake and hurricane resistant shelter.

While these designs are simple enough and can be implemented reasonably quickly, as a large quantity of materials is now in place in Port-au-Prince, the shelter strategy needs to incorporate a range of interventions appropriate to each family's circumstances and needs to include the reinforcement of livelihoods. As was observed by the RAT team in March, the IFRC could:

"... immediately start shelter programme activities in non-affected areas that will provide former inhabitants of Port-au-Prince with opportunities to restart their lives and remain in their départements of origin. Immediate support will need to provide a basis for income generation for displaced families".

In the decisions arising from the Montreal meeting it was made clear - and indeed a condition of considerable funding by a number of PNSs - that the IFRC would specifically undertake TS implementation in Port-au-Prince, and that the PNSs would focus on regional opportunities. With the IFRC – and all other agencies - still facing considerable constraints over land in Port-au-Prince, one or two NSs are beginning to make some headway in TS implementation in outlying areas.

Haiti has no enforced building codes or construction quality inspection, and before the earthquake less than 10-15 percent of building construction had a design professional involved. The result is that as many as 85-90 percent of buildings were destroyed in Léogane, and up to 60-70 percent of buildings in some districts of Port-au-Prince⁸¹. Moreover, a large number of houses were on sites which are still highly hazard-prone (for example, on steep slopes and terrain vulnerable to landslides). Hence hazard mapping for sites where replacement building will take place must be undertaken before embarking on any construction work, whether for TS or for permanent housing.

⁷⁹ <http://web.worldbank.org/external/default/main?noSURL=Y&theSitePK=1324361&piPK=64252979&pagePK=64253958&contentMDK=22451659>; visited on 22 May 2010

⁸⁰ IFRC. Emergency and Transitional Shelter in Haiti, undated

⁸¹ Haiti Recovery Assessment, Volume 1 – Synthesis Report, 29 March 2010

Conclusions

- The IFRC has more than met its target for providing emergency shelter kits;
- Transitional shelter provision has been slow to start in terms of procurement and distribution. It could have been speeded up if a great deal of time had not been taken on clarifying the “what and how” of transitional shelter which usually comes as a medium term/interim response after the first emergency phase is over;
- The relief ERU dedicated to emergency shelter deliveries should have been considered as one of the relief units and managed by the FACT relief delegate from the outset;
[Postscript: These issues have subsequently been discussed at the global shelter meeting and the relief ERU meeting (in Paris in April), with an agreement that in future this will be the case];
- There was poor understanding about all the various shelter teams and delegates which caused frustration and confusion. The agreed and approved roles of the various teams was unclear to many interviewees and there was seen to be ‘so many shelter people’ who only worked within their own lines of responsibility;
- The IFRC has led the Emergency Shelter Cluster well and its role is acknowledged by all external interlocutors. A more proactive leadership on shelter options, designs and cost parameters from the early stages of the cluster process would have given the Cluster and its members greater leverage to negotiate with donors on funding for the shelter response;
- Shelter is understood as a ‘product’ to be delivered, rather than seen as a process which incorporates various components of psychosocial support, community relationships and more importantly, livelihoods strategies of the affected communities. Given the government’s weak capacity - which is unlikely to change dramatically in the medium to long term - TS will evolve into permanent ‘housing’ and this would mean that TS will need to be planned and delivered in a manner that facilitates active involvement of the affected communities;
- The shelter commitments previously made may be undeliverable given the current operating context and there needs to be more work done on understanding the range of other options and possibilities for delivery of housing solutions, and perhaps to rebrand or remarket the commitments as additional information becomes available;
- A systematic hazard mapping of all sites where TS will be built is required. The government does not have in place appropriate building codes for new constructions, although UNDP has already been supporting the Government on hazard assessment.

Recommendations:

- R51: For the IFRC, given the strategic importance of shelter issues, consideration should be given to creating a specific shelter ERU capacity – as opposed to a subset of relief – which can be deployed early on during the response in all future disaster responses. This would also help facilitate transition from emergency to transitional shelter⁸²;
- R52: A Movement shelter strategy for Haiti incorporating a multi-pronged approach to shelter solutions for communities, which involves large-scale rubble clearance through cash for work, owner-built shelters, repairs to damaged houses, in-situ reconstruction where land deeds are clear, more work in outlying areas and linking shelter with livelihoods needs to be articulated and agreed by members of the Movement urgently;
- R53: In the light of the above (Recommendation #52) a new plan of action needs to be drawn up incorporating a multi-pronged approach to the shelter and livelihoods needs of the population. The plan needs to recognise that, unlike in the response to the Indian Ocean tsunami, in Haiti the TS will probably ‘evolve’ into permanent housing. More importantly, the plan also needs to recognise that delivering the TS will take more than 12 months, and therefore, for at least the next one year, the living conditions in the temporary shelters/tents will need to receive adequate attention from all humanitarian organisations;
- R54: The IFRC needs to work with UNDP, the Government of Haiti and the Shelter Cluster to ensure that technical capacity is available for systematic hazard mapping of all houses and sites where TS/permanent houses will be built.

5(i)d: Livelihoods

Although a livelihoods intervention was not part of the Montreal Commitments, it is discussed here as an important component directly linked to shelter solutions for the affected people. The Government of Haiti’s recovery action plan⁸³ puts the total damages and losses due to the earthquake at US\$ 7.9 billion, representing nearly 45 percent of the country’s GDP in 2009, of which 70 percent is borne by the private sector and 30 percent by the public sector. The government has had a strong and visible presence as the lead for all sectors in the Post-Disaster Needs Assessment (PDNA), a joint assessment facilitated by the World Bank, the UN and donors. The government has also stated that the 2008 Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) will be used as the basis for recovery and reconstruction, and the PDNA will provide a vision for the country, and function as a programming tool for the PRSP, inclusive of disaster and recovery needs⁸⁴.

⁸² Haiti Earthquake, January 2010, End of Mission Report, Jean-Pierre Taschereau

⁸³ Action plan for national recovery and development of Haiti

⁸⁴ MPCE (2010). Termes de Reference pour l’évaluation des besoins post désastre après le tremblement de terre de 12 janvier 2010 en Haïti, Port-au-Prince: Ministère de la Planification et de la Cooperation Externe. Available at: <http://onerresponse.info/Disasters/Haiti/Early%20Recovery/Pages/default.aspx>

Besides the damages to infrastructure and utilities, loss of livelihoods and damage to the small and informal businesses in urban and peri-urban areas has driven hundreds of thousands of people to the impoverished countryside which already was overburdened with the bulk of the country's workforce, who eke out a meagre living from the low-productivity rural sector⁸⁵. For the affected communities, regaining some control over their livelihoods is the highest priority.

RCRC Response on Livelihoods

The response so far has been minimal in this area (by the RC Movement and other agencies). The RAT Report emphasised the need for Movement partners to come up with a wide range of appropriate entry points for programming, including replacement of lost assets, improving access to credit, intervening in market systems, improving small-scale infrastructure, investing in the skills base and improving rural productivity:

"The Recovery Framework will need to provide space for creative solutions to the needs while supporting the development of capacity in the appropriate locations and at the appropriate levels. Movement partners should plan to scale up livelihoods programming across all operational areas as part of an integrated approach to service provision and as a means to gradually exit from the current modality of substitution for basic services"⁸⁶.

The Plan of Action also suggests: *"livelihoods programming across [all] operational areas as part of a holistic approach to service provision and as a means to gradually exit from the current modality of substitution"*, and gives a range of possible interventions. Beyond a couple of basic pilot projects to date, it appears however that the IFRC has not yet begun serious discussions on this broad sectoral input⁸⁷ and time is slipping while this is discussed but not being brought together as a realistic strategy for implementation.

For the first ten weeks after the disaster, there was no delegate or adviser on Livelihoods in the IFRC team. In early April, a Recovery Coordinator was brought in for six weeks and he recently submitted a draft recovery strategy. This delegate has now completed his assignment and it is unclear to the RTE Team if the IFRC now intends to bolster its capacity on livelihoods programming in the coming months or not. The Evaluation Team saw or heard little evidence of any of this being planned, except for some cash distributions by one PNS and discussions on similar plans for limited cash distributions being developed by another.

As has been discussed in the shelter section above, shelter provision makes a special case for promoting livelihoods and economic recovery by backward and forward linkages. For example, the use of cash for work for rubble clearing in the early stages with the involvement of the community can, besides preventing distress sales of any productive assets by vulnerable families, provide psychosocial benefits to the affected communities.

The RTE Team suggests that the IFRC's recovery strategy needs to integrate cash assistance, cash for work and livelihoods interventions with its shelter and watsan strategies if it is serious about meeting the *priority* needs of the affected communities, rather than designing the programme based on IFRC's own perception of what the communities need. Experience in previous disasters has shown that:

"where people were given funds to repair their (housing) units, most families actually economised enough to build new ones. In the event, a much larger number of (quite comparable) new houses were built by families that were given funds just for repairs, and contractors were generally not involved. In those villages it was possible to use local people in construction, so employment was created for people from the disaster-affected region"⁸⁸.

The Early Recovery Cluster, led by UNDP, has recently developed a draft economic recovery strategy⁸⁹ which focuses on a three track approach:

- *Track A:* Livelihoods stabilisation through income generation and emergency employment, like cash for work interventions;
- *Track B:* Economic recovery for employment creation and food security;
- *Track C:* Sustainable capacity development and employment creation for inclusive economic growth.

The RTE Team does not believe that the IFRC is geared to working on the Track C approach to recovery. However, most of the major disasters in recent years (the Indian Ocean tsunami, the Georgia conflict, the Gujarat earthquake) have highlighted the importance of integrating livelihoods response with shelter using Track A and B approaches. It could reasonably be expected, by now, that the IFRC would have taken this lesson on board in designing its strategy from the early stages of a response. As the IFRC's expertise in the area of livelihoods is limited and the recovery response needs to be built on a holistic approach to shelter, livelihoods and other basic needs (particularly water and sanitation), the IFRC should consider leveraging

⁸⁵ Agriculture sector provides for 24% of the GDP of Haiti, and employs over three-quarters of the labour force.

⁸⁶ IFRC, *The Recovery Assessment Team – Synthesis Report*, March 2010.

⁸⁷ Only one PNS has initiated, in the last few weeks, a small 'basic needs supplement' pilot programme covering 3,000 families, with a cash grant of US\$ 50 per family. As a comparison, several other agencies are giving cash grants of up to US\$500 in three tranches, with ongoing monitoring on its use in between.

⁸⁸ World Bank Group. *Response to the Haiti Earthquake: Evaluative Lessons, 2010*

⁸⁹ UNDP. *Post Earthquake Economic Recovery Strategy for Haiti 2010-13, Draft 1*

its resources and logistics capacity to enter into partnerships with experienced NGOs who may have greater competences in other programming areas, and in livelihoods interventions in particular. This approach is currently not agreed by the HNRCS and work needs to be done with the Society to ensure that while it can be seen ultimately as a 'Red Cross programme', it can perhaps be delivered by another partner more qualified and experienced in the approach required ([see Section 5\(i\)a](#)).

Conclusion

- So far there has been a weak focus on livelihoods interventions by the RC, and as the RC moves towards transitional shelter implementation, the approach needs to integrate livelihoods with shelter, which will require significant bolstering of the IFRC's capacity to undertake more complex community-based programming in the field of shelter and livelihoods, and should include cash grants and a variety of other livelihoods interventions.

Recommendation

R56: The IFRC needs to immediately recruit and deploy a small team of delegates with expertise in livelihoods and cash grants who will work closely with the other programmes team to design and implement a joined-up approach to shelter/livelihoods programming;

R57: Additionally (or alternatively if Recommendation 56 proves impossible), the IFRC needs to explore external partnerships with more experienced NGOs or other agencies, in consultation with the HNRCS.

5(i)e: Water and Sanitation (Item 4 of the Montreal Declaration)

The Water & Sanitation programme area (watsan) has been, and remains, a major output of the ERU and IFRC teams on the ground, and the joint input by the RC Movement is a significant contribution towards the overall needs for watsan services for those affected by the earthquake. This scale of input is both vitally necessary and highly relevant and appreciated. This sector serves as a key life saving and health promotion ingredient, and represents an important part of the overall appeal, with the RC Movement having committed to a large proportion of the total service delivery in Port-au-Prince.

As many hundreds of thousands of people still live in the makeshift camps – with no immediate solutions emerging for their relocation or resettlement elsewhere – the ongoing 'relief' needs of a very large-scale intervention are obvious and vital. However, it is recognised in the sector that such a level of non-official inputs cannot go on forever, but equally accepted that a withdrawal strategy is proving extremely hard to develop⁹⁰.

The IFRC and other agencies are caught between the current (and continuing) necessities of supplying watsan services to the population in the displaced camps and the need to eventually withdraw from the supply of free services to return to the pre-quake market-driven situation. It is unclear at this time how and when such a withdrawal can be achieved. *[More details of the identified constraints and challenges faced by the whole sector are outlined in the WASH⁹¹ Cluster documentation⁹².]*

Previously, many areas of the city had no fixed distribution network, and water tankering was the normal means of supply in many areas. The population was used to having to pay for water for their consumption and other domestic needs. There is said to be sufficient quantity of water available to the urban water supply system but its distribution is a long-standing problem. For example, repairs are required to one of the city's main water supply pipes to stop significant leakages of treated water, but so far there is no agreement between the two separate government authorities responsible for the pipes⁹³, so despite it being a basic engineering task with funding potentially available, nothing can move ahead.

The arrival of the relief agencies and the wider use of trucking and distribution of free supplies of water have distorted the existing market and the longer it continues the more difficult it will be to withdraw these 'free' services and return to the previous methods. Of course, with so many people still in the camps withdrawal of these supplies is not yet an option, but a strategy of gradual withdrawal and a return to the pre-existing methods has to be worked on. It seems inevitable that people will live in temporary camps for another 6-12 months at the very least, so watsan needs – particularly sanitation & drainage during the current rainy season – will remain.

Current water supply per capita is far short of Sphere guidelines, at somewhere around five litres per person per day, but it is reported that this water is often not consumed⁹⁴ but only used for washing and other domestic purposes, while drinking water is again frequently being purchased from the traditional commercial supply lines.

⁹⁰ IFRC Watsan Team, Haiti: RC/RC Movement Watsan Challenges; 26.04.2010

⁹¹ WASH = Water, Sanitation & Hygiene

⁹² <http://groups.google.com/group/wash-response-haiti-2010/web/water-supply---beyond-water-trucking>

⁹³ DINEPA (Direction Nationale de l'Eau Potable et de l'Assainissement), and CAMEP (Centrale Autonome Métropolitaine d'Eau Potable)

⁹⁴ It is suggested that beneficiaries are not all drinking the distributed water, at least in some of the camps, as they have reverted to buying chilled water from the market.

Sanitation is also said to have improved in many areas since the earthquake through the provision and maintenance of portable or constructed latrines by many agencies. However, although Sphere standards have been set as the target⁹⁵, it is acknowledged that the reality is far from the target – lack of adequate space is one major issue, and lack of reporting by some agencies to the cluster has not helped give the full picture.

On 05 May, UN OCHA reported⁹⁶ the completion of nearly 10,000 latrines in displaced persons' settlements, as humanitarian organizations continued to work toward the planned target of constructing approximately 16,000 latrines in affected areas. WASH partners estimated an average client rate of 190 persons per latrine as of that date. The organizations continue work towards an initial goal of achieving a rate of 100 persons per latrine (still way below Sphere guidelines); however, WASH partners also indicated a need to develop a more accurate method for determining the actual need for latrines, as queues for latrine usage in the settlements are seldom noticed and residents are probably using facilities elsewhere.

Clearance and maintenance of the camp latrines and those on the streets has also been supplemented by the agencies' inputs in addition to the pre-existing commercial operations. Collection and treatment of this waste was a concern expressed in the report of the IFRC's Scoping Mission Report in early February⁹⁷. The UN, in conjunction with the government authorities, have constructed an emergency facility for receiving the effluent, and the cleaning costs per latrine have since dropped significantly, although they remain above a sustainable level for the local authorities. The IFRC has imported two top-of-the-line liquid waste disposal trucks (still awaiting registration) and while these can be operated during the 'emergency phase' it is unclear how, when and to whom their long term operation will be transferred.



For solid waste, although still fairly dirty in many areas of town, Port-au-Prince overall is reported to be cleaner than before the earthquake after placement of street bins and a range of community clean-up campaigns, all funded by UNDP and other external agencies.

External coordination by the IFRC with other agencies in the sector – notably via the WASH cluster mechanism – has overall been good although a couple of PNSs suggested there could have been better transmission of information by the IFRC (who attended the WASH cluster meetings) to the involved PNSs (who did not attend). Concern over inadequate monitoring by some of the ERU teams was also expressed (and reported back to the PNS concerned directly by the RTE Team), but equally praise for others in terms of the excellent quality of initial and ongoing work which they have done. The large expectations now moving onto the under-staffed IFRC team present a major challenge for the months ahead, despite the clear message that the RC is playing an invaluable role in this sector.

As already commented upon in the RAT Report⁹⁸, there needs to be more coordinated and better integrated planning for watsan service provision in the future, especially as the shelter and livelihoods components will – hopefully - see a change of emphasis away from service delivery to the camps and more to provision to communities resettling in new or former living areas. As it is being recommended that a review of the shelter strategy be undertaken to look at developing a more flexible and multi-pronged approach to shelter delivery, this would be the time to ensure integrated planning is undertaken with the watsan - and livelihoods - teams.

The withdrawal of the watsan ERU operations has also created an additional pressure on the IFRC team in the ongoing water supply programme, partly because not all the necessary equipment has been transferred by the departing teams but also because sufficient delegates have still not been recruited to take on the increased responsibilities. At the time of writing there are nine open watsan positions posted on JobNet⁹⁹ and this shortage severely impacts on the team's ability to undertake its work adequately.

Conclusions

- The RC Movement has made a significant and valuable contribution towards the overall needs of the affected population in water and sanitation, through the inputs of the various ERU teams and the IFRC programming. This work,

⁹⁵ Sphere guidelines state one latrine per 20 people should be the target

⁹⁶ [http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/RWFiles2010.nsf/FilesByRWDocUnidFilename/MUMA-8592EF-full_report.pdf/\\$File/full_report.pdf](http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/RWFiles2010.nsf/FilesByRWDocUnidFilename/MUMA-8592EF-full_report.pdf/$File/full_report.pdf)

⁹⁷ Haiti Recovery Scoping Mission, Preliminary Analysis and Recommendations; Santiago Gil et al for the IFRC; February 2010 (page 9)

⁹⁸ Haiti Recovery Assessment, Vol1 Synthesis Report, 29 March 2010 (page 29)

⁹⁹ <https://jobnet.ifrc.org/public/index-ifrc.asp> (as at 22 May 2010)

along with the coordination activities, needs to continue for the foreseeable future. The IFRC, with an insufficient staff complement, is under increased pressure to take over the additional activities left behind by the withdrawing ERU teams;

- Eventual withdrawal from the mass provision of water and sanitation services to the camps has to be planned, but at the moment, with no clear strategy for dealing with land issues and shelter options, and therefore the movement of the people away from the camps, such planning is extremely difficult.

Recommendations

R57: Through better integrated planning with other sectors, and more coordination with the main governmental authority DINEPA, work towards scaling back the distribution of free services needs to be developed and implemented;

R58: Urgently strengthen the IFRC WASH team with the necessary staff;

R59: Continue to engage with all other WASH sector agencies and with the government authorities at the highest levels to determine a coordinated, realistic and timely strategy for exiting from the ongoing heavy 'relief' commitments;

R60: With the departure of ERUs, the IFRC needs to bolster its own WASH implementation capacity in particular as the current WASH facilities may not be able to cope with the rains in the hurricane season and would require massive upgrading and maintenance.

5(i)f: Protection Issues (Item 5 of the Montreal Declaration)

In Montreal in early February, the participants committed the Movement to recognise and address the specific needs of the more vulnerable parts of the affected populations. The RAT team included a gender focal person and their report highlighted gender and protection as two of the six cross-cutting issues, and recommended developing "a protection-related operational framework for the Haitian context" as well as gender sensitization training for all Movement personnel working in Haiti, including HNRCS staff and volunteers. Nevertheless, all IFRC operations have applied accepted guidelines for GBV and other gender and protection elements (eg: location and set up of latrines and washing facilities) within the project design.

Although a range of possible interventions was outlined in the Plan of Action, neither the three month Federation-Wide Progress Report¹⁰⁰ nor the May Operations Update¹⁰¹ make any mention of protection activities. Certain suggested programme activities (eg: restoring of family links or the identification and disposal of mortal remains) are anyway seen as ICRC activities.

Placement of a gender based violence (GBV) delegate was decided (by Geneva) early on in the operation, but without any discussion with the Haiti team¹⁰². Although a delegate was recruited and funded by 26 March¹⁰³, this post was not officially approved until 27 May¹⁰⁴. The delay in accepting this post and the lack of gender sensitization training generally puts the IFRC in a delicate position. Work is moving forward on the prevention of violence against children and women by a number of PNSs in different sectors, and several are developing services for survivors of violence, including medical assistance and counselling. Other PNSs are providing violence prevention training for volunteers, and one PNS has a ten-step tool to train RC Movement personnel on creating safe environments. The arrival of the GBV delegate as well as the staffing up of the IFRC's health coordination department should help in the adoption of these programmes and practices across all Movement partners.

A number of inappropriate behaviour issues have been reported within the base camp (see comments under Human Resources: Living Conditions and Security). Although these were dealt with at the time, delegates need to be reminded of their obligations as signed in the Staff Code of Conduct, and an appropriate mechanism needs to be in place to prevent or deal with any such issues in the future.

Conclusions

- This is the first emergency operation where a gender focal person has been included as part of the assessment team at such an early stage, but unfortunately this commitment was slow to be followed up in other ways;
- Although the IFRC committed to providing assistance to restore family links or identify and dispose of mortal remains, there is no evidence of such programmes being implemented beyond what the ICRC may have done;
- While some PNSs are incorporating protection issues into their programming, it is not consistent across the Movement.

Recommendations

R61: It should be verified that all staff have signed and understand the Staff Code of Conduct and a zero tolerance policy (on sexual and gender-based violence) should be made clear and enforced; this should be reinforced at orientation sessions held on arrival in base camp;

¹⁰⁰ Operation Update released on 23 April 2010

¹⁰¹ Released on 21 May 2010

¹⁰² Based on an email chain

¹⁰³ Based on an email from HR

¹⁰⁴ Vacancy Status Update – Haiti May 2010

R62: Due to the known increase of GBV in the aftermath of disasters, gender issues should be systematically included in disaster response plans and staffing.

5(ii): Disaster Preparedness and Response Capacity at National Level

The last major earthquake in Haiti was about 150 years ago. However, being in the Caribbean, this country is visited by tropical storms and hurricanes with regular frequency. The hurricane season of 2008 saw four storms hit the country with very heavy rains. The rugged hillsides, stripped bare of almost all natural cover due to deforestation, allowed waters to flood into large areas of the country¹⁰⁵. Particularly hard-hit was Gonaives, the fourth largest city. The hurricanes killed 793 people, destroyed 22,702 homes and damaged another 84,625. About 800,000 people were affected – eight percent of Haiti's total population. The flood wiped out 70 percent of Haiti's crops, resulting in dozens of deaths of children due to malnutrition in the months following the storms. Damage was estimated at over US \$1 billion, the costliest natural disaster in Haitian history until the earthquake. The previous year, tropical storm Noel also brought similar misery to the country, although the scale of destruction was much lower.

On top of the natural disasters, the country's political landscape is fragile, and riots and uprisings occur periodically. National elections are due early next year¹⁰⁶, and public anger at what is seen by people as the government's inept handling of the post-earthquake response could potentially trigger riots and violence on the streets, which could plunge the country's volatile political and security situation into crisis.

All of these are scenarios against which ongoing humanitarian operations will have to continue, as well as respond to new humanitarian crises in the form of flooding of temporary camps and eventual displacement, fresh displacement in flooded or hurricane-affected areas, displacement due to political violence, etc. Any of these could also affect the ongoing recovery programme, and communities may have to live in the temporary camps for longer than is necessary if work comes to a halt during the election period.

As was noted in the RAT report, institutional capacity for disaster response in Haiti was critically affected by the earthquake. Despite external support, the present capacity of the HNRCS and the Civil Protection Agency to act as effective national coordination mechanisms for disaster response is limited. At the national level, UNDP and the International Strategy for Disaster Reduction are already working with the Government of Haiti to revitalise disaster preparedness plans for the next hurricane season and longer-term disaster risk reduction (DRR) strategies. At the national level, the HNRCS is part of the body responsible for disaster management, the National Disaster Management Agency (NDMA), which offers the Society a unique position to shape national policy and plans on disaster preparedness (DP).

DP/DRR within the IFRC Programming

One of the RC's three pillars of the Haiti operation is DP/DRR, which aims at integrating preparedness activities to mitigate the effect of future emergencies with risk reduction strategies that enable the communities to reduce their vulnerability to future disasters. DRR corresponds to section eight of the RC Code of Conduct¹⁰⁷ which requires that relief aid must strive to reduce future vulnerabilities to disasters as well as meeting basic needs. The aim of DRR is to build safer communities and increase resilience to a range of shocks, including natural hazards (such as floods, earthquakes and droughts), man-made hazards (such as fires, road accidents) and health epidemics. DRR is an approach to programming that emphasises the importance of capacity building of at-risk communities through organisation and participation in disaster mitigation or prevention activities. *"In a DRR approach, at-risk communities (individuals, families, households) are actively engaged in identification, analysis, reduction, monitoring and evaluation of disaster risks in order to reduce their vulnerabilities and enhance capacities"*¹⁰⁸.

The IFRC in Haiti has developed a DP/ DRR plan¹⁰⁹ which has two components: (a) community-based disaster preparedness; and (b) institutional preparedness and capacity building of HNRCS. The second component builds in contingency planning as integral to the institutional preparedness. As part of the institutional capacity building for the HNRCS, a Disasters Management Operations Centre will be located in Hinche in order to ensure that there is decentralised capacity outside the city of Port-au-Prince for rapid response. The IFRC intends to work with the regional committees of the HNRCS in high risk areas and train the staff and volunteers in search and rescue, first aid and needs assessment, as well as installing appropriate equipment and protocols for communication. Additionally, the Haiti delegation and HNRCS have established and trained ten emergency Response and Assessment Teams who will be first responders in case of a localised disaster – eg: storm damage or flooding – affecting those already displaced. These teams have already been deployed several times.

¹⁰⁵ <http://www.wunderground.com/hurricane/haiti.asp>

¹⁰⁶ Originally scheduled for November 2010; reportedly put back to February 2011

¹⁰⁷ The Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and NGOs in Disaster Relief

¹⁰⁸ Source: British Red Cross Society, Position paper – Disaster Preparedness and DRR

¹⁰⁹ IFRC. *Disaster Preparedness and Disaster Risk Reduction Haiti 2010 and Onward – Surge Project*

The IFRC should continue to work with the HNRCS to ensure plans and capacities to deal with various situations are put in place in the next few weeks. The likelihood of one or the other of various scenarios (flooding, hurricane, political turmoil) coming to reality is very high in a country like Haiti and the government will be hamstrung by its inadequate capacity to deal with any of the scenarios. In this regard, the recommendations made in the RAT report are highly relevant and need to be seriously acted upon.

In particular the following RAT recommendations need urgent attention¹¹⁰:

- Strengthen the operational and administrative capacity of HNRCS relief services for at least 24 months by financing the structure (including human, financial and logistical resources) and the offices required;
- Improve the HNRCS internal telecommunications network nationwide;
- Provide equipment and emergency basic training for at least 4,000 volunteers;
- Train at least 600 volunteers from HNRCS branches throughout the country on disaster preparedness, national intervention teams, damage assessment, Sphere standards, etc.;
- Strengthen the operational and administrative capacity of the Monitoring and Operations Centre in Hinche;
- Pre-position relief supplies in HNRCS branches to serve up to 10,000 families;
- Train identified community members in the use of pre-positioned stock and equipment; and
- Put in place a basic early warning system and evacuation plans in urban and rural communities, including camps of internally displaced people.

In terms of community-based DP/DRR, engagement with communities is yet to start, and as the recently deployed DP/DRR team begins its work, it is expected that this engagement will take place when the recovery work begins. The DP team in Haiti is working closely with programme sectors, watsan and shelter in particular, to ensure that contingency planning is integrated into all programme sector plans.

Conclusion

- The bulk of the earthquake-affected population now living in temporary camps is likely to remain in similar situations for at the very least the next six to twelve months. Contingency plans need to be developed and operational capacity put in place to deal with coming hurricane and rainy season as well as potential political instability which may lead to more displacements.

Recommendation

R63: Implement the recommendations regarding contingency planning made in the RAT report in collaboration with the HNRCS (as repeated above).

Chapter 6: Summary of Findings and Recommendations

This final section summarises the findings and recommendations presented in the previous Chapters, under 14 key headings.. A full list of the Recommendations made throughout the text is given in Annex Six in a tabular format to facilitate management response and follow-up.

1. Key Finding on Early Response

Overall, the first couple of months of the operation were seen by all interviewees as positive in a very difficult and complex operating environment. The RC Movement has been seen to have and to use its global tools quickly and effectively, which have profiled the universality and strength of the Movement admirably.

Core Recommendation:

Review the global tools for deployment in large operations, particularly the deployment-readiness and Standard Operating Procedures for all ERUs.

Detailed Recommendations:

- R1: Geneva ERU team to follow up with all ERU NSs to ensure compliance with procedures regarding updated information about readiness to deploy;
- R2: Undertake a detailed analysis on the ERU deployments in order to ensure that the valuable lessons from this massive deployment are crystalized;

¹¹⁰ The RAT Report

- R3: Review existing global tools, systems and SOPs (especially the ERU handover protocols) in order to draw lessons from the Haiti Operation so as to fully utilize the existing diversity of human and material resources available to the Movement.
- R4: As more and more regional NSs have begun to play vital roles in almost all large disasters in their regions, the IFRC Zone Offices, using their local knowledge of the NSs, need to orient the FACT teams before they are deployed about the importance of proactive engagement with and support to regional and other PNSs already on the ground.

2. Key Finding on Camp Management and Facilitation of RCRC response:

Camp management and facilitation for the entire RCRC response was generally good, despite difficult conditions and a fluid security environment.

Core Recommendation:

The living and working conditions in the base camp in Port-au-Prince can be significantly improved by making several minor practical measures which will go a long way in mitigating some of the harsh conditions delegates work in.

Detailed Recommendations:

- R17: The base camp ERUs need to have harmonized SOPs working to a single standard agreed for future deployments;
- R18: Management should encourage the installation of a small commercial kiosk on-site, to be run by local people, to sell food and drinks to delegates and staff; several water coolers should be purchased and positioned (and maintained) around the site;
- R19: The Haiti management needs to explore and consider what other accommodation options may be available to help encourage key delegates into long-term positions;
- R20: Consideration needs to be given to providing a range of leisure or sports activities, and maybe a 'cool area' within the camp;
- R21: Management should define and agree a range of possible options for delegates to be able to get offsite during the evenings for social evenings with other agency staff, meals in restaurants etc, from time to time;
- R22: Ensure options are in place, and known about, to enable necessary operational commitments to be met regarding evening meetings, etc.;
- R23: The hours of the curfew should be subject to regular review to take account of the prevailing situation around the city. Whether the hours are changed or not, delegates should be given clear reasons for why these decisions are being taken and the basis for taking such decisions (whether they are relaxed or tightened).
- R24: The Haiti management team needs to accept that there is a need for an appropriate level of health cover for the staff and delegates, and to revise the staff complement accordingly
- R25: National Societies and the IFRC need to ensure that all delegates arrive in Haiti with sufficient medication and vaccinations as they may not be available in country. Deploying NSs need to ensure this information is provided and verified in advance of travel.

3. Key Finding on Human Resources:

A very large number of delegates has been through this operation and the HR systems of the Movement have worked hard to find and recruit well over 1,000 delegates to date. The effective use of RDRT and RIT members (from Africa and the Americas respectively) is notable. The Evaluation team finds the current IFRC recruitment processes and procedures too bureaucratic, slow and inflexible, directly impacting on programme implementation, and this operation could be used to identify where further harmonization and streamlining of the HR procedures could take place. The situation in this instance is further compounded by overstretched capacity of the Zone office and the Haiti HR team, which have to date not been sufficiently resourced due largely to recruitment difficulties of HR staff. The HR planning also seems to have been done ahead of a detailed strategic plan on programming delivery for the period ahead, rather than being designed to respond to identified programme needs.

Core Recommendation:

The HR system, procedures and practices need a thorough overhaul as, while some of these may work perfectly well in small and medium sized operations, they hinder timely decision-making and implementation during times of large and complex emergencies.

Detailed Recommendations:

- R5: The HR capacity within a Haiti Support Team in Panama needs to be scaled up as a matter of urgency.
- R6: The strategic programme planning needs to precede the delegate planning and subsequent sourcing and recruitment to ensure the right delegates and staff are recruited for the identified jobs, rather than the other way around, so once the programme planning is done, the HR mapping will need to be redone accordingly;

- R7: If delegate salaries cannot be readily increased then 'hardship packages', terminal bonuses, 'education grants' and other similar incentives need to be quickly developed and agreed and made available to encourage more appropriately-qualified people to apply for the open positions;
- R8: Consultancy contracts could be more widely used which would allow more salary flexibility and a quicker result – managers/budget holders need to be able to make that call, within certain limits and oversight and for certain key levels of job, but without having to 'fight the system' each and every time;
- R9: HR in general needs to become considerably more creative and wide-ranging in where it advertises and posts open positions, and should consider making better use of more 'non-traditional' NS inputs and resources, tapping into wider markets and global expertise, sourcing people who would not know about or use the limited JobNet option;
- R10: Roles and responsibilities need to be defined for the relevant levels (eg: in the Zone) to enable a much shorter decision-making process, giving the authority to decide faster on more flexible contracting options, more creative remuneration packages etc.
- R11: Consider recentralising (to Geneva) all emergency recruitment procedures for the initial weeks of a major emergency, to take advantage of institutional knowledge of delegate and to allow the Zone to gear up its HR capacities.
- R12: The creation of unified HR Policies and Procedures for local recruitment should be made a priority and done in conjunction with those PNSs which have already created their own policies and procedures;
- R13: A working agreement should be developed with each PNS for IFRC HR services, even if a Status Agreement is not yet signed;
- R14: The Haiti delegation HR team needs to increase its staff complement to be able to provide those services adequately.
- R15: Key senior IFRC delegates should be routed through Panama before traveling to Haiti in order to meet Zone staff and receive an initial orientation;
- R16: A staff handbook or briefing file with information on policies, procedures, organizational structure and other necessary information should be available to all staff in Haiti; and a focal person should be assigned in Port-au-Prince to orient all new staff and be generally available to assist with new staff questions and needs.
- R29: Ensure staff policies and procedures are known to the staff and printed copied are available in the camp for reference purposes;
- R30: HR Geneva to ensure the policies and procedures published on the website are updated when they are amended;
- R31: The 'Principles and Rules in Disaster Relief' policy document needs to be better profiled by the IFRC and NSs during regular DP work, and it needs to become better understood and adhered to by the NSs themselves.

4. Key Finding on Management Issues:

There continues to be a lack of clarity on roles and responsibilities, and therefore on levels of decision making authority at all levels. The current Zone set-up in Panama offers insufficient capacity for providing dedicated support to the Haiti operation.

Core Recommendation:

Greater clarity in delineation of authority between Geneva, the Zone Office and the Country Office is needed, and a dedicated Haiti Support Cell with full authority and control over all aspects of the Haiti operation and support functions in Panama needs to be created urgently.

Detailed Recommendations:

- R26: Develop a Haiti Support Cell at Zone level, with an adequate staff complement which should be empowered to make decisions and to find answers efficiently; and should work closely with and directly for the Haiti operation. Reporting to the Zone Director and the Secretary General in a matrix relationship, the Head of the Support Cell will have full authority and control over all aspects of the Zone's support functions for the Haiti operation. It should be time-limited and funded from the Haiti budgets. There should be regular and close interaction between the post-holders and the Haiti team, including regular field visits;
- R27: The Haiti Country Representative should be empowered to run the country operation and should be able to resource his/her support needs accordingly. S/he should be held accountable to deliver on the agreed plans and given the latitude and authority to make the decisions necessary;
- R28: Senior management in Geneva needs to agree the strategic directions with the Zone and Haiti teams, and then stand back and allow Panama and Haiti to deliver and be held accountable for that delivery, and support them as necessary.
- R42: The review of PADRU currently underway needs to analyse in detail the role the Unit has had in the Haiti response, and whether this is considered appropriate and acceptable to the IFRC Secretariat, to help produce informed decisions about PADRU's future.

5. Key Finding on Movement Coordination:

Learning from the tsunami response, the IFRC's coordination mechanisms in large disasters have become clearer, as was evidenced in this operation involving a large number of PNSs. There is need for greater emphasis on "big picture" analysis

and planning, joint problem solving, as well as identifying opportunities to address the capacities and interests of the RC partners.

Core Recommendation:

Ensure coordination thinking and delivery is at the forefront of all planning and engagement by all delegates and is not seen as just one person's responsibility; and ensuring that established mechanisms are in place and used effectively.

Detailed Recommendations:

- R32: Ensure that expectations regarding the IFRC's coordinating role are clearly understood, and better reflected in job descriptions, action plans, and the work of all delegates;
- R33: Further clarify what support services and supplementary services the IFRC Secretariat is obliged to provide to its membership, and sign the required agreements with the partners;
- R34: Ensure full implementation of the various coordination mechanisms included in the signed Movement Coordination Framework (SCC, MP, OCC, TC) plus the three additional leadership and coordination mechanisms, as necessary;
- R35: While an IFRC coordination delegate for Léogane is being identified, place an acting delegate and/or establish a coordination mechanism that can be closely monitored from Port-au-Prince; and re-evaluate whether a delegate is needed in this position in Jacmel.

6. Key Finding on Working with Government and External Partners:

There is insufficient engagement at the highest inter-agency or government levels, usually the responsibility of the Country Representative, and additional momentum could possibly be achieved on a range of current issues if this was strengthened.

Core Recommendation:

The IFRC needs to be more proactive in forging agreements beyond the Movement where the relevant resources are not available within, and where it does engage with governments and inter-governmental processes (like the Interim Commission, now being set up) it needs to do so with caution without compromising the RCRC principles.

Detailed Recommendations:

- R36: The Country Representative needs to concentrate on increased interaction beyond the RC Movement – closer and more regular links need to be established and maintained with external agencies, the UN and the Government of Haiti;
- R37: The Country Representative also needs to further explore possible link-ups with other partners on areas such as livelihoods interventions, where the RC Movement is traditionally weak, and ensure that the HNRCS is in agreement with this approach;
- R38: Obtaining the Status Agreement should be considered a priority for the country delegation.

7. Key Finding on Communication and Reporting:

Reporting in general was considered to have been very good by all stakeholders. The external communications role has been handled by Geneva rather than by the Zone. While acknowledging there needs to be a standardized output, this could have been handled differently and by now the Zone should be leading the process.

Core Recommendation:

Develop a communications strategy in agreement between Geneva, the Zone and the country delegation but over time ensure responsibility to deliver on this strategy becomes a Zone responsibility allowing Geneva to pull back while the Zone increases its capacity.

Detailed Recommendations:

- R39: The FACT reporting delegate should be able to concentrate on reporting for the Team, and be supported by a dedicated communications cell at Zone level and/or a communications delegate within the FACT;
- R40: In future large-scale emergencies, and if necessary (in terms of Zone capacity), consider placing a Communications Cell at the relevant Zone level to centrally handle all communications enquiries ... bring 'Geneva to the field' from the outset and run the communications from the Zone, thereby supporting and empowering the Zone in the longer term;
- R41: In this operation, responsibility should be transferred to the Americas Zone under the guidance and support, but not the direct management or direction, of the Geneva Communications Department. The Panama Communications Team should be strengthened to enable this happen.

8. Key Finding on Local Capacity and National Society:

At a local level there was limited engagement between the IFRC and the HNRCS on a permanent basis, and the delegation is not resourced at this time to make any significant OD inputs. The HNRCS is not adequately structured to lead and support

the large scale of the current and future operation, and needs to view this operation as a true opportunity to capitalise on the resources available to it, and to transform itself accordingly.

Core Recommendation:

The IFRC needs to develop its delegation capacity to provide appropriate OD and management support to HNRCS, as well as, within the region, determining the roles and responsibilities of PADRU as this will be a critical factor on how the IFRC responds to seasonal disasters in Haiti while the post-earthquake operation is ongoing.

Detailed Recommendations:

- R43: Determine and clarify the OD roles and responsibilities within the IFRC's country and regional team;
- R44: Urgently find and place a suitable OD delegate(s) within the IFRC country team with clear milestones set on moving forward with the OD process;
- R45: PNSs should be brought back to their commitment of working in "a concerted approach" rather than along individual lines of engagement;
- R46: The HNRCS should accept that it has to actively address the needs to scale up in a number of key areas of management and support functions, and to move ahead to ensure they remain 'in the driving seat' as anticipated;
- R47: Consider the establishment of a Peer Learning Network of senior management of affected NSs who have the past and current experience of having to scale up and restructure following a major natural disaster.

9. Key Finding on Health Sector Work:

The RCRC has been a key provider of high-quality medical assistance to the population following the earthquake which decimated the available health sector capacity, and as the operation moves into a reconstruction and recovery phase, there is the need to have a clear exit strategy of the health services being provided. Internal IFRC coordination of the health ERUs needs to be improved.

Core Recommendation:

The IFRC needs to urgently agree a clear policy vis-a-vis continuation of its hospital-based healthcare work in Port-au-Prince, particularly with regard to the government's policy of reverting to a paying system.

Detailed Recommendations:

- R48: Attendance at the Health Cluster meetings and better dissemination of the information gained there need to begin as soon as possible
- R49: Ordering of medicines needs to be streamlined and suitable storage facilities need to be found as a matter of urgency;
- R50: The Department in Geneva, in conjunction with the delegation management, health staff and PNSs in the field, will need to decide a policy to address the issue of charging for medical services and ensure this is disseminated to all partners.

10. Key Finding on Shelter:

The IFRC has more than met its target for providing emergency shelter kits. The post-emergency shelter commitments made in Montreal may be undeliverable given the current operating context and there needs to be more work done on understanding the range of other options and possibilities for delivery of housing solutions. In terms of IFRC's role as cluster lead on shelter, it has led the Emergency Shelter Cluster well and its role is acknowledged by all external interlocutors.

Core Recommendation:

A Movement-wide shelter strategy incorporating a multi-pronged approach which is appropriate for the mainly urban context of the Haiti earthquake needs to be developed, to provide clarity to all stakeholders as to the approach RCRC ought to take.

Detailed Recommendations:

- R51: For the IFRC, given the strategic importance of shelter issues, consideration should be given to the creating a specific shelter ERU capacity – as opposed to a subset of relief – which can be deployed early on during the response in all future disaster responses. This would also help facilitate transition from emergency to transitional shelter¹¹¹;
- R52: A Movement shelter strategy for Haiti incorporating a multi-pronged approach to shelter solutions for communities, which involves large-scale rubble clearance through cash for work, owner-built shelters, repairs to damaged houses, in-situ reconstruction where land deeds are clear, more work in outlying areas and linking shelter with livelihoods needs to be articulated and agreed by members of the Movement urgently;
- R53: In the light of the above (Recommendation #52) a new plan of action needs to be drawn up incorporating a multi-pronged approach to the shelter and livelihoods needs of the population. The plan needs to recognise that, unlike in

¹¹¹ Jean-Pierre Taschereau (FACT team leader), Haiti Earthquake, January 2010, End of Mission Report,

the response to the Indian Ocean tsunami, in Haiti the TS will probably 'evolve' into permanent housing. More importantly, the plan also needs to recognise that delivering the TS will take more than 12 months, and therefore, for at least the next one year, the living conditions in the temporary shelters/tents will need to receive adequate attention from all humanitarian organisations;

R54: The IFRC needs to work with UNDP, the Government of Haiti and the Shelter Cluster to ensure that technical capacity is available for systematic hazard mapping of all houses and sites where TS/permanent houses will be built;

11. Key Finding on Livelihoods:

So far there has been an insufficient focus on livelihoods interventions by the RC to date, and as the Movement moves towards transitional shelter implementation, the approach needs to integrate livelihoods with shelter, watsan and other programme areas. This will require significant bolstering of the IFRC's capacity to undertake complex community-based programming in these fields, and should include cash grants and a variety of other livelihoods interventions.

Core Recommendation:

The IFRC needs to develop a strategy to integrate its shelter work with the provision of livelihoods which is seen as critical to long term sustainability of any shelter programme.

Detailed Recommendations:

R55: The IFRC needs to immediately recruit and deploy a small team of delegates with expertise on livelihoods and cash grants who will work closely with the other programmes team to design and implement a joined-up approach to shelter/livelihoods programming;

R56: Additionally (or alternatively if Recommendation 55 proves impossible), the IFRC needs to explore external partnerships with more experienced NGOs or other agencies, in consultation with the HNRCS.

12. Key Finding on Water and Sanitation:

The RC Movement has made – and is still making - a significant and valuable contribution towards the overall needs of the affected population in water and sanitation, through the inputs of the various ERU teams and the IFRC programming. However, there is a danger that the withdrawal of the ERUs without a clear and agreed exit strategy may leave gaps which the IFRC may not yet have the capacity to fill.

Core Recommendation:

In consultation with local water and sanitation authorities and other providers, IFRC needs to develop a clear exit strategy, while at the same time continuing to provide the required services in the temporary camps.

Detailed Recommendations:

R57: Through better integrated planning with other sectors, and more coordination with the main governmental authority DINEPA, work towards scaling back the distribution of free services needs to be developed and implemented;

R58: Urgently strengthen the IFRC watsan team with the necessary staff;

R59: Continue to engage with all other WASH sector agencies and with the government authorities at the highest levels to determine a coordinated, realistic and timely strategy for exiting from the ongoing heavy 'relief' commitments;

R60: With the departure of ERUs, the IFRC needs to bolster its own WASH implementation capacity in particular as the current WASH facilities may not be able to cope with the rains in the hurricane season and would require massive upgrading and maintenance.

13. Key Finding on Protection:

The IFRC has been slow to take this commitment forward and needs to have an improved accountability mechanism in place, which includes consistent reinforcement of the Staff Code of Conduct.

Core Recommendation:

The IFRC needs to be more proactive in the field of protection and gender-related issues, both in programme planning and in delegate awareness.

Detailed Recommendations:

R61: It should be verified that all staff have signed and understand the Code of Conduct and a zero tolerance policy (on sexual and gender-based violence) should be made clear and enforced; this should be reinforced at orientation sessions held on arrival in base camp;

R62: Due to the known increase of GBV in the aftermath of disasters, gender issues should be systematically included in disaster response plans and staffing.

14. Findings on Contingency Planning:

The bulk of the earthquake-affected population now living in temporary camps is likely to remain in similar situations for at the very least the next six to twelve months. Contingency plans need to be developed and operational capacity put in place to deal with coming hurricane and rainy seasons as well as potential political instability which may lead to more displacements.

Core Recommendation:

R63: Implement the recommendations regarding contingency planning made in the RAT report in collaboration with the HNRCS.

Annex One: Terms of Reference

REAL TIME EVALUATION of the HAITI EARTHQUAKE RESPONSE

1. SUMMARY

- a. Purpose:** This RTE seeks to assess the effectiveness and efficiency of the coordination and management systems of the Haiti earthquake response operation, focusing on both relief and early recovery concerns. It will provide a snapshot of the current situation, including real-time feedback and learning to the IFRC in Haiti, the Zone, the headquarters in Geneva and to the members of the partner National Societies in the operation.
- b. Audience:** This RTE will be used by the IFRC in Haiti, the Zone, and in the headquarters in Geneva and it will inform all the RC/RC stakeholders involved in the Haiti earthquake operation.
- c. Commissioners:** This RTE has been commissioned by the USG of the Disaster Reduction, Response and Recovery Division, IFRC, Geneva
- d. Reports to:** The RTE team leader will report to a 3-person management group comprised of representatives of the Geneva IFRC Secretariat and the zone office in Panama.
- e. Duration:** approx 30 days
- f. Timeframe:** Between 6 April 2010 – 7 May 2010
- g. Location:** Haiti, Dominican Republic, Panama and Geneva (Switzerland)

2. BACKGROUND

An earthquake measuring 7.0 on the Richter scale hit the Caribbean nation of Haiti on 12 January 2010 at 4.53 p.m. (local time). The earthquake primarily affected the populations of the Sud-Est, Sud-Ouest, Nippes and Ouest provinces of the country, wreaking havoc on an already poor and vulnerable nation. The earthquake caused extensive damage to the nation's infrastructure and in particular to critical government and administrative functions in the major cities. Approximately 200,000 people are thought to be dead and 300,000 injured. A further 1.2 million are in spontaneous settlements.

Lack of shelter and sanitation are the biggest threats, particularly as we approach the rainy and hurricane seasons. There are also major contextual challenges affecting the response in terms of the capacity in country, the damage to the country's core infrastructure and government, the pre-existing poverty, the lack of space and the logistics of the operation. As a result, the relief phase will be extended for longer than usual (up to 12 months) and it will take time to hand over to the recovery and reconstruction.

The International IFRC now has an Emergency Appeal for the Haiti earthquake for CHF CHF 218.4 million launched on 9 February. This makes it the biggest single country response in the history of the IFRC. The aim is to reach 300,000 beneficiaries using the skills and resources of over 400 delegates, 33 partner National Societies and 21 ERU deployments and a 29 person FACT team to support the Haiti Red Cross response. The IFRC also now coordinates the Emergency Shelter Cluster, having taken over from the International Organisation of Migration (IOM) on 10 February.

This scale of the operation throws up a number of management and coordination challenges for the Movement and in response to this a Movement coordination framework is being set up, outlining forums for engagement at a senior or strategic management, operational management and technical management levels. Within this framework there are regular meetings between the different parties of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement. A Movement Coordinator has also been appointed to facilitate this process. A major partner meeting was also held in Montreal on 9 and 10 February to agree the way forward at the highest levels and a statement of commitment to assist the people and NS of Haiti was agreed.

The IFRC is holding this RTE because of its commitment to carrying out a high quality operation in terms of speed, efficiency and effectiveness and a commitment to accountability to beneficiaries needs, as well as to the donors to this operation. Due to the scale of the disaster, the number of external actors, both within and outside the RC, and the significant levels of funding, there will be a need for high levels of accountability and scrutiny in this operation and there will be international attention on the response and recovery operation in Haiti.

3. EVALUATION PURPOSE AND SCOPE

The International IFRC is committed to ensuring quality assurance, standards and a strong culture of lesson learning in its disaster response and, as such is committed to carrying out Real Time Evaluations (RTEs) in the wake of all major disasters requiring an international response. This evaluation is being carried out in the relief phase of the operation and has the following purposes:-

1. To examine the efficiency and effectiveness of the management and coordination systems used by the IFRC at all levels and highlight any gaps or bottlenecks. The RTE will feed back real time information to managers at field and headquarters levels to help them improve management and coordination and it will make recommendations to assist decision-making on the ground, in the Zone and in Geneva. As the relief phase in Haiti is likely to continue for up to twelve months it is important that this review feeds into the ongoing relief operation to improve delivery.
2. To analyse the current operation and situation in Haiti, in order to identify relevant opportunities, challenges and risks and to assist the IFRC Secretariat management in Geneva, Zone and country level to plan for future programming, especially the early and longer-term recovery and rehabilitation of the affected population.
3. To use its snapshot of the operation to identify the main lessons to be learned for the teams on the ground, for the IFRC Secretariat's management at each level and for the wider organisation.

The evaluation will focus on the combined IFRC response (IFRC Secretariat and NS) from the onset on 12 January until the time the evaluation team arrives in Haiti. It will consider links to ICRC activities, but will refrain from pronouncing on those activities. The RTE will not focus on the impact of the operation. It would also not look in detail at the work of each sector of the operation but would rather take an overall look at the operation overview and what has and had not worked. In relation to lesson learning and extrapolating these lessons across the wider IFRC, the unusual scale and circumstances should also be taken into account. Geographically, the RTE would focus on the operation in Port-au-Prince, but would also ensure it covers other operational centres such as Jacmel, Léogane and Carrefour.

4. EVALUATION OBJECTIVES AND KEY QUESTIONS

The RTE will focus on:-

- a) the effectiveness, efficiency, timeliness and appropriateness of the **assessment, planning and management processes and systems** put into place, from the outset and as the context / needs evolved, including identification of critical gaps and bottlenecks. And how this supported the timeliness and adequacy of the overall response;
- b) the adequacy of **coordination**, both with internal and external actors; and
- c) an analysis of the **risks and challenges** facing the operation.

Key Issues and Questions

Outlined below are the issues that the RTE will focus on, and within these some guiding questions on which the team will base its work. It is recognised that the team will not be able to address all of these questions in detail but will be guided by these questions:

Assessment, planning and management systems

- How timely and relevant were the different plans, appeals, and management reports?
- To what extent have plans been developed based on thorough, participatory needs assessments and if not, what were the constraints?
- How timely and effective was the response against the needs and stated objectives? What management or other factors explain why the response was/was not delivered in an effective and timely manner?
- How have recovery considerations been incorporated into planning and relief interventions?
- How effective were the systems to mobilize resources – financial, human resources, communications/media, logistics etc.? How adequate is the mobilization of human resources? And what challenges were faced in delivering the appropriate support? Was the IFRC’ operational structure well geared to deliver timely, efficient and effective disaster response?

Coordination

- How timely and effective is the coordination system within the IFRC (IFRC Secretariat and NS actors)? How well is the the structure functioning for both relief and recovery?
- Were the roles, responsibilities and expectations at each level clear (Geneva, Zone, and country)?
- How efficient and effective was the coordination of the Movement’s global tools, particularly the large scale mobilization of ERUs?
- How useful were the the International IFRC’s Principles and Rules in Disaster Response and what did the field need in terms of practical support to aid coordination?
- How effectively has the IFRC coordinated with external actors, particularly the UN (the cluster system), the Government, the military and the international and national humanitarian community?
- How has the role of neighbour governments / military forces and the NSs’ auxiliary role in relation to them had an impact on the operation?

Risks and challenges

- To what extent have critical gaps been identified and addressed in a timely way? What main factors helped or hindered the response (security events, infrastructure, procedures, access, etc.)?
- What gaps or bottlenecks still remain? Are there plans in place to address these already or is this an area that still needs to be addressed?
- Taking a snapshot of the situation in Haiti, what are the most serious risks or challenges facing the operation? What mitigating factors could be brought in to address these?
- In relation to the IFRC operation and the IFRC Secretariat management and coordination, what challenges or threats are faced? And what opportunities are there to address these?

5. METHODOLOGY

The RTE will be held in two phases – the first set of preparations and field visit will be held within the initial three months of the operation to examine the first response phase and inform subsequent implementation. The second evaluation visit will be held towards the end of the year to look at the follow up on the findings, recommendations and lessons of the first review and agree the final conclusion / recommendations of the RTE team on the operation. The present ToR are only valid for the first RTE field visit and report and further work will be done to agree the team and ToR for the second phase.

A management group will be set up to manage and support the RTE. It will comprise a representative of the Americas Zone Office, one from Disaster Services Department (DSD) and one from Performance and Accountability Department (PAD). The management group will discuss and agree the initial scope, workplan and timeframe of the RTE, with the RTE team, will support the and oversee the RTE process and will ensure agreement on the final report. It will have a role to quality assure the process.

The team will be fully briefed in Geneva, Panama, Santo Domingo and Haiti. During the course of the RTE they will fully engage with staff from the country management team, and the management at all levels. They will also meet with all other Movement actors in country. The team will not only focus on Port au Prince, but also visit Carrefour, Jacmel, Léogane, etc.

In country it will also meet with other actors, such as UN agencies, the Government, INGOs and NGOS, the military and other relevant actors and will include beneficiary perspectives as appropriate.

The team will be sensitive to the significant workload of the various teams and ensure that demands on those teams are kept to a minimum. A small team of people will be earmarked to support the RTE team on practical matters in Geneva, Zone and at country level, but while they are in country they should aim to be as self sufficient as possible.

The RTE forms part of an overall “Performance & Accountability Framework for Haiti” managed by the Zone, and as well as the RTE process, there will be other monitoring, review and evaluation processes that the RTE should be aware of and consider as informing their findings. This includes a series of exit surveys, run through survey monkey on the internet to interview all exiting staff and volunteers. This is a pilot and will look at wider feedback on the operation and its effectiveness / appropriateness. The RTE team should also consider other evaluations of the operation and end of mission reports / debriefs from teams such as the FACT / ERUs etc. The team should also look at the work of the Recovery Scoping Mission (RSM) and of the Recovery Assessment Team (RAT).

The team will report its preliminary findings to the in-country team and the Zone before leaving the region. The team leader present the key findings in Geneva within two weeks of the return from the field. A draft report will also be submitted within two weeks of the team’s return from the field, upon which the country, Zone and Geneva management will have one week to comment. The report will then be finalized to be shared by IFRC Secretariat senior management with agreed stakeholders. A consolidated management response will be provided within two weeks (including a plan for managing the follow up to the RTE). This will go towards informing a second RTE mission.

The second RTE mission will take place approximately six months later and will follow a similar process and timeframe and will have a separate ToR. The second mission will follow up on the recommendations and lessons from the first RTE and will assess the effectiveness and relevance of the recovery and rehabilitation.

6. EVALUATION DELIVERABLES

The RTE team will deliver the following:

Inception Report – The inception report be a scoping exercise for the RTE and will include the proposed methodologies, data collection and reporting plans with draft data collection tools such as interview guides, the allocation of roles and responsibilities within the team, a timeframe with firm dates for deliverables, and the travel and logistical arrangements for the team. This will also consider feedback to date from the “exit surveys” of returning staff carried out on the internet. The scoping exercise will allow the team to gather initial information and draw first impressions of key issues to be covered.

Debriefings / feedback to management at all levels – The team will report its preliminary findings to the in-country and Zone teams before leaving the region and will take on board any pertinent comments or corrections. The team leader will present the full report to Geneva management within two weeks of the return from the field.

Draft report – A draft report, identifying key findings, recommendations and lessons for the current and future operation, will be submitted within two weeks of the consultants’ return from the field. The country, Zone and Geneva management will have two weeks to comment.

Final report – The final report will contain a short executive summary (no more than 1,000 words) and a main body of the report (no more than 10,000 words) covering the background of the intervention evaluated, a description of the evaluation methods and limitations, findings, conclusions, lessons learned, clear recommendations. It would contain appropriate appendices, including a copy of the ToR, cited resources or bibliography, a list of those interviewed, and any other relevant materials. The final report will be submitted two weeks after receipt of the consolidated management feedback.

All products arising from this evaluation will be owned by the IFRC. The team leader and / or members will not be allowed, without prior authorization in writing, to present any of the analytical results as his or her own work or to make use of the evaluation results for private publication purposes.

7. EVALUATION MANAGEMENT and TIMETABLE

The RTE has been commissioned by the USG DRRR and will be managed by a management group (see section 5). The management group will oversee the conduct and quality of the evaluation. The team leader will report on progress or challenges to the management group. The preliminary and final reports will be submitted through the management group, who will ensure the quality of the report providing input if necessary. The management group will submit the report to the USG DRRR, who will oversee a management response and will ensure subsequent follow up.

Indicative timetable for the RTE process		
Hiring of Consultants / Contract signed	Early April	
RTE team to scope out RTE process/timeframe and submit inception report	Early to Mid April	
Desk Review and Study of Documents	Early to Mid April	
Mission Briefings in Geneva & Panama	Mid to end April	
RTE in Haiti and Santo Domingo	End April to mid May	15 days
Debriefings in Haiti, Panama and Geneva	Mid May	
Presentation of draft report	End May to early June	
Finalization of first phase report	Mid June	
Total Working Days for Consultants for first phase		30 days

8. ETHICAL STANDARDS

The evaluators should take all reasonable steps to ensure that the evaluation is designed and conducted to respect and protect the rights and welfare of the people and communities involved and to ensure that the evaluation is technically accurate and reliable, is conducted in a transparent and impartial manner, and contributes to organizational learning and accountability. Therefore, the evaluation team should adhere to the evaluation standards and applicable practices outlined in the IFRC Evaluation Policy.

The IFRC Evaluation Standards are:

1. **Utility:** Evaluations must be useful and used.
2. **Feasibility:** Evaluations must be realistic, diplomatic, and managed in a sensible, cost effective manner.
3. **Ethics & Legality:** Evaluations must be conducted in an ethical and legal manner, with particular regard for the welfare of those involved in and affected by the evaluation.
4. **Impartiality & Independence:** Evaluations should be impartial, providing a comprehensive and unbiased assessment that takes into account the views of all stakeholders.
5. **Transparency:** Evaluation activities should reflect an attitude of openness and transparency.
6. **Accuracy:** Evaluations should be technical accurate, providing sufficient information about the data collection, analysis, and interpretation methods so that its worth or merit can be determined.
7. **Participation:** Stakeholders should be consulted and meaningfully involved in the evaluation process when feasible and appropriate.
8. **Collaboration:** Collaboration between key operating partners in the evaluation process improves the legitimacy and utility of the evaluation.

It is also expected that the evaluation will respect the seven Fundamental Principles of the Red Cross and Red Crescent: 1) humanity, 2) impartiality, 3) neutrality, 4) independence, 5) voluntary service, 6) unity, and 7) universality. Further information can be obtained about these Principles at: www.ifrc.org/what/values/principles/index.asp

9. EVALUATION TEAM COMPETENCIES AND QUALIFICATIONS

The management group will select the members of the evaluation team, which will comprise three to four persons, including a team leader, up to two international staff and at least one regional or national team member.

The team members will have the following skills and experience:

- Demonstrable experience of conducting evaluations of humanitarian programmes and in particular of experience of leading or working on the evaluation of a recent major disaster;
- Good knowledge of strategic and operational management of humanitarian operations and an ability to provide strategic recommendations to key stakeholders;
- One person in the team with a good knowledge of Haiti;
- One person in the team with knowledge of support services systems,
- Strong analytical skills and ability to clearly synthesize and present findings, draw practical conclusions, make recommendations and to prepare well-written reports in a timely manner;
- Excellent writing and presentation skills in English and French (Spanish language capacities would be an asset).

10. APPLICATION PROCEDURES

Interested candidates should submit their application material by 7th April 2010 to Chihiro Sato (chihiro.sato@ifrc.org). Application materials should include:

1. **Curriculum Vitae (CV)**
2. **Cover letter** clearly summarizing your experience as it pertains to this assignment, your daily rate, and contact details for three professional referees.

Applicants may be required to provide examples of previous written work similar to that described in this ToR. Application materials are non-returnable and we thank you in advance for understanding that only short-listed candidates will be contacted.

Annex Two: Disaster Chronology

Event	Timing (all Haiti time)	Date
Earthquake in Haiti	16:53h	Tuesday 12 January
ERU Information Message by SMS	17:47h	Tuesday 12 January
ERU Alert by SMS	18:09h	Tuesday 12 January
FACT Alert issued by SMS	19:30h	Tuesday 12 January
ERU Deployment message by SMS (9 ERUs: Logs, IT, Relief x 2, RD Hospital, BHC x 2, Watsan x 2)	05:39h - 11:33h	Wednesday 13 January
FACT confirmation of deployment by SMS	07:15h	Wednesday 13 January
ERU Alert by SMS (Base camp)	07:55h	Wednesday 13 January
Preliminary Appeal issued		Wednesday 13 January
FACT TL departed Canada	12:30h	Wednesday 13 January
Initial FACT Team members arrive Santo Domingo		Weds 13 / Thurs 14 January
ERU Deployment message by SMS (base camp ERU)	10:09h	Thursday 14 January
Initial FACT members and first Relief ERU arrived Port-au-Prince by road from Santo Domingo	16:00h	Thursday 14 January
ERU Alert and then Deployment message by SMS (BHC, Logs)		Friday 15 January
ERU Alert by SMS for Field Hospital		Friday 15 January
ERU Alert and then Deployment message by SMS (Base camp II, MSM)		Saturday 16 January
ERU Alert and then Deployment message by SMS (Base camp II, MSM)		Friday 15 January
German RC Field Hospital ERU arrives in Port-au-Prince		Friday 22 January
NorCross/CanCross rapid deployment hospital operational		from Sunday 16 January
Establishment of Base camp		from Thursday 28 January
Handover from FACT Team to IFRC Operations Team		04 February 2010

Annex Three: List of People Interviewed

NB: Email contact with the following delegates & staff is via the "firstname.secondname@ifrc.org" unless shown differently. Those marked with * are not IFRC staff or delegates (their contact emails are shown where known).

Face to Face Interviews:

In Geneva

Andrew Rizk	Head of Finance
Angela Eaton	Senior Officer, Budget and Analysis Unit
Bekele Geleta	Secretary General
*Ben Mountfield	RAT Team member benmountfield@gmail.com
Benoit Porte	ERU Officer, Disaster Services Department
Birgitte Olsen	Head of Logistics
Dorothy Francis	Senior Officer, FACT, Disaster Services Department
Elise Baudot	Legal Counsel, Legal Department
Geri Lau	Head, OD Department
Graham Saunders	Head, Shelter Department
Hakan Karay	Relief Officer, Disaster Services Department
Jean-Etienne Brodier	Senior Officer, OD Department
Lars Tangen	Head, Security Unit
Lorna Lusambili	HR Coordinator, Field Support
Miguel Urquia	Shelter Department
Mikhail Chitashvili	Senior Procurement Officer, Logistics Department
Panu Saaristo	Senior Officer Emergency Health (previously in Panama; also on FACT team)
Paul Conneally	Manager, Public Communications
Pierre de Rochefort	Disasters Information Unit, Disaster Services Department
Pierre Kremer	Head, Communications Department
Pieter de Rijke	Senior Officer ERU, Disaster Services Department
Sandra d'Urzo	Shelter Department
Simon Eccleshall	Head, Disaster Services Department
Tammam Aloudat	Health Senior Officer, Water, Sanitation & Emergency Health Unit
William Carter	Watsan Officer, Water, Sanitation & Emergency Health Unit

In Panama

Ariel Kestens	Head of Zone Support Services
Carmen Ferrer	Zone Shelter Delegate
Felipe del Cid	RIT Coordinator
Hezela Caballero	Finance Officer, PADRU
Ilir Causaj	Logistics Delegate, PADRU
Jan Gelfand	Head of Operations
Jane Grimshaw	Zone PMER Coordinator
Julie Hoare	Zone Health and HIV Coordinator
Katia Gonzales	Zone Finance Delegate
Lorenzo Violente	Zone Health Delegate (also on RAT Team)
*Mauricio Bustamante	Outgoing acting Head of PADRU maurobus@une.net.co
Nelson Castaño	Zone DRR Coordinator
Omar Robinson	Disaster Management Officer, PADRU
Pablo Medina Ascuncion	Operations Coordinator (Geneva staff temporarily in Panama)
Paco Maldonado	Acting Head of PADRU
Pilar Forcen	Zone Communications Delegate
Ruben Cano	Haiti Support Team Coordinator
Tanya Wood	Regional Representative, Caribbean
Willem van Lippen	Zone Human Resources Delegate
Winnie Maganda	HR Delegate for Haiti
Xavier Castellanos	Director of Americas Zone

In Haiti

Alex Wynter	Communications Consultant
Alexander Bernal	IT & Telecoms Coordinator
Andrew Hawkesford	Security Coordinator
Andrew Jarjou	Relief Delegate

Bah Mamadou Dian	Programme Coordinator, Disaster Preparedness/DRR Team	
*Ben Harvey	Acting WASH Cluster Coordinator, UNICEF	
Bernard Omollo	Medical Logistics Delegate	
*Birgitta Kunz	Cooperation Delegate, ICRC	
Caroline Feeley	Administration Coordinator	
Charlie Musoka	Team Leader, Canadian Red Cross, Jacmel	charlie.musoka@redcross.ca
Cheryl Wijemanne	HR Delegate – staff on loan	
*Daniel Valcyn	Senior Driver, IFRC	
and numerous other Haitian employees of the IFRC		
*Dorcivil Sylvestre	Vice President, Haiti National Red Cross	
*Douglas Shire	Humanitarian Affairs Manager, World Vision	
Franco Kabuela Kaya	Finance Coordinator	
Gbetie Prosper	Relief Delegate	
Gianluca Salone	Watsan Programme Coordinator	
Greg McDonald	Shelter Cluster Coordinator	
Henna Korte	Finnish Red Cross ERU Team Leader	
Hope Weiner	Reporting Delegate	
Iain Logan	IFRC Head of Operations	iain.logan@globalemergencygroup.com
Iris Nolvi	Staff Health Delegate	
*James Brown	Team Leader, Humanitarian Civil/Military Coordination, UN OCHA	
Jeanette Hansen	Senior Assistant – HR team Geneva	
*Dr Jean-Pierre Guiteau	Director General, Haiti National Red Cross	
*Jean-Pierre Taschereau	Acting Canadian RC Team Leader (and head of original FACT team)	
Jens Poul Madsen	ERU Team Leader, Danish RC	
*Jim Kennedy	Shelter Programme Manager, CARE International	
Johannes Schad	Team Leader, German RC Field Hospital ERU	
John Kargotich	Civil/Military Coordination Officer, UN OCHA	
John Muathe Mutso	Watsan Delegate (and RDRT member from Kenya RC)	
Jorge Asprilla	Zone Finance Manager	
Jouko Keloneva	Security Delegate	
Julie Bastarache	Risk Management & Audit Officer	
*Laurence Oroma	Assistance Programme Manager, World Vision	
*Marcel Bovy	WatHab Delegate, ICRC	
Marcel Goyeneche	DP/DRR Delegate	
Marcel Fortier	IFRC Country Representative for Haiti	
Maria Angeles Fernandez	Delegate, Spanish Red Cross, Jacmel	
Maria Clara Attridge	DP/DRR Delegate	
Martha Pena	Senior Officer, Shelter Department	
Massimo Urbani	Health Coordinator	
*Matthew Marek	Head of Delegation, American Red Cross	
Members of the Relief Team of the Colombian Red Cross		
Members of the Relief Team of the Mexican Red Cross		
Norbert Allale	Relief Coordinator	
Odette Cyr	Support Services Coordinator	
*Oiwa Yutaka	Japanese Red Cross ERU Team Leader	
and all members of the joint JRCS and HongKong Red Cross medical team		
Ola Skuterud	Movement Coordinator	
*Per Andersson	Engineering & Env. Health Manager, Emergency Response Team, CONCERN	
Peter Finlay	Logistics Delegate	
Pilar Palomino	Spanish Red Cross Head of Operations in Haiti	
Poul Henning Nielsen	Danish ERU base camp manager	
Prosper Gbete	Relief Delegate	
*René de Vries	Recovery Programme Advisor	
*Renee Ryan	HR Manager – Canadian Red Cross	
Richard Fradin	Team Leader, French Watsan ERU	
*Rita Hoegh	Danish base camp kitchen manager	
*Rolond Palme	Head of DP/DRR, Haitian Red Cross Society	
Romain Guigma	Relief Delegate	
*Ronald Delice	Branch Secretary, HNRCS Jacmel	
Rosemary Parnell	Logistics Coordinator	
Salac Agal	Fleet Manager	

*Sandra Dessimoz	Deputy Head of Delegation (and Security Delegate), ICRC
*Saraswati Pasupathy	BeNeLux RC ERU team member
*Tom Dobbin	Shelter Programme Manager, CONCERN Worldwide
Vera Kremb	Gender Officer, IFRC Geneva (on mission in Haiti)
*Villagers and beneficiaries in 10 temporary camp sites in and around Port-au-Prince	
*Villagers and beneficiaries in two target villages in Cap Rouge District, Jacmel	
Xavier Génot	Movement Coordination (Shelter) Delegate

In Santo Domingo

Alexandre Claudon	IFRC Regional Representative, Latin Caribbean
*Dr. Dalbert Polanco	Head of Health Department; a.i General Director, Dominican RC
*Lidia Comary	Head of Disaster Risk Reduction Department, Dominican RC
*Sergio Vargas	Head of Relief Department, Dominican RC

By telephone

*Dominique Mathieu	Cooperation Department, ICRC, Geneva
*Dr Michaele A. Gédéon	President, HNRCS
*Hossam Elsharkawi	Former Emergency Team Coordinator for Norwegian RC (now Canadian RC)
*Lotte Relander	Cooperation Department, ICRC Geneva
*Niels Scott	Head of UN OCHA, Port-au-Prince
*Sandra Moretti	Cooperation Department, ICRC Geneva
*Walter Cotte	Director General, Colombian Red Cross

Via Email Questionnaire

The relief managers at the HQs of National RC Societies of the following countries received an email questionnaire: Turkey, USA, Great Britain, Qatar, Iran, Finland, Iceland, Ireland, France, Netherlands, Switzerland, Canada, Belgium, Spain, Colombia, Jamaica, Israel, Dominican Republic, Norway, Sweden, Germany, Hong Kong, Japan, UAE, Austria, Australia, Finland, New Zealand, Luxembourg, Singapore, South Korea, Denmark, Italy, Kuwait (34).
(Nine written responses to date).

Annex Four: Evaluation Team itinerary

Week of 01 to 07 May 2010	Initial briefings (team leader only) in Geneva
Weekend of 08/09 May	Team travel to Panama for initial briefings (one team member (TM) delayed by 24 hours due to ash cloud over Europe)
Monday 10 and Tuesday 11 May	Interviews with Americas Zone staff in Panama
Wednesday 12 May (all day)	Team travels Panama to Port au Prince via Miami Welcome Session and meeting with Country Representative
Thursday 13 May	Security Briefing Attended coordination meeting with IFRC team leaders Initial interviews with managers, delegates and staff at base camp Orientation trip around Port-au-Prince
Friday 14 May	Interviews with delegates and staff at base camp Attended coordination meeting with ERU team leaders Meetings with NGO staff and with UN OCHA
Saturday 15 May	Interviews with delegates and staff at base camp Field trip to attend coordination meeting in Léogane (one TM);
Sunday 16 May	Interviews with delegates and staff at base camp Field trip to Carrefour with visits to Danish RC project site and to German/Finnish RC field hospital ERU; interviews with delegates on these sites (three TMs)
Monday 17 May	Interviews with delegates and staff at base camp
Tuesday 18 May (national holiday)	Interviews with delegates and staff at base camp Telephone interviews with departed delegates
Wednesday 19 May	Interviews with delegates and staff at base camp Travel to and from Jacmel (two TMs) Meetings with Spanish & Canadian RC teams; and Haiti RC Branch Secretary Visit to two affected villages + one resettlement site around Jacmel
Thursday 20 May	Interviews with delegates and staff at base camp Meetings with several NGOs and the ICRC Feedback presentation meeting to management and coordinators
Friday 21 May	Travel Port-au-Prince to Santo Domingo
Saturday 22 May	Work on draft report and presentation
Sunday 23 May	Work on draft report and presentation
Monday 24 May	Meeting with IFRC Regional Representative in Latin Caribbean Working lunch with Relief Team from the Red Cross of the Dominican Republic
Tuesday 25 May	Meeting with IFRC Regional Representative in Latin Caribbean Team travel Santo Domingo to Panama
Wednesday 26 May	Work on draft report and presentation + final interviews
Thursday 27 May	Debriefings & presentation of preliminary findings to Americas Zone senior staff in Panama (two sessions)
Friday 28 May	Team departure from Panama

Annex Five: Biographies of the Team

The Evaluation Team was composed of four independent consultants, each with past evaluation experience and of working with the Red Cross Movement. The Team was put together by the Performance and Accountability Department in Geneva following the call for offers as outlined in the Terms of Reference (see [Annex 1](#) above). A management team of three IFRC officers (two in Geneva, one in Panama) was also formed to support and guide the process.

Martin Fisher (team leader) first joined the British RC in London in 1986 after a period working in Africa and the Middle East, and later spent several years in South and Southeast Asia as an IFRC delegate. After five more years working with the UN WFP, also in Southeast Asia, in 1999 he moved to Geneva to take up a post as Regional Officer in the IFRC Secretariat, and worked in the Africa Department, MENA Department (covering the post-war Iraq emergency operation), and finally in the Tsunami Recovery team. He left the IFRC in 2006 and has worked as an independent consultant since then, undertaking numerous programme reviews and evaluations for the IFRC, RC National Societies and other agencies.

Abhijit Bhattacharjee is a strategy and change management expert with over 27 years of senior management and consulting experience in international development and humanitarian organisations. He specialises in the creation and implementation of management system frameworks, enabling change managers and leaders in leading organisational change processes. Clients include the United Nations organisations, the European Commission, government agencies, humanitarian and international aid organisations. He is also an Executive Coach and certified NLP Practitioner.

Juan Saenz has 26 years of humanitarian experience, 16 of which have been within international humanitarian organizations at field level, local and national, as well as international HQs level. He has worked in Africa, Latin America, Asia and Europe. His experience includes various senior management and governance positions at local, national, regional and global levels within the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement. His experience also includes seven years as a senior humanitarian consultant for international and national organisations in almost 40 countries. Currently Juan is the CEO of Humanitarian Productions S.C., a Mexico Based company dedicated to video, media and consulting for humanitarian organizations.

Sandra Schimmelpfennig is the director of The Charity Rater, LLC and an aid blogger at 'Good Intentions are Not Enough'. Previously she was the programme coordinator for the American RC Tsunami Recovery Programme in Thailand, and the director of the Disaster Tracking Recovery Centre (D-TRAC) which tracked all international and national recovery projects in Thailand following the Indian Ocean tsunami.

Annex Six: Summary of Recommendations

<i>Recommendation #</i>	<i>Detail</i>	<i>Accepted</i>	<i>Responsibility</i>	<i>Comment / follow up / due by date</i>
3a: GLOBAL TOOLS				
R1 (page 11)	Geneva ERU team to follow up with all ERU NSs to ensure compliance with procedures regarding updated information about readiness to deploy			
R2	Undertake a detailed analysis on the ERU deployments in order to ensure that the valuable lessons from this massive deployment are crystalized			
R3	Review existing global tools, systems and SOPs (especially the ERU handover protocols) in order to draw lessons from the Haiti Operation in order to fully utilize the existing diversity of human and material resources available to the Movement			
3b: REGIONAL INTERVENTIONS				
R4 (page 13)	As more and more regional NSs have begun to play vital roles in almost all large disasters in their regions, the IFRC Zone Offices, using their local knowledge of the NSs, need to orient the FACT teams before they are deployed about the importance of proactive engagement with and support to regional and other PNSs already on the ground			
3d: HUMAN RESOURCES & SECURITY				
R5 (page 14)	The HR capacity within a Haiti Support Team in Panama needs to be scaled up as a matter of urgency			
R6 (page 16)	The strategic programme planning needs to precede the delegate planning and subsequent sourcing and recruitment to ensure the right delegates and staff are recruited for the identified jobs, rather than the other way around, so once the programme planning is done, the HR mapping will need to be redone accordingly			
R 7	If delegate salaries cannot be readily increased then 'hardship packages', terminal bonuses, 'education grants' and other similar incentives need to be quickly developed and agreed and made available to entice more of the right people to apply for the open positions			
R 8	Consultancy contracts could be more widely used which would allow more salary flexibility and a quicker result – managers/budget holders need to be able to make that call, within certain limits and oversight and for certain key levels of job, but without having to 'fight the system' each and every time			
R 9	HR in general needs to become considerably more creative and wide-ranging in where it advertises and posts open positions, and should consider making better use of more 'non-traditional' NS inputs and resources, tapping into wider markets and global expertise, sourcing people who would not know about or use the limited JobNet option			
R 10 (page 17)	Roles and responsibilities need to be defined for the relevant levels (eg: in the Zone) to enable a much shorter decision-making process, giving the authority to decide faster on more flexible contracting options, more creative remuneration packages etc			
R 11	Consider recentralising (to Geneva) all emergency recruitment procedures for the initial weeks of a major emergency, to take advantage of institutional knowledge			

	of delegate and to allow the Zone to gear up its capacities			
LOCAL STAFF RECRUITMENT				
R 12 (page 17)	The creation of unified HR Policies and Procedures should be made a priority and done in conjunction with those PNSs which have already created their own policies and procedures			
R 13	A working agreement should be developed with each PNS for IFRC HR services, even if an official service agreement is not yet signed			
R14	The Haiti delegation HR team needs to increase its staff complement to be able to provide those services adequately			
DELEGATE ORIENTATION				
R 15 (page 18)	Key IFRC senior staff should be routed through Panama before traveling to Haiti in order to meet key staff and receive initial orientation			
R 16	A staff handbook or briefing file with information on policies, procedures, organizational structure and other necessary information should be available to all staff in Haiti; and a focal person should be assigned in Port-au-Prince to orient all new staff and be generally available to assist with new staff questions and needs			
LIVING CONDITIONS				
R 17 (page 19)	Base camp ERUs need to have harmonized SOPs working to a single standard agreed for future deployments			
R 18	Management should encourage the installation of a small commercial kiosk on-site, to be run by local people, to sell food and drinks to delegates and staff; several water coolers should be purchased and positioned (and maintained) around the site			
R 19	The Haiti management need to explore and consider what other accommodation options may be available to help encourage key delegates into long-term positions			
R20	Consideration needs to be given to providing a range of leisure or sports activities, and maybe a 'cool area' within Base camp, for delegates to use			
SECURITY				
R 21 (page 20)	Management should define and agree a range of possible options for delegates to be able to get offsite during the evenings for necessary inter-agency meetings, social evenings with other agency staff, meals in restaurants etc, from time to time			
R 22	Ensure options are in place, and known about, to enable necessary operational commitments to be met regarding evening meetings, etc			
R 23	The hours of the curfew should be subject to regular review to take account of the prevailing situation around the city. Whether the hours are changed or not, delegates should be given clear reasons for why these decisions are being taken and the basis for taking such decisions (whether they are relaxed or tightened)			
STAFF HEALTH				
R 24 (page 21)	The Haiti management team needs to accept that there is a need for an appropriate level of health cover for the staff and delegates, and to revise the staff complement accordingly			

R 25	National Societies and the IFRC need to ensure that all delegates arrive in Haiti with sufficient medication and vaccinations as they may not be available in country. Deploying NSs need to ensure this is information provided and verified in advance of travel.			
4: MANAGEMENT				
R 26 (page 23)	Develop a Haiti Support Cell at Zone level, with an adequate staff complement which should be empowered to make decisions and to find answers efficiently; and should work closely with and directly for the Haiti operation. Reporting to the Zone Director and the Secretary General in a matrix relationship, the Head of the Support Cell will have full authority and control over all aspects of the Zone's support functions for the Haiti operation. It should be time-limited and funded from the Haiti budgets. There should be regular and close interaction between the post-holders and the Haiti team, including regular field visits			
R 27	The Haiti Country Representative should be empowered to run the country operation and should be able to resource his/her support needs accordingly. S/he should be held accountable to deliver on the agreed plans and given the latitude and authority to make the decisions necessary			
R 28	Senior management in Geneva needs to agree the strategic directions with the Zone and then stand back and allow Panama and Haiti to deliver and be held accountable for that delivery, and support them as necessary			
POLICIES and PROCEDURES				
R 29 (page 23)	Ensure staff policies and procedures are known to the staff and printed copied are available in the Camp for reference purposes			
R 30	HR Geneva to ensure the policies and procedures published on the website are updated when they are amended			
R 31 (page 24)	The 'Principles and Rules' document needs to be better profiled by the IFRC and NSs during regular DP work, and it needs to become better understood and adhered to by the NSs themselves			
4b: MOVEMENT COORDINATION				
R 32 (page 26)	Ensure that expectations regarding the IFRC's coordinating role are clearly understood, and better reflected in job descriptions, action plans, and the work of all delegates;			
R 33	Further clarify what support services and supplementary services the IFRC Secretariat is obliged to provide to its membership, and sign the required agreements with the partners			
R 34	Ensure full implementation of the various coordination mechanisms included in the signed Movement Coordination Framework (SCC, MP, OCC, TC) plus the three additional leadership and coordination mechanisms, as necessary;			
R 35	While an IFRC coordination delegate for Léogane is being identified, place an acting delegate and/or establish a coordination mechanism that can be closely monitored from Port-au-Prince; and re-evaluate whether a delegate is needed in this position in Jacmel			
4c: EXTERNAL RELATIONS				
R 36 (page 27)	The Country Representative needs to concentrate on increased interaction beyond the RC Movement – closer and more regular links need to be established			

	and maintained with external agencies, the UN and the Government of Haiti;			
R 37	The Country Representative also needs to further explore possible link-ups with other partners on areas such as livelihoods interventions, where the RC Movement is traditionally weak, and ensure that the HNRCS is in agreement with this approach;			
R 38	Obtaining the Status Agreement should be considered a priority for the country delegation.			
4g: REPORTING and COMMUNICATIONS				
R 39 (page 30)	The FACT reporting delegate should be able to concentrate on reporting for the Team, and be supported by a dedicated communications cell at Zone level (see Recommendation #40) and/or a communications delegate within the FACT;			
R 40	In future large-scale emergencies, and if necessary (in terms of Zone capacity), consider placing a Communications Cell at the relevant Zone level to centrally handle all communications enquiries ... bring 'Geneva to the field' from the outset and run the communications from the Zone, thereby supporting and empowering the Zone in the longer term;			
R 41	In this operation, responsibility should be transferred to the Americas Zone under the guidance and support, but not the direct management or direction, of the Geneva Communications Department. The Panama Communications Team should be strengthened to enable this happen.			
5: DECISION MAKING (and the role of PADRU)				
R 42 (page 32)	The review of PADRU currently underway needs to analyse in detail the role the Unit has had in the Haiti response, and whether this is considered appropriate and acceptable to the IFRC Secretariat, to help produce informed decisions about PADRU's future			
6: OPPORTUNITIES, RISKS and CHALLENGES IN PROGRAMMING				
6(i)a: OD & Capacity Building				
R 43 (page 34)	Determine and clarify the OD roles and responsibilities within the IFRC's country and regional team			
R 44	Urgently find and place a suitable OD delegate(s) within the IFRC country team with clear milestones set on moving forward with the OD process			
R 45 (page 35)	PNSs should be brought back to their commitment of working in "a concerted approach" rather than along individual lines of engagement			
R 46	The HNRCS should accept that it has to actively address the needs to scale up in a number of key areas of management and support functions, and to move ahead to ensure they remain 'in the driving seat' as anticipated			
R 47	Consider the establishment of a Peer Learning Network of senior management of affected NSs who have the past and current experience of having to scale up and restructure following a major natural disaster			
6(i)b: Health				
R 48 (page 36)	Attendance at the Health Cluster meetings and better dissemination of the information gained there need to begin as soon as possible			
R 49	Ordering of medicines needs to be streamlined and suitable storage facilities			

	need to be found as a matter of urgency			
R 50	The Department in Geneva, in conjunction with the delegation management, health staff and PNSs in the field, will need to decide a policy to address the issue of charging for medical services and ensure this is disseminated to all partners			
6(i)c: Shelter				
R 51 (page 40)	For the IFRC, given the strategic importance of shelter issues, consideration should be given to the creating a specific shelter ERU capacity – as opposed to a subset of relief – which can be deployed early on during the response in all future disaster response. This would also help facilitate transition from emergency to transitional shelter			
R 52	A Movement shelter strategy incorporating a multi-pronged approach to shelter solutions for communities, which involves large-scale rubble clearance through cash for work, owner-built shelters, repairs to damaged houses, in-situ reconstruction where land deeds are clear, more work in outlying areas and linking shelter with livelihoods needs to be articulated and agreed by members of the Movement urgently			
R 53	In the light of the above (Recommendation #52) a new plan of action needs to be drawn up incorporating a multi-pronged approach to the shelter and livelihoods needs of the population. The plan needs to recognise that, unlike in the response to the Indian Ocean tsunami, in Haiti the TS will probably 'evolve' into permanent housing. More importantly, the plan also needs to recognise that delivering the TS will take more than 12 months, and therefore, for at least the next one year, the living conditions in the temporary shelters/tents will need to receive adequate attention from all humanitarian organisations;			
R 54	The IFRC needs to work with UNDP, the Government of Haiti and the Shelter Cluster to ensure that technical capacity is available for systematic hazard mapping of all houses and sites where TS/permanent houses will be built. (UNDP has already been supporting the Government on hazard assessment)			
6(i)d: Livelihoods				
R 55 (page 41)	The IFRC needs to immediately recruit and deploy a small team of delegates with expertise on livelihoods and cash grants who will work closely with the shelter team to design and implement a joined-up approach to shelter/livelihoods programming			
R 56	Additionally (or alternatively if Recommendation 56 proves impossible), the IFRC needs to explore external partnerships with more experienced NGOs or other agencies in consultation with the HNRCS.			
6(i)e: Water & Sanitation				
R 57 (page 43)	Through better integrated planning with other sectors, and more coordination with the main governmental authority DINEPA, work towards scaling back the distribution of free services needs to be developed and implemented			
R 58	Urgently strengthen the IFRC WatSan team with the necessary staff			
R 59	Continue to engage with all other WASH sector Agencies and with the Government authorities at the highest levels to determine a coordinated, realistic and timely strategy for exiting from the ongoing heavy 'relief' commitments			

R 60	With the departure of ERUs, the IFRC needs to bolster its own watsan implementation capacity in particular as the current watsan facilities may not be able to cope with the hurricane season rains and would require massive upgrading and maintenance			
6(i)f: Protection				
R 61 (page 44)	It should be verified that all staff have signed and understand the Staff Code of Conduct and a zero tolerance policy (on sexual and gender-based violence) should be made clear and enforced; this should be reinforced at orientation sessions held on arrival in base camp			
R 62	Due to the known increase of GBV in the aftermath of disasters, gender issues should be systematically included in disaster response plans and staffing			
6(ii): DP and DRR				
R 63 (page 46)	Implement the recommendations regarding contingency planning made in the RAT report in collaboration with the HNRCS (see details in the text, page 38)			

Annex Seven: Red Cross/Red Crescent Commitment to Haiti - Montreal, Canada

The International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, with 23 National Societies, the IFRC and ICRC, gathered in Montreal, Canada, on 9-10 February 2010. We solemnly expressed our profound sorrow for the devastating loss of life following the significant earthquake that impacted Haiti on 12 January 2010. As a group, we paid special tribute to the resilience, strength and courage of the staff and volunteers Haitian Red Cross and reaffirmed our solidarity with them throughout the concrete and effective actions in the relief, and recovery process.

The needs are immense and the Haitian people continue to suffer from the impact of the earthquake. We resolved to remain swift and steadfast in our support. Our primary concern is to ensure life saving and life sustaining actions are based on our Fundamental Principles and the vision of sustainable recovery. We will continue to urgently respond to pressing requirements in the most affected populations. We reiterated our commitment to undertake a coordinated, coherent and comprehensive approach to meeting Haiti's immediate and longer-term needs, to be aligned with the strategic aims and enabling actions of the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies' Strategy 2020. Together, we are fully committed to sustainably building strong and resilient communities that meet the legitimate and long-held aspirations of the Haitian people.

The relief and recovery needs are bigger than any single organization and therefore this work is to be done in coordination with and in complement to, other sectors (governments, UN, national actors). This is to be done in recognition of the Movement's limited resources and the appropriate role of government to rebuild Haiti. The combined Movement response is planning to support the needs of 80,000 families (approximately 400,000 people). As of 5 February 2010, the Movement has provided health services for at least 13,000 people – with over 1,600 people currently being treated each day. Over 37,000 families have received non-food relief items. As well, nearly 20,000 households have received some type of shelter material, such as tarpaulins, rope, shelter tool kits and tents.

Over 15 million litres of drinking water have been distributed, 300,000 people are currently receiving water each day, and sanitation interventions are being carried out in nine transitional settlements by the Red Cross Red Crescent. Disaster affected individuals and households are also being assisted through livelihood substitution activities, while taking into account the importance of strengthening the economic security of households and supporting the local economy.

The following principles will guide our joint contribution to Haiti's relief, recovery and development:

Ownership: Haitians own their future. We will respect and work with the Haitian Red Cross, and will align with their priorities in their role as auxiliary to government, and support them on the participation of nation-wide platforms to manage the response and recovery.

Inclusiveness: We will reach out. We will adhere to a community-based approach so that those affected will drive their own recovery based on their humanitarian needs and capacity while ensuring protection and dignity.

Unity: We are one movement, running one operation. Building on our strengths, we will define priority programs and responsibilities. We agree and commit to respect Movement coordination mechanisms with an inclusive and transparent approach. All Movement components agree to uphold the Movement's Fundamental Principles, and in particular neutrality, independence, and impartiality.

Coordination: We will ensure a well coordinated effort with other partners and our stakeholders in Haiti and home, recognizing that our collective efforts will have a greater impact than a series of individual ones. We will use the skills and knowledge of others. We will coordinate and, as appropriate, share information with each other, and relevant partners in our own countries.

Effectiveness: We will deliver based on needs and our capacity to meet the needs. We will focus our efforts based on our competencies and global reach. We will review on an ongoing basis the lessons learned and apply these to our operations.

Sustainability: We commit to building local capacity. The cornerstone of sustainability is the Haitian Red Cross and its volunteers. A concerted approach in supporting the Haitian Red Cross to build its capacity and their role in civil society in light of the context is needed.

Accountability: We will be accountable. Transparency, accountability and communication to beneficiaries, public, donors and governments, including in the allocation and management of resources, will be an integral part of our joint approach. We will establish robust tracking and evaluation systems to assess performance and measure results.

Priority areas

In recognition of the extraordinary needs of the Haitian people, the Movement expects to maintain its integrated emergency relief efforts for up to 12 months. Taking into account the specific core competencies and resources of the Movement, we will deliver integrated assistance in the following priority areas:

Capacity Building: Recognizing the history and critical role of the Haitian Red Cross in civil society, the Movement commits to assist executing a Plan of Action to be developed by the Haitian Red Cross. Capacity building efforts will have the short-term objective of increasing the Society's ability to respond to the impending hurricane season, as well as the long-term objective of rebuilding and expanding its capacity.

Health: The Movement will continue to provide curative health services for a catchment area of at least 500,000 residents of Port-au-Prince and the surrounding area for at least six months. This complements ongoing community-based health programs, such as first aid, psychosocial assistance, disease prevention and may later include blood collection.

Shelter: Based on input from the Haitian community and the need to urgently develop and deploy suitable shelters for the rainy and hurricane seasons, the Movement will seek to provide, as quickly as possible, approximately 30,000 families with appropriate transitional shelters.

Water and Sanitation: Integrated with community shelter, health and other facilities, the Movement will continue to provide water to over 30,000 families each day during the relief phase. We seek to scale up emergency sanitation facilities to a comparable number of families.

Protection: Recognizing the specific needs of vulnerable populations, such as women and children during the relief phase of our operation, the Movement will closely work with Haitian governmental authorities and the Protection Cluster members to actively assist: unaccompanied children to restore links with their families while assuring the appropriate use of technology, in the prevention of violence against children and women, and in the identification and orderly disposal of mortal remains.

In delivering the assistance described above, the Movement recognizes the responsibility placed upon it by our donors to effectively and efficiently provide relief and recovery assistance to the full extent of the Movement's collective resources. The Movement furthermore commits to proactively and effectively communicate to all stakeholders in an open and transparent basis.